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Abstract 
This dissertation identifies and criticises a fundamental characteristic of the philosophical 
discourse surrounding the animal issue: the underlying anthropocentric reasoning that informs 
the accounts of both philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Such reasoning works from 
human paradigms as the only possible starting point of the analysis.  
Accordingly, the aim of my dissertation is to show how anthropocentric reasoning 
and its implications distort the inquiry of the animal debate. In extracting the erroneous biases 
from the debate, my project enables an important shift in the starting line of the philosophical 
inquiry of the animal issue. 
In chapters one and two, I focus on philosophy of mind. I show how philosophical 
accounts that are based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning are inattentive to the relevant 
empirical findings regarding animals' mental capacities. Employing a conceptual line of 
argument, I demonstrate that starting the analysis from a human paradigm creates a rigid 
conceptual framework that unjustifiably excludes the possibility of associating the relevant 
empirical findings in the research. Furthermore, I show how the common approaches to the 
issue of animals' belief and intentions deny that animals can have these capacities, and I 
demonstrate how such denials can be avoided.  
The philosophical discourse that I examine denies intentional mental capacities to 
animals. Such denials take place, I maintain, because the analysis is anthropocentric: it uses 
humans' most sophisticated capacities as the only possible benchmark for evaluating animals' 
mental abilities. A central example of such anthropocentric reasoning is the oft-mentioned 
view that there is a necessary link between language and intentionality. Such a link indeed 
characterises humans. Yet the claim that there is no intentionality without language is a 
problematic framework for analysing the supposed intentionality of non-linguistic and pre-
linguistic creatures. Employing a standard that applies to normal, adult humans excludes the 
possibility of animals' intentionality from the outset. It seems, however, that intentionality is a 
capacity that evolves in stages, and that simple intentional mental states do not require 
language. At the same time, such an analysis ignores, to a large extent, cases of attributing 
intentionality to pre-linguistic humans and even normal, adult humans. Thus, I show how the 
denial that animals may have intentional mental capacities results in a double standard.  
In chapters three to six, I critically examine the anthropocentric nature of the debate 
concerning animals' moral status. The anthropocentric reasoning relates to the conditions of 
moral status in an oversimplified manner. I show that human prototypes, e.g., rational agency 
and autonomy, have mistakenly served as conditions for either moral status in general or of a 
particular type. Seemingly, using such conditions excludes from the proffered moral domain 
not only animals, but also human moral patients. Yet eventually only animals are excluded 
from the proffered moral domain. I identify and criticise the manoeuvre that enables this 
outcome. That is, although the proffered conditions are based on individual characteristics of 
moral agents, they are applied in a collective manner in order to include human moral patients 
in the moral domain under examination. I also show that when animals are granted moral 
status, this status appears to be subjugated by human needs and interests, and therefore the 
very potential to substantiate animal moral status becomes problematic. 
Significantly, I also criticise arguments in favour of animals' moral status, claiming 
that they sustain the oversimplified nature of the inquiry, hence reproducing the major 
problems of the arguments they were originally designed to refute. As part of my critique 
towards both such arguments and anthropocentric reasoning, I suggest a non-anthropocentric 
framework that avoids oversimplification with regard to the conditions of moral status. The 
aspiration of anthropocentric reasoning as well as of pro-animals philosophers is to find a 
common denominator that is allegedly shared by all members of the moral community as the 
single foundation of moral status, which consists of individual characteristics. My framework 
challenges this aspiration by showing that this common denominator cannot account for all 
cases. The framework that I suggest enables establishing moral statuses upon distinctive 
foundations, and at the same time, my proposal avoids falling into the trap of speciesism. 
 i
Acknowledgments 
This project benefited from the guidance of my supervisors Richard Holton and Elinor Mason. 
Richard accompanied the project from its early stages. His engaging and useful comments 
helped me transform my ideas into a systematic discussion. Elinor joined at a later stage of 
my work and prompted me to sharpen my points. Thanks also to Denis Walsh who provided 
guidance in different stages of my research. 
 
Special thanks to Jeffrey Ketland, David Levy, and Michael Ridge for their helpful feedback 
and advice. 
 
I would also like to thank my examiners, Andy Clark and Michael Wheeler.  
 
I have benefited from discussions with the staff of the department of Philosophy at the 
University of Edinburgh, in private and during 'work in progress' seminars. My friend and 
colleague Julian Kiverstein provided insightful comments on several chapters.  
 
The University of Edinburgh and the Overseas Research Students (ORS) Award Scheme 
Committee provided financial support for this project. This research could not have been 
completed without their generous assistance.  
 
Ronald de Sousa and Elizabeth Anderson provided illuminating feedback on drafts of the first 
chapter. Thanks also to the participants of the European Society for Philosophy and 
Psychology congress (Italy, 2003), and to the participants of the International conference on 
Davidson—'Reflections on Davidson' (Israel, 2004), for helpful discussions.  
 
Thanks to my friends Kirsten Scott and Georgie Badakshan for language editing of extensive 
parts of this monograph. 
 
Yofi Tirosh, my wife and soul-mate, has been a committed reader and an attentive, yet fierce, 
critic. Her honest and insistent feedback was invaluable. 
 
Special and deep thanks to my beloved sister, Tal Kohavi. For always being there for me 
and…for many other things as well.  
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Rivka (Riva) and Shaul Kohavi, with love, 




Table of Content 
 
Preface          1  
Chapter 1 
One Strand in the Animal Mind Discourse     7 
I.  Introduction        7 
II.  Anthropocentric A Priori Reasoning and Empirical Findings  9 
     A. Kenny on Intentionality      10 
     B. Leahy on Self-Awareness      13 
III.  Revisiting Davidson's Position on Animal Belief and Surprise  16 
IV.  A Critique of Davidson's Argument     19 
    A. Being Surprised and the Knowledge of Being Surprised  19 
     B. Elaborations on Surprise      24 
V.  Holism and Intensionality      29 
VI.  How My Argument Damages Anthropocentric A Priori Reasoning  33 
     A.  My Proposal (Revisited) and Relevant Empirical Findings  34 
     B. Every Debate has (At Least) Two Sides    36 
     C. Explanatory Value       40 
VII.  Conclusion        43 
Chapter 2 
Indeterminacy of Content and Sceptical Atmosphere     47 
I.  Introduction        47 
II.  The Asymmetry Thesis       49 
III.  Indeterminacy of Content: The General Reasoning   51 
IV. Similarity between Networks of Intentional States    56 
     A. Premise 1        57 
     B. Premise 2        58 
V. Epistemological Circularity      61 
VI. How Actual Doubt Comes into Play     67 
VII.  Conclusion        70 
Chapter 3  
Moral Status in the Mirror of Anthropocentrism    73 
I.  Introduction        73 
II.  Moral Status        75 
     A. Aspects of Moral Status      75 
     B. Conditions for Moral Status      76 
    C. Moral Status and Moral Rights: A Note on Terminology  78 
1. Moral Rights as a Specific Moral Domain   79 
2. Moral Rights as Specification of Moral Entitlements  80 
III.  Anthropocentrism and Conditions of Moral Status   83 
     A. Kant        84 
     B. Carruthers        86 
     C. Rawls        87 
     D. Summary        89 
IV.  Shifting the Centre of Gravity      90 
    A. The Transition to Collective Conditions    91 
      1. Kant        91 
     2. Rawls       93 
 3. Fox        99 
    B. Where does all this Leave Animals?     100 
V.  Conclusion        103 
 iii
Chapter 4          
Animals' Moral Status and Duties       105 
I.  Introduction        105 
II.  Animals as Objects of Welfare      107 
     A. Rawls on Duties towards Animals     108 
    B. Fox: Against Duties towards Animals    112 
     C. Rawls' and Fox's Problematic Accounts on     
        Animal Moral Consideration     116 
 1. Rawls       117 
 2. Fox        119 
III. Anthropocentric Reasoning and the Complexity of Morality  122 
IV.  Substantiating Animals' Moral Status     128 
     A. Revisiting the Problem of Substantiating Animals' Moral Status 129 
    B. Direct Duties towards Animals     130 
    C. Moral Theory and Moral Practice: A Possible Objection  135 
V.  Conclusion        138 
 
Chapter 5  
The Scope of the Arguments from Marginal Cases    140 
I.  Introduction        140 
II.  The Background Principles of the AMC     142 
III.  Two Versions of AMC       144 
     A. The Negative AMC      144 
  1. Moral Consistency      145 
  2. Refuting the Conditional of the AMC    146 
     B. The Positive AMC       147 
1. Moral Consistency      148 
  2. Refuting the Conditional of the AMC    148 
IV. The AMC and its Argumentative Framework    150 
     A. The Negative AMC and Traditional Anthropocentric    
          Reasoning        151 
     B. The Positive AMC and the Sustenance of Traditional 
         Reasoning        152 
V. A Broad Condition for Moral Status     155 
     A. Example A: Behaving Morally towards the Dead  
         and Human Corpses      157  
     B. Example B: Relational Value     158 
VI.  Possible Objections       159 
    A. Objection to Example A      159 
 1. The Moral Relevance of Respecting the Dead   159 
 2. Respecting the Dead and Moral Intuitions   162 
    B. Objection to Example B      167 
 1. The Status of Relational Value     167 
 2. Impartiality and Partiality     169 
     C. Summary: Reconsidering the Relationship between    
         the Positive AMC and Traditional Reasoning   177 





Human, Animals, and Human Society      183 
I.  Introduction        183 
II. Revisiting the Refutation of the AMC's Conditional   184 
III.  The Background Theories      186 
     A. The Moral Convictions Embedded in Anthropocentric Reasoning 187 
     B. The Case of Human versus the Case of Animals   190 
     C. How does all this Concern the AMC?    193 
IV. Bond-Forming as an Element Underlying Human Society   194 
     A. Humans as Bond-Forming Creatures and the Context  
         of Human Society       195 
     B. The 'Russian Doll Effect'      201 
     C. An Objection and a Reply      206 
     D. The Case of Pets and Bond-Forming    210 
     E. The Outcome of Refuting the AMC's Conditional   213 
V. Speciesism and Discrimination      216 
VI.  Conclusion        224 
 
Conclusion          227 
 
Bibliography         238 
 v
Preface 
de Beauvoir: You've never liked animals. 
Sartre:        Oh, but I have, to some extent.  
    Dogs and cats. 
de Beauvoir: Not much. 
Sartre:        Animals. As I see it they are  
    a philosophical  problem. Basically.1
 
 
My primary aim in this dissertation is to identify and criticise a central narrative in the 
philosophical discourse about animals. The central narrative is established upon 
anthropocentric reasoning, i.e., reasoning that considers human paradigms as the only 
standard for attributing either mental capacity or moral status to animals. Using such 
standards, anthropocentric reasoning segregates humans from animals by focusing only on the 
differences between them. For instance, anthropocentric reasoning maintains that a common 
property supposedly shared by all humans and only humans is a necessary condition for moral 
status (either moral status in general or moral status of a particular kind). Consequently, 
animals, in addition to many human moral patients, do not satisfy the required condition and 
thus cannot be included in the relevant moral domain. In fact, as we shall see, this situation 
affects mostly animals. 
The common reply to anthropocentric reasoning maintains that animals should be 
endowed with moral status. The methodology of this counter-reasoning is to connect the 
human case with the animal case by concentrating only on the similarities between them. Both 
positions, I argue, oversimplify the issue of moral status. Additionally, the counter-reasoning 
is distorted as a result of the original anthropocentric view. Thus, one of this project's central 
aims is to identify the implicit connection between anthropocentric moral reasoning and its 
counter-reasoning, and to critically examine the common reply to anthropocentric reasoning 
with regard to animals' moral status. 
 
*** 
                                                 
1 Simone de Beauvoir, from Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre (1981, 316). 
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This dissertation consists of six chapters. Each chapter delves into a particular problematic 
element of the animal debate. 
The first chapter examines the gap between anthropocentric a priori reasoning and 
empirical findings concerning animals' mental capacities. On the one hand, it is commonly 
argued that only language users can have intentional mental capacities (such as beliefs). On 
the other hand, empirical findings, although they might still be deficient and subject to 
multiple interpretations, suggest that despite the fact that animals are languageless, they may 
have intentional mental capacities that underlie abilities such as hiding, waylaying, and 
calling for attention. Pointing at this gap enables me to highlight a problematic strand in the 
animal mind discourse—a strand that enables the inattention to empirical findings and the 
dismissal of seemingly sophisticated behaviour of animals from the research. My aim, 
however, is not to find the 'correct' interpretation of empirical findings, but rather, through 
conceptual analysis, to identify the mistakes of anthropocentric reasoning. I argue that 
anthropocentric reasoning denies that animals are capable of having mental capacities such as 
beliefs, relying on a standard that is based on a human paradigm and is thus suitable only for 
normal, adult humans. In this chapter, I also illuminate the low explanatory value of this 
reasoning.  
The second chapter explores conceptual and epistemological aspects of the animal 
mind debate. In contrast to the common view, I argue that in the relevant aspects, there is no 
categorical difference between humans and animals in terms of the way in which we justify 
the attribution of intentional mental states. The chapter is framed by a comparison between 
the human case and the animal case, through which I systematically examine the different 
kinds of doubts employed in each case, focusing on the issue of indeterminacy of content. In 
this context, the epistemological problem of other minds and the conceptual problem 
concerning the conditions of intentional states represent two sides of the same coin: the latter 
concerns the conditions for having mental states that consist of determinate content and the 
former concerns the observer's ability to ascribe determinate content to mental states. I 
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demonstrate that the problem of indeterminacy of content in cases that are not based on 
human paradigms is as applicable to normal, adult humans as it is to animals.   
In chapter three, I demonstrate that the issue of moral status—whether in general or 
of a particular type—is also obscured by anthropocentric reasoning. Significant to my 
argument is the distinction between moral agents and moral patients. My aim in using this 
distinction is very specific: I wish to show that although the distinction is well-established, 
anthropocentric reasoning fails to address it properly. This failure renders a shift in the 
spotlight of the debate: it brings the argument away from focusing on the differences between 
moral agents and moral patients to focusing on the differences between human beings and 
animals. A crucial consequence of this shift is that although anthropocentric reasoning aims to 
segregate the case of humans' moral status from that of animals, this segregation is done using 
the standard of adult, normal human beings. In other words, applying the first chapter's line of 
argument to the debate over animals' moral status, I argue that human paradigmatic 
characteristics (e.g., rational agency or autonomy) have been mistakenly employed as the only 
conditions of either moral status in general or of specific types of moral status (e.g., the status 
of rights-holders). Such reasoning oversimplifies the nature of the inquiry by not sufficiently 
addressing the complexity of morality. Additionally, such reasoning converges into the idea 
of denying moral status (either in general or of a particular type) to animals because they are 
not moral agents. I also argue that anthropocentric reasoning does not manage to show that 
animals are not moral patients. The surprising consequences of this insight to human moral 
patients are elucidated in this chapter as well. 
Chapter four examines cases in which animals are excluded from a particular moral 
domain, but not from the moral community, and thus are still considered moral patients who 
are entitled to well-being. The accounts that I examine in that respect are problematic in that 
they acknowledge animals' moral considerability, while apparently not grounding it in any 
securing status. Moreover, it appears that according to these accounts, animal needs and 
interests are subjugated to human needs and interests. Thus, it is unclear how animal needs 
and interests can be taken into account and how we can substantiate their moral status. Once 
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again, I trace the source of these problems to anthropocentric reasoning. My aim in this 
project is not to justify animal moral status. However, I demonstrate that the recognition 
within the accounts I examine, that animals are morally considerable, entails that humans 
have direct duties to animals. Even if animal moral status is limited, it still regulates minimal 
standards that are meant to protect the basic needs and interests of animals from being 
frustrated. Direct duties towards animals substantiate the moral status with which they are 
endowed. 
Chapter five focuses on the argument from marginal cases (i.e., the argument 
referring to humans such as the mentally handicapped or the senile). This argument 
emphasises the similarities between individual characteristics of humans—characteristics that 
are said to form the criterion for moral status—and individual characteristics of animals, via 
marginal cases. The idea is that for every proffered condition that supposedly separates the 
human case from the animal case with regard to moral status, it is possible to show that there 
are some humans (i.e., marginal cases) who do not satisfy this condition. Accordingly, the 
attempt is to establish a broad criterion for moral status—such as sentience—that can be 
applied to all humans and to the relevant animals. My in-depth analysis of this argument 
recognises its advantages. However, it also leads to the conclusion that this argument 
reconstructs the oversimplified nature of the inquiry of moral status that I traced with regard 
to anthropocentric reasoning in the preceding chapters. Whereas anthropocentric reasoning 
focuses only on the differences between humans and animals, the argument from marginal 
cases focuses only on their similarities. This rationale of the argument from marginal cases, I 
argue, can be identified in the conditional that if all human beings deserve moral status, then 
so do some animals. Both attitudes, however, are one-dimensional in that they attempt to base 
moral status upon a single criterion, and to base this criterion for moral status on individual 
characteristics. As with anthropocentric reasoning, I demonstrate that this argument 
oversimplifies the complexity of morality and is thus exposed to exceptions for which it does 
not account, and hence cannot single-handedly provide a satisfying foundation for moral 
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status. By this stage, it would be clear that the distorted reasoning plaguing the issue of 
animals' moral status has affected both sides of the debate. 
Chapter six argues that although the proponent of the argument from marginal cases 
maintains that refuting the conditional if all human beings deserve moral status, then so do 
some animals represents speciesism, this is not necessarily true. I suggest a balanced position 
whose seed I sow earlier: I propose that both humans and relevant animals can have moral 
status, while separating the human case from the animal case, arguing that usually humans 
and animal moral status are embedded in different foundations. The salient exception to this 
separation is the case of pets. I argue that the moral status of pets can indeed be established on 
the same foundation of human moral status. Separating the cases of humans and pets from the 
case of other animals is possible because my account enables establishing moral status on 
more than a single condition. Yet I carry out this separation without employing an 
anthropocentric approach or speciesist reasoning. I maintain that different background 
theories underlie the issue of humans' and animals' moral status. These theories affect our 
moral practice in a way that should be taken into consideration in formulating the criteria for 
moral status. For instance, I show that our background theory in the human case has already 
granted moral status to all humans, even if they are incompetent, and that this can be justified 
on non-speciesist grounds. I argue that the bond-forming inclination of human beings is the 
element that underlies this background theory, and that it cannot be reduced to one's 
individual characteristics since it relates to society as a whole. I suggest that this element is 
the relevant criterion for moral status both in the case of humans and in the case of pets, and 
demonstrate its explanatory value. Although the criterion of bond-forming is usually 
irrelevant to non-pet animals, I nonetheless contend that other criteria are available for their 
case. In addition to avoiding blatant exceptions with regard to moral patients, the main 
advantage of my proposal is that it provides a case for humans' and animals' moral status in a 




This project does not deal with applied ethics, and in accordance with its purpose, it does not 
aim to provide particular normative standards concerning the interrelationships between 
humans and animals or to provide a list of do's and don'ts with regard to animals. It is 
significant to note that this project aims to identify basic faults in the ways we approach the 
animal issue, faults that influence our arguments and shape the debate over animal mind and 
moral status. In this sense, this project aims to 'clear the ground' in order to enable further 
developments in the research, aspiring to facilitate the creation of new ways of approaching 
the animal debate. As long as the ways of thinking that I expose and criticise throughout this 
dissertation dominate the research, there is little prospect for non-anthropocentric theories to 
be taken seriously. 
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Chapter 1 
 One Strand in the Animal Mind Discourse 
It is extremely difficult for a sophisticated member  
of a sophisticated society to grasp a very simple  
and primitive form of life: in a way he must  
jettison his sophistication, a process which is  
itself perhaps the ultimate in sophistication.1  
 
I. Introduction 
It is not uncommon to find positions in philosophical literature that deny that animals are 
capable of having mental capacities such as beliefs, intentionality, or consciousness. Even in 
20th-century literature, one can still find doubts regarding the existence of pain in animals 
(Harrison, 1991). These positions are occasionally based on the accusation that pro-animal 
philosophers are highly emotional and intuitive,2 or anthropomorphic (Davidson, 1975, 155).3 
In most cases, however, positions denying animals' mental capacities are based on the claim 
that animals lack language.4 Some have denied these mental capacities by rejecting 
behavioural resemblance between humans and animals as well as the similarity between the 
nervous systems of humans and animals on the grounds that such empirical findings are 
insufficient as evidence. Others dispute evolutionary theory (Harrison, 1991), projective 
imagination, simulation (Stich and Nichols, 1995), and the argument from analogy by arguing 
that these methodologies are conceptually flawed. Whether or not charges against arguments 
ascribing mental capacities to animals are justified, the immediate result is a great rift 
between the suggested a priori reasoning on the one hand and empirical findings on the other. 
My aim in this chapter is not to defend the claim that animals possess mental 
capacities such as beliefs and thoughts. Rather, my aim is to uncover a strand that plays a 
major role in the animal mind discourse: the rift between anthropocentric a priori reasoning 
                                                 
1 Peter Winch, from "Understanding a Primitive Society" (1972, 37). 
2 Fox (1986, 13); Frey (1880, 84); Carruthers (2000, 199). 
3 The charge of anthropomorphism that appears in the literature might also imply that testing analgesics 
on animals might be considered anthropomorphic as well. However, this charge usually appears 
without any consideration that anthropomorphism might be useful. For the usefulness of 
anthropomorphism in science, see Rollin (1997). 





on the one hand, and the empirical findings on the other. I will argue that an anthropocentric 
analysis—that is, an analysis that relates to mental capacities according to the paradigmatic 
standard of the language user—makes itself immune to empirical findings concerning, for 
instance, alleged sophisticated behaviour of animals. Deciphering this manoeuvre is at the 
heart of this chapter.  
By 'empirical findings' I refer to data from cognitive ethology, comparative 
psychology, comparative biology, or even an intelligent common sense, that is based on 
observation and experiments. This data is an indication for something, but whether or not it is 
an indication of X depends on how one interprets it. For instance, according to certain 
interpretations, empirical findings may suggest evidence for the existence of certain mental 
capacities, but at the same time other interpretations might be available as well.  
By 'a priori reasoning', I refer to a methodology that purports to establish the 
conditions for the possession of mental capacities from reflection. Descartes' Meditations is a 
good example of a priori reasoning. My critique, however, is not directed towards a priori 
reasoning in general, but only towards a particular kind of this reasoning, i.e., anthropocentric 
a priori reasoning.5
As I will demonstrate, the conclusion that results from the reasoning I have sketched 
above, namely that animals cannot have beliefs, intentionality, and conscious mental states, is 
enabled by a philosophical misconception that is founded on an anthropocentric approach to 
animal minds: it is based on the human paradigm as the only possible standard for attribution 
of certain mental capacities. I will also demonstrate how arguments that are based on 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning facilitate the inattention to empirical findings, although I do 
not argue that the latter should prevail over a priori reasoning. My primary line of argument in 
this regard is based on conceptual analysis. 
I first establish my argument through a brief examination of texts by Anthony Kenny 
and Michael Leahy. These texts illuminate the blind spots in the prevailing philosophical 
discourse regarding animals' mental capacities. I then proceed to conduct a critical analysis of 
                                                 




Donald Davidson's account of animal belief, which will occupy most of this chapter. Finally, I 
will critically examine my own argument. While elaborating on the problem of how to 
interpret empirical findings, I will emphasise how my argument damages the reasoning that I 
have criticised.  
 
II. Anthropocentric A Priori Reasoning and Empirical Findings 
It is commonly held that the mastery of language justifies the ascription of certain mental 
capacities to humans. Adult humans possess language, which is considered a necessary 
condition for mental states such as thoughts and beliefs: the idea is that language enables the 
very capacity for these states. For instance, you cannot think about your belief as a belief or as 
your belief if you do not know what belief is, and do not have mastery of the term 'belief'. 
However, in the case of animals, we face a conceptual problem: although animals can 
communicate, they lack language in the relevant sense of the concept, and thus they 
supposedly lack the necessary conditions for mental capacities such as belief. Thus, animals' 
lack of language is said to set a conceptual barrier to having certain mental capacities.6 This is 
an anthropocentric a priori reasoning because it bases the idea that animals do not have 
certain mental capacities on the human paradigm of being a 'language user'.  
I do not argue that anthropocentric a priori reasoning ignores any empirical findings 
whatsoever, and such a claim would be false. Indeed, the very claim that animals lack 
language, or a certain kind of language, is partially based on empirical observations of 
animals. This, however, does not harm my argument since I am concerned with cases in 
which the very issue is the alleged sophisticated behaviour of animals, given that they are 
either languageless or lacking the kind of language that is allegedly required for the mental 
capacity in question. In other words, a possible reply to my contention regarding 
                                                 
6 An additional problem concerns the indeterminacy of content. Humans can express themselves with 
propositions, and thus we can supposedly determine the content of their beliefs, and hence justify that 
they hold mental capacities such as beliefs and higher-order representations. That is, their linguistic 
behaviour supplies the content of these mental states. Animals lack language, and therefore, 





anthropocentric a priori reasoning, the reply that the conclusion that animals are languageless 
is empirically based, would not have consequences for my argument. Moreover, note that the 
need to provide an explanation for the alleged sophisticated behaviour of animals arises 
precisely because animals are languageless: my very point is that even though animals do not 
have language in the relevant sense of the concept, empirical findings still suggest that they 
may have certain mental capacities that originally were said to require language. Thus, the 
gap between the empirical findings in this respect and anthropocentric a priori reasoning 
about what these findings suggest about animal minds demands attention.7 It is important to 
note that I do not argue that empirical findings take precedence over a priori reasoning in 
general nor over anthropocentric a priori reasoning in particular, but rather that one should 
attempt to incorporate the relevant empirical finding in the research, and that this cannot be 
done once one is arguing from anthropocentric a priori reasoning. 
By way of illustration, I will consider the arguments of Anthony Kenny and Michael 
Leahy.  
 
A. Kenny on Intentionality 
Kenny attributes wants to animals, but differentiates between wants and intentionality. He 
argues as follows:  
The capacity for intentional action is the same thing as the 
capacity to act for reasons. It is because they lack the 
capacity to act for reasons that non-human animals lack the 
capacity for intentional action.  
Intentional action presupposes language in the same way as 
self-consciousness presupposes language. […] Fido [the 
dog] may scratch to get at the bone, and his scratching 
manifests his desire to get at the bone; but there is nothing 
within his [behavioural] repertoire to express that he is 
scratching because he wants to get at the bone. (1989, 39) 
 
Kenny appeals to intentional acts as they are defined in relation to humans. It is true that 
lacking language, animals can neither verbalise reasons for action, even after the act has taken 
place, nor can they verbalise them in principle. Kenny appeals to a standard that only humans 
                                                 
7 In most cases philosophers are aware of the empirical findings, but—crucially—they manifest an 




share, i.e., the capacity to verbalise reasons for actions and to reflect upon them; thus, he 
directly links intentionality to human language and therefore concludes that ascribing 
intentional acts to animals is flawed with anthropomorphism. Kenny's appeal to the capacity 
to verbalise reasons (a capacity for which language is a necessary condition) as the only 
standard is an example of anthropocentric a priori reasoning. By appealing exclusively to 
linguistic ability without considering alternatives, Kenny excludes from the outset any 
possibility that some animals might perform intentional acts that might not require language 
like that of humans and that would not completely match paradigmatic human intentionality.  
More importantly, Kenny's account indirectly excludes the possibility that animals 
can have intentional states such as desires and beliefs because they are directed towards an 
object:8 his account implies that because animals lack language, they cannot verbalise the 
object of such intentional state, and this, supposedly, implies that the dog cannot even want or 
desire to eat.9 I do not contest Kenny's claim that the ability to act for reasons that one can 
verbalise is the paradigm of volition, i.e., that the paradigm of wanting is linguistic (1989, 
37). It does seem reasonable, however, to understand intentionality as a generic concept that 
encapsulates many types of volitional states; some of these states do not require linguistic 
capacities and could be attributed to animals.10 The issue here, nonetheless, is not 
terminological. There are many cases in which it will be hard to ignore the sophistication of 
animals' actions, especially due to the gap between such actions and animals' other simple 
actions. 
Consider, for instance, cases of alleged deception. De Waal reports cases of deception 
in chimpanzees (1996, 75-78). In its full meaning, as De Waal claims, deception requires 
awareness of the way in which others see the actions of the deceiver, and the intention that 
others may attribute to him. De Waal reports that while seeing a stranger approaching their 
                                                 
8 One must note, however, that Kenny definitely does not mean this, and actually attributes to animals 
desires (see the quote above) as well as simple thoughts (1989, 39 and 127). It is worth noting that 
Kenny's attitude concerning animals' mental capacities is relatively positive. 
9 As we shall see in due course, Davidson partially takes this line of argument.  
10 One can think of unconscious cases of intentionality. Horgan and Woodward (1985, 157-158) hold 




cage, many chimpanzees will fill their mouth with water, and will wait as if everything is as 
usual until they are able to splash the water on the 'intruder'. He also reports that some of the 
chimpanzees have managed to manipulate people who expected this behaviour from them: the 
chimpanzee, pretending to be busy with something else, conceals the fact that he has water in 
his mouth, but turns around at the right moment in order to splash the water. Similar cases of 
allegedly sophisticated behaviour concerning deception, manipulation and pretense, are 
reported by Byrne and Whiten (1988).11
Importantly, De Waal is not bound by a claim that apes cannot perform acts of 
deception because they lack language. At the same time he does not argue that these examples 
represent cases of deception in its full meaning. Once one is not bound to the human 
paradigm, one can raise alternative ways to provide a satisfying interpretation to certain 
empirical findings that may provide us with an explanation unavailable to those who work 
exclusively from the human paradigm. It is clear that for many examples with a particular 
interpretation, there exist also counter-interpretations. However, the issue here is that a 
dispute over the correct interpretation of animal behaviour is irrelevant for those who work 
from the human paradigm, unless the behaviour is linguistic in the full-fledged meaning of the 
concept.12 In order to make such a dispute relevant one first needs to consider alternatives to 






                                                 
11 See also De Waal (1982, 62-63); Allen and Bekoff (1997, ch.6). 
12 Dennett quotes the following example, which was sent to him: "One evening I was sitting in a chair 
at my home, the only chair my dog is allowed to sleep in. The dog was lying in front of me, 
whimpering. She was getting nowhere in her trying to 'convince' me to give up the chair to her. Her 
next move is the most interesting, nay, the only interesting part of the story. She stood up, and went to 
the front door where I could still easily see her. She scratched the door, giving me the impression that 
she had given up trying to get the chair and had decided to go out. However as soon as I reached the 
door to let her out, she ran back across the room and climbed into her chair, the chair she had 'forced' 
me to leave" (1976, 183). In this example, in contrast to Kenny's claim, it seems that the dog's 





B. Leahy on Self-Awareness 
In dealing with animals' consciousness and self-consciousness, Michael Leahy argues in a 
similar vein to Kenny:  
Self-awareness even in an absolutely minimal form, is not 
merely to recognise oneself, but to be aware of recognising 
oneself as oneself, with much of what that implies.  
(1991, 145) 
 
Leahy's argument is anthropocentric in that it takes the case of human adults to be the only 
possible standard for self-awareness. I do not argue that animals can be self-conscious in the 
same way that humans are; I do not claim that a dog could think about himself as himself, or 
even think literally that his master is at the door. However, Leahy argues from the 
paradigmatic case of humans, in which one can think about oneself consciously. In this case 
one can make oneself the object of one's thought. Only the adult human who possesses a 
developed language has this ability, but the case of adult humans does not exhaust all there is 
to say on this matter. Consider the case of children. There is no single critical moment when a 
child becomes self-conscious, and from then on recognises himself as himself. Among other 
problems, Leahy's account is focused on self-awareness in adult humans—the paradigmatic 
case of self-awareness; thus, it has nothing to say about different stages of acquiring self-
awareness that eventually lead to the paradigmatic case of self-awareness.13
Considering the possibility that self-awareness could be achieved in ways that diverge 
from the paradigmatic human model might shift our view on this issue. Here is an initial 
suggestion that demands further investigation: the dog is aware of objects, but he is aware of 
his body in a completely different way, and the dog's behavioural repertoire reveals this. In 
this sense it is clear that the dog differentiates himself from other things in the world, and in 
                                                 
13 For a detailed account regarding the transition from an understanding of simple desires to an 
understanding of beliefs in infants, see Wellman (1991). For a detailed account about the development 
of self-recognition in infants, see Bertenthal (1978). Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996) argue that the 
newborn infant is capable of rudimentary differentiation between self and non-self, namely that the 




order to do that he does not have to know that he does that, or to be able to think about 
himself in terms of subject and object.14  
Gallup (1970), for instance, carried out an experiment testing whether chimpanzees 
and macaque monkeys recognise themselves in a mirror. While they were anaesthetised they 
were marked with paint on several parts of their body. After they recovered, the chimpanzees 
did not show any indication of knowing that they were marked. Later on they were presented 
with a mirror. At this stage, immediately after catching their sight in the mirror, they touched 
the marked areas on their bodies, inspecting them with their eyes and fingers. In contrast to 
the chimpanzees, the macaque monkeys did not show any sign of such self-recognition. 
Marten and Psarakos (1994) adapted the mirror mark test on dolphins, and report that most of 
the adult dolphins that they tested used the mirror for a visual inspection of their bodies, in the 
place were the mark was located.15  
*** 
These empirical findings are important because many animal behaviours are illuminated by 
the interpretation that animals have intentional mental states and self-awareness in a minimal 
form, even though they are languageless.  
Leahy and Kenny argue from the human paradigm, and thus relate to the capacity in 
question from the perspective of language possession. They ignore borderline cases and 
gradual degrees of consciousness and intentionality, which are the relevant perspectives to the 
animal case (as well as for the case of young children); i.e, they ignore the non-paradigm 
cases. Thus, they examine animals with a tool that only applies to adult humans. In that, they 
fail to pick up on patterns that might be recognised by using a different analysis. By the use of 
                                                 
14 See Bermúdez (1998, passim; 2001, 143-144) for discussion on non-conceptual self-consciousness 
and bodily awareness. 
15 Cenami, Aureli, Verbeek and De Waal claim that animals cannot do without a self (and this is 
different from self-awareness) as a point of reference. They demonstrate their claim on apes and other 
animals, and do not use the famous mirror experiment. They state: "[T]he animal self is formed on the 
basis of reciprocal influences and dynamic interactions with surrounding objects: it is ecological, 
social, and cognitive" (Cenami, 1995, 696). Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner constructed an experiment in 
which three pigeons used a mirror to locate a spot on their body which they could not see directly.  
They do not attribute self-awareness to the pigeons, but claim to "have shown how at least one instance 
of behaviour attributed to self-awareness can be accounted for in terms of an environmental history" 




this anthropocentric a priori reasoning, they implicitly relate to animals as if they were 
humans.  
By starting from the viewpoint of the human paradigm, they allow the empirical 
findings regarding alleged sophisticated behaviour in animals to be ignored: once one is 
working from the human paradigm, there is, for example, no point in observing the dog's 
behaviour. There is no need to make observations about the dog being either disappointed or 
satisfied with the food he gets, because according to this approach the dog would not be able 
to verbalise his alleged disappointment or satisfaction anyway. In other words, the 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning creates so rigid a conceptual framework that it eliminates 
both the significance and the relevance of empirical findings. This anthropocentric approach 
might miss significant patterns.  
While there are many philosophical accounts that view the lack of language as a 
barrier for animals' possession of certain mental capacities,16 I will concentrate on Donald 
Davidson's work. Davidson's denial of animals' intentional mental capacities has been 
immensely influential. This prominence renders his discussion essential for illustrating the 
inattention to empirical findings and its underlying anthropocentrism. In part III, I will present 
Davidson's account that denies animal belief. Parts IV and V critically examine this account. 
Finally, in part VI, I will elaborate on how my argument challenges anthropocentric a priori 
reasoning. 
                                                 
16 Here are some examples. Hampshire: "The fact that the animal has no language, whether of words or 
of gestures, adequate to express its intentions is part of the sense of the conclusion that no intentions 
can be attributed to it" (1959, 98). Frey: "If what is believed is that a certain sentence is true, then no 





III. Revisiting Davidson's Position on Animal Belief and Surprise 
In "Rational Animals" (1982) and other papers (1975, 1997a, 1997b, 1999), Davidson argues 
that animals cannot have beliefs. I claim that Davidson has not demonstrated this, and that his 
arguments in that regard are based on the human paradigm as the only possible standard for 
belief attribution. As I noted earlier, arguing from the human paradigm is what enables the 
inattention to empirical findings regarding animals' mental capacities. The consequence is an 
unexplained rift between anthropocentric a priori reasoning and empirical findings. My 
critique focuses primarily on Davidson's main line of argument, namely, that the existence of 
a belief requires the possession of the concept of belief.  
Propositional attitudes, according to Davidson, are mental states that involve 
language as a necessary condition. More accurately, they are attitudes whose content can be 
specified by reference to a proposition. Davidson's holistic view of language entails a holistic 
view of mental content. The attribution of psychological attitudes is tied up with the 
interpretation of utterances. This is crucial for attributing mental states to other persons. An 
inability to assign meanings to an alleged linguistic behaviour will therefore imply an 
inability to attribute attitudes, and vice versa. A creature that, from a third-person perspective, 
cannot be interpreted as capable of meaningful speech, will also be regarded as a creature who 
is not capable of having attitudes. Moreover, the inability to interpret the 'linguistic behaviour' 
of such creatures entails that languageless creatures such as animals are incapable of thought. 
Davidson characterises thoughts as propositional attitudes (1982, 475, 478),17 but 
does not deny that speechless animals have a mental life. He only argues for the 
interrelationship between mental states, language, and interpretation. He abstains from any 
consideration of the mechanism entailed by his theory. Heil adequately summarises this idea, 
noting that "the interpretational practices Davidson discusses float on the surface of a sea of 
mentality about which his theory is silent" (1998, 154). 
In characterising thoughts as propositional attitudes, Davidson uses the term 
'propositional attitude' to cover both first-order and second-order thoughts. A second-order 
                                                 




thought is the attitude an agent has towards his thoughts, whereas the first-order thought is 
simply a thought (1982, 478). The key issue is that language is required both for my ability to 
think (first-order), and for my capacity to know or to think that I am thinking (second-order) 
(1982, 477, 478).18
Davidson claims: 
That oak tree, as it happens, is the oldest tree in sight. Does 
the dog think that the cat went up the oldest tree in sight? Or 
that the cat went up the same tree it went up the last time the 
dog chased it? It is hard to make sense of the questions. But 
then it does not seem possible to distinguish between quite 
different things the dog might be said to believe. (1982, 474) 
 
The dog cannot believe that the tree is an 'oak tree' since he does not possess language, and 
hence this concept is beyond his reach, as much as it is beyond the reach of every speechless 
creature. However, Davidson's argument is not merely that the dog does not have language 
and so does not possess specific terms like 'the oldest tree in sight' and 'oak tree'. Davidson's 
fundamental claim is that the possession of the concept of belief is a necessary condition a 
creature must satisfy if it is to have any propositional attitudes, namely, if it is to have any 
thoughts or beliefs. One cannot have beliefs if one does not have mastery of the concept of 
belief (1982, 479):    
First, I argue that in order to have a belief, it is necessary to 
have the concept of belief.  
Second, I argue that in order to have the concept of belief 
one must have language. (1982, 478) 
 
Since the dog is speechless, he does not possess the concept of belief at all. In other words, 
the main claim is directed to the very potential to have beliefs: if one does not have the 
concept of belief one cannot have the potential to form beliefs (1982, 476). 
Additionally, Davidson claims that to possess the concept of belief requires 
possession of the concept of objective truth (1982, 479-480). This provides us with a better 
                                                 
18 In addition, because of the holistic character of propositional attitudes, every thought or belief is 
dependent upon a network of beliefs. In Davidson's words: "[T]o have one [propositional attitude] is to 
have a full complement. One belief demands many beliefs, and beliefs demand other basic attitudes 
such as intentions, desires and, if I am right, the gift of tongues" (1982, 473). This is the core of 
Davidson's notion of the holistic nature of thought. Later I relate to Davidson's arguments concerning 




grip on his notion of the concept of belief. The idea is this: (1) The capacity to have beliefs 
requires the ability to distinguish between a true belief and a false belief; (2) This ability 
requires the concept of objective truth; and (3) Only the language user can have this 
sophisticated capacity that will enable him to differentiate true from false belief.19 That is, 
having this capacity amounts to having the concept of belief, which is a second-order belief—
a belief about a belief (1982, 479-480).20
Davidson uses the concept of surprise in order to support his argument: 
Surprise requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I 
did believe and what I come to believe. Such awareness, 
however, is a belief about a belief: if I am surprised, then 
among other things I come to believe my original belief was 
false. (1982, 479) 
 
The concept of surprise provides us with a concrete case: in order to be surprised, one must 
not only have a belief and the ability to change one's belief, but also the awareness of a 
contrast between the original belief and the present belief. 
 
 
                                                 
19 In "Thought and Talk" Davidson argues for the same conclusion: "Can a creature have a belief if it 
does not have the concept of belief? It seems to me it cannot, and for that reason. Someone cannot have 
a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping the contrast 
between truth and error—true belief and false belief" (1975, 170). 
20 Davidson does not explain how we acquire the concept of belief, besides saying that "[i]t follows that 
a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of belief" (1975, 170). 
To be a member of a speech community is to have the capacity for interpreting linguistic utterances. 
However, this capacity is acquired gradually. Thus, it seems that we encounter here 'the chicken and 
egg problem', even in the case in which Davidson takes this concept to be a logical constraint on his 
explanatory system (1999, 307). Carruthers (1992, 128) criticises Davidson on a similar point (see also 




IV. A Critique of Davidson's Argument 
Whether or not animals are able to be surprised is not important for my argument. I examine 
Davidson's discussion of surprise because the conditions he sets for this mental capacity (and 
for others) can be easily applied to many other significant capacities questionably ascribed to 
animals. Davidson's line of argument implies that animals cannot call for attention, cannot 
hide, cannot pretend, cannot waylay, and cannot plan. All these abilities, the argument 
suggests, require language, the concept of objective truth and the concept of belief. However, 
empirical observations suggest that animals have such abilities as hiding or planning to a 
certain degree. Yet Davidson's argument can be shown to be problematic via a conceptual 
analysis, without necessarily referring to empirical findings. I shall present my argument 
gradually. 
 
A. Being Surprised and the Knowledge of Being Surprised 
Davidson over-intellectualises the concept of surprise, even with respect to humans. He does 
so as a consequence of an anthropocentric analysis that sets the conditions for having a belief 
according to the most sophisticated capacities of adult humans.21 As a result he becomes 
entangled in a misconception of the concept of surprise. The confusion here, I maintain, is 
between being surprised and the knowledge that I am surprised. In other words, the confusion 
is between first-order thought and second-order thought. Davidson's argument holds only for 
the knowledge that I am surprised, not for the experience, or the first-order thought, of being 
surprised.  
I suggest that possession of the concept of belief and the concept of objective truth 
considered by Davidson as conditions for surprise, have nothing to do with surprise in itself, 
but instead concern reflective capacity—that is, the capacity to reflect on the fact that one is 
surprised. I will henceforth call this capacity, 'reflective surprise'. Reflective surprise consists 
of a certain awareness of the gap between past belief and present belief; it is one's 
                                                 
21 Davidson suggests that his argument invites the just accusation of anthropocentrism, but justifies his 
methodology by claiming that he simply 'describes a feature of certain concepts' (1982, 473). 
Accordingly, his inattention to the empirical findings is not presented as a problem that should be 




understanding of the fact that one is surprised (and sometimes it can be followed by a second-
order surprise: one's surprise by the fact that one is surprised). I shall demonstrate my claim, 
but in order to ensure that I do not carry out an anthropomorphic analysis myself, I will 
analyse the case of a young child who does not yet possess language. Note that I do not 
equate the cases of non-linguistic creatures and those of pre-linguistic creatures: the claim 
here is not necessarily that children at the pre-linguistic stage have the same cognitive 
capacities as animals, but that in both cases it seems that non-linguistic thoughts take place. 
That is, despite the absence of language, surprise may occur. 
No one suspects that very young children have an understanding of the metalinguistic 
predicates 'true' and 'false', or of the concept 'objective truth', but nor does anyone doubt that 
young children can be surprised, at least to a certain degree. Their behaviour demonstrates 
that they can be surprised. The key issue, however, is that considering that the acquisition of 
language, and hence of full-blown beliefs, is a gradual process, one must assume that very 
young children can have first-order beliefs, even if not fully complemented. For instance, 
when a child says 'toy, this toy', 'this, I want this', or even 'this thing', he does believe 
something. Crucially, denying this entails the impossibility of acquiring language, and hence 
of acquiring full-blown beliefs.22
Children use terms like 'this' and 'thing' before understanding that these are abstract 
terms, and before being able to reflect on them. Clearly they do not use them abstractly, but as 
names for things they do not know how to label. That is, they use these words far more 
narrowly than the way adult humans use them. We do not say that a child does not believe 
anything when he says 'this' or 'thing' because he does not possess the concepts of 'this' or 
                                                 
22 Vygotsky argues that "[i]n animals, even in anthropoids whose speech is phonetically like human 
speech and whose intellect is akin to man's, speech and thinking are not interrelated. A prelinguistic 
period in thought and a preintellectual period in speech undoubtedly exist also in the development of 
the child. Thought and word are not connected by a primary bond. A connection originates, changes, 
and grows in the course of the evolution of thinking and speech" (1962, 119). Hauser provides an 
account on word acquisition in children: "the child's brain appears to limit the inferences drawn about 
word meaning and appropriate usage. Thus when children hear the word 'dog', they fail to make the 
inference that the word could refer to dog parts (tail, paw), and action performed by dogs (playing 
fetch, eating a bone) […]. Rather, children infer that words associated with solid, bounded objects such 




'thing', since these concepts are abstract and require full mastery of language. Rather, we say 
that he uses these terms in a specific manner, and although this manner does not correspond to 
their full-blown meaning, the child still has some grasp of these terms. Indeed, one does not 
know what goes on in the child's mind and one cannot depict it accurately with words, but for 
the same reason, one cannot deny that the child has beliefs, especially when the child's 
behaviour points to this conclusion. 
The child who has not yet grasped the concept of objective truth can nevertheless still 
believe 'X' and later 'not X'. The child can be seen as having the potential to experience 
surprise, once one takes into account that surprise is not always, if at all, a purely cognitive 
experience, and one that cannot be fully articulated. The elements that condition the surprise 
here, and make it a surprise, in contrast to 'just believing that not X' (which marks a first-order 
belief, but not a first-order surprise) are: the context, such as the significance of the original 
and the present belief,23 the type of belief, and the child's emotional state at the time. The 
child is surprised because suddenly, in the 'right' context, something that he wished for has 
happened, or something has moved him. However, significantly, the child can neither explain 
the gap between his former belief and his present belief, nor can he conceive of the concept of 
objective truth. Now, if the child behaves as if he is surprised but cannot reflect on the 
experience of surprise, we can say that he does not have a reflective surprise, i.e., that he does 
not know or understand that he is surprised. Yet it appears that the best interpretation of the 
empirical finding we have in hand is to say that the child is surprised in the sense of first-
order surprise.24 Of course, we might be wrong, but fallibility is not the issue at stake. We 
must not confuse the epistemological problem of 'other minds' with the conceptual problem 
concerning the conditions of being surprised.  
Malcolm claims that "[g]rammatical form is no index of psychological reality" (1977, 
51). Indeed, in too many linguistic-based approaches there is a demand, although sometimes 
                                                 
23 For instance: 'Hey, daddy is here!' I do not mean to say that very young children verbalise this 
proposition. This proposition is only an approximation. However, from a certain stage, children do 
differentiate their parents from other people.  
24 Note that Davidson would have not accepted this interpretation because according to his account, the 




an implicit one, that first-order mental states be capable of linguistic expression. The 
consequence of such approaches is not only that the non-linguistic aspects of mental states—
even when discussing adult humans—are neglected, but also that mental states and 
experiences are often examined from a cognitive perspective only (in contrast, for instance, to 
an emotive perspective) and are taken to be purely cognitive processes. 
In this sense, it is significant to note that Davidson, Kenny and Leahy refer to 
language as a condition for certain mental capacities, but do not provide arguments 
concerning any powers that make language possible as the crucial feature for developing 
certain mental capacities. Nonetheless, had they suggested such an argument, it might have 
been useful in distinguishing between non-linguistic creatures and pre-linguistic infants 
(recall that earlier I claimed that I do not equate these cases). For instance, such an argument 
might suggest that the cognitive capacities of children at the pre-linguistic stage consist of an 
innate capacity of language formation that animals lack—the innate capacity to develop 
sophisticated language; human language (such an argument was suggested by Chomsky, 
1975). That is, it is not simply that animals do not have a human-like language, but that they 
also lack any potential to develop such a language.  
Such an argument, however, would not harm my critique. First, I only claim that in 
both cases (i.e., the non-linguistic case and the pre-linguistic case) it seems that non-linguistic 
thoughts take place. Second, indeed, such an argument may suggest the beginning of a 
solution to the issue of gradual acquisition of mental states such as beliefs, self-awareness and 
others, and the issue of gradual acquisition of language (although it is not available as a way 
out for Davidson—I will elaborate on this in part V).25 However, I would agree with this line 
                                                 
25 To emphasise this latter point concerning language acquisition, consider the presumed process by 
which the human species came to have a developed language. For instance, Evans and Marler argue: 
"Language did not emerge in its current form without evolutionary antecedents, like Athena springing 
from the head of Zeus. Rather, it is dependent in part upon primordia that can be identified in the 
communication of animals" (1995, 374). Similarly, Darwin claimed: "If no organic being excepting 
man had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly different nature from those 
of the lower animals, then we should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties 
had been gradually developed. But it can be shewn that there is no fundamental difference of this kind. 
We must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between one of the lowest 
fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than between an ape and man; yet this 




of argument: the reasoning of such an argument would support my claim that we should avoid 
relying exclusively on the human paradigm. For instance, I claimed that Leahy's account is 
focused on self-awareness in adult humans—the paradigmatic case of self-awareness (see part 
II, section B). Thus, I claimed, it has nothing to say about different stages of acquiring self-
awareness that at the latest stage lead to the paradigmatic case of self-awareness. Had Leahy 
provided an argument concerning the powers that make language possible, or at least 
mentioned its possibility, he would have also needed to admit that self-awareness may be 
acquired in stages. This, however, would damage his argument that relates only to the 
advanced stage of acquiring this capacity. 
Referring back to Malcolm's claim that "[g]rammatical form is no index of 
psychological reality" (1977, 51), it might be said that to a certain degree, Davidson's account 
might be in accordance with that of Malcolm. For instance, in his "Reply to Simon Evnine", 
Davidson makes a more cautious claim about the requirement of the concept of objective 
truth: "I do not mean explicit control of the concept of truth, but the realization that what is 
believed may not be correct" (1999, 309). In that case, animals, as well as young children, do 
possess this ability (in the primitive manner that language users cannot articulate). They 
definitely grasp, for instance, that their 'demands' for food or a certain kind of food have not 
been satisfied (and we are able to interpret them as doing so). In general, it is possible to show 
an awareness of a mistake in one's beliefs by a proper adjustment of correction in one's 
behaviour. Thus, this weaker version of Davidson's requirement makes his denial of animal 
belief even more problematic with relation to empirical observations. 
Let us further examine the experience of surprise, by considering the first seconds of 





B. Elaborations on Surprise 
Generally, in the first seconds of surprise, one does not reflect upon some former belief or 
present belief. It is doubtful whether what occurs in the very moment of surprise could be 
characterised in propositional terms. As we already know, not every experience and 
realisation can be pinned-down with propositions, and the experience of surprise is no 
different.26 A few seconds later, maybe still under the effect of the surprise, one may 
understand that one believed 'X', but that now one does not believe 'X'. It is only at that later 
point that one performs an act of thinking that is reserved only for competent language users, 
i.e., paradigmatic humans, typically adult, who possess developed enough language to enable 
such an understanding.  
Davidson relates neither to the very first seconds of surprise nor to the other 
components of surprise, such as the emotional aspects of surprise. He describes the 
experience of surprise as a continuous experience that includes the understanding that 'I am 
surprised'. Hence he defines the experience of surprise as having a propositional content, that 
is, the content that 'I am surprised'. At least in the first approximation, a surprise is available 
as a continuous reflective experience, but the crux, yet again, is that this process is available 
only for language users. Davidson concentrates on specific cases of surprise where one is led 
to conclude that an original belief was false. Nevertheless, his general conclusion is a broad 
one, and he implicitly claims that children have neither beliefs nor surprises. The confusion, 
again, is between first-order and second-order thoughts. One may have the experience of 
being surprised, but be unable to think 'I am surprised'. The latter (the realisation that 'I am 
surprised'), involves a second-order thought, the thought that I believe I am surprised.27
Undoubtedly, the paradigmatic human experience of surprise is markedly different 
from that of pre-linguistic child: there are different types of surprise, and the conditions for 
                                                 
26 Concerning adults, think about infatuation. Less dramatically put, think about experiencing the bite 
of a mosquito. Davidson, of course, acknowledges this (1975, 157-158). However, according to his 
account, a child cannot believe that 'something bit him' unless he understands what a bite is.   
27 It is worth mentioning that once one considers the emotional character of surprise, it becomes clear 
that such a second-order belief is not a sufficient condition for this type of surprise. The fact that it is 





one type do not necessarily fully overlap with the conditions for the others.28 It appears, thus, 
that Davidson has traced the conditions of the paradigmatic case of surprise—that of 
paradigmatic humans. But from these conditions he draws a conclusion that includes non-
linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures. Ultimately, his argument cannot account for stages of 
acquiring the capacity to be surprised in particular, and for the capacity to believe in general. 
Note that the non-paradigmatic cases should have been the important elements to 
Davidson's inquiry. Davidson acknowledges the existence of borderline cases (1982, 473; 
1997a, passim; 1997b, 127-128), but his inquiry fails to develop them. Let me clarify: for 
instance, Davidson's argument implies that the tiger cannot hide if he does not possess the 
concept of belief, which supposedly provides him with the capacity to recognise that he is 
unsafe in this place and alerts him to find a safer place to lie down. His account doest not 
provide means to understand the following example as well. The famous animal behaviour 
researcher Donald Griffin (1984, 74) describes a case of self-concealment that can be found in 
the literature: grizzly bears looked out for positions from which they can watch human 
intruders, namely hunters, without being seen. He also claims that the bears made efforts to 
avoid leaving tracks, indicating that they realised that their tracks could be followed by 
hunters. Now, one should indeed beware of unqualified adoption of empirical observations 
and experiments, but a demand to acknowledge it seriously is in place, especially when 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning creates such a rigid rift between the theory on the one hand 
and empirical findings on the other.  
Moreover, Davidson wishes to distinguish between rational animals on the one hand, 
and a-rational animals on the other, but he does so only on the basis of differentiating 
paradigmatic humans from animals. It is clear that children are somewhere in between, and 
that their case, although different in many respects from that of animals, is also very similar. 
                                                 
28 This difference is central to my thesis, and it concerns the examples of intentionality by Kenny and 




The most important lesson one can draw from the case of children is that 'rationality', 
whatever it is, cannot be defined in a cut and dried way.29
Davidson acknowledges his counter-intuitive conclusions by claiming that, "we can 
continue to explain the behaviour of speechless creatures by attributing propositional attitudes 
to them while at the same time recognizing that such creatures do not actually have 
propositional attitudes" (1982, 477-478). He offers a 'practical recipe' for understanding 
animal behaviour, but not a philosophical account of animals' sophisticated abilities such as 
discrimination and generalisation.30 He emphasises this claim about behaviour by arguing that 
examining animal behaviour through the framework of propositional attitudes is justifiable in 
light of the available observations of animal behaviour. The use of this framework is 
instrumentally useful, but not true (1982, 477). Davidson's idea is that it would be wrong to 
make such attributions, for the same reason that it would be obviously wrong to attribute 
attitudes to heat-seeking missiles (1982, 477). Yet, as Davidson claims, we have a better 
explanation of the 'behaviour' of heat-seeking missiles: we do not need to ascribe 
propositional attitudes to the missiles, but only to their designers. Davidson is aware that in 
the case of animals we observe behaviour that is much more sophisticated and that we do not 
have a better explanation of animal behaviour (1982, 477; 1999, 305). Despite the difference 
between the two cases, he does not modify his conclusion. However, precisely because of this 
difference the empirical findings deserve careful attention that will lead to an interpretation 
that may, or may not, fit in with his theory. But in order to do that, one first needs to consider 
alternatives to anthropocentric a priori reasoning and to attempt to incorporate empirical 
findings into the research. A brief example of such incorporation can be found in Dupré's 
account (see footnote 29) and in Evnine's account (to be discussed in part V).  
                                                 
29 Dupré uses Davidson's own argument in this matter against him: "The final conclusion of the paper 
discussed above [Davidson's "Rational Animals", 1982] is that 'rationality is a social trait. Only 
communicators have it.' Since many animals are social, and many animals communicate, we should 
perhaps enlist Davidson in support of the view that there are many kinds of rational animals" (2002, 
232). Dupré demonstrates here how animal behaviour (concerning communication skills) is not taken 
into account. See also footnote 40, below.  




As I noted earlier, Davidson equates thoughts with propositional attitudes. It is clear 
that animals do not possess propositional attitudes, but this is not the issue: the real issue is 
providing an account of languageless or non-propositional attitudes, an account that will 
partially differentiate between propositional attitudes and beliefs or thoughts. Davidson, 
however, has not challenged his anthropocentric a priori reasoning by acknowledging such an 
alternative. He consistently reconstructs his original thesis that "[t]here is in fact no 
distinction between having a concept and having thoughts with propositional content, since 
one cannot have the concept of mama unless one can believe someone is (or is not) mama, or 
wish that mama were present, or feel angry that mama is not satisfying some desire" (1997a, 
25).31 But the empirical observations suggest that children can be very distressed that mama 
or papa is going out and leaving them with a babysitter, even before they understand the 
concept of mama or papa; they also suggest that a child can demand that 'this woman' will do 
'what I want', and that he will not be satisfied unless this woman—not someone else—will do 
it.  
On the one hand, Davidson has definitely shown that without having a minimal grasp 
of the concept 'mama', a child cannot verbalise his anger in propositional terms; thus, he 
cannot classify 'these people' as 'my parents, the people who brought me to this world'. On the 
other hand, Davidson's rigid conceptual framework actually dictates that the second-order 
belief (i.e., possessing the concept of belief) is a necessary condition for the first-order belief 
(i.e., believing that this is mama). Thus, this framework cannot fit in with the interpretation of 
the empirical observation concerning children that I suggested in the previous paragraph. A 
possible way out here is that the young child does have a certain grasp of the concept of 
belief, maybe even unconsciously. At any rate, however, the child cannot have a full-blown 
possession of this concept, and he cannot articulate it.32
The main problem here results from the confusion I highlighted earlier between first-
order and second-order thoughts. By positing second-order thoughts as the prototype of 
                                                 
31 See also his (1997b, 124).  
32 A position in favour of languageless beliefs, and also regarding the ability of languageless beliefs 




thinking, and by taking propositional attitudes to cover any kind of thought, there is no need 
to consider any behavioural resemblances or physiological similarities that might suggest that 
thought is possible without propositional attitudes. Thus, the anthropocentric a priori 
reasoning fuels the neglect of empirical findings. Davidson reduces the argument simply to 
either having or not having propositional attitudes instead of taking propositional attitudes to 
be a necessary condition for certain kinds of thoughts. He instead extends it to being a 
necessary condition for any kind of thought.  
Based on Davidson's clearly defined conclusions concerning animal beliefs, how are 
we to explain behaviour of animals that appears to indicate belief? Or, how are we to account 
for the fact that young children can be surprised, but lack the conceptual sophistication to 
think 'I am surprised'?33 If we agree with Davidson, how do we explain the case of a dog who 
behaves as if he believes the cat is in the tree, and later modifies his behaviour, suggesting 
that he now realises that the cat is not there but somewhere else?34 How can we explain the 
successful prediction of a dog's actions, of which Davidson is not unaware (1982, 477)? 
Davidson has not addressed these issues. Accordingly, again, his lack of acknowledgment of 
empirical findings is not presented as a problem that should be explained.  
To summarise, Davidson's argument is distorted for two main reasons. First, he over-
intellectualises the concept of surprise. This is a consequence of his anthropocentrism: he 
employs anthropocentric a priori reasoning, i.e., reasoning based on standards paradigmatic of 
adult humans. His biased starting point distorts his analysis by concealing the possibility that 
there can be differing degrees of concept possession.35 Recognising this point entails a shift in 
our understanding of concept possession. Second, he neglects the empirical findings, which 
                                                 
33 A reply from Davidson's doctrine of interpretation would restate his motivations for denying animal 
belief, but it would also reconstruct his anthropocentric a priori reasoning. 
34 Malcolm (1977, 49). Malcolm refers to Davidson (1975). In his (1982) Davidson cites Malcolm 
(1977); his specific use of the oak tree example that I quoted earlier is a direct reply to Malcolm.  
35 A similar claim, albeit in regard to consciousness, is maintained by Dennett: "Consciousness, I claim, 
even in the case we understand best—our own—is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. If this is right, 
then consciousness is not the sort of phenomenon it is assumed to be by most of the participants in the 




could have been included in a more refined version of his account (and could be surely 
included in an account that acknowledges differing degrees of concept possession).  
 
V. Holism and Intensionality 
My main criticism of Davidson does not relate in detail to his doctrines regarding the holistic 
nature of belief and intensionality, but rather is directed towards the requirement of the 
concept of belief. These doctrines have only a secondary role in a possible defence of his 
position regarding animals.36  
However, analysing Davidson's rigid holism would simply fortify my criticism 
because the requirement for multiple, simultaneous (even if implicit or unconscious) beliefs in 
order to maintain one specific belief cannot account for early stages of acquiring language. 
This requirement may adequately represent a network of beliefs of a paradigmatic human, but 
because we are dealing with animals and children it is irrelevant as an absolute model for 
having beliefs. Consequently, such anthropocentric a priori reasoning concerning the intrinsic 
nature of beliefs excludes from the outset the possibility that both languageless and pre-
linguistic creatures could have beliefs. In any case, I have not argued that it is possible to 
make sense of a belief as a private attitude completely detached from other beliefs or mental 
states. 
The same goes for the argument regarding the intensional nature of thought. What it 
shows with respect to animals is already clear from the very beginning: since animals are 
languageless, it is impossible to substitute co-referential terms in the sentence 'the dog thinks 
the cat went up that oak tree', as in any other sentence.37 It is impossible, of course, even to 
verbalise the very sentence. The challenge that the intensionality thesis causes for the animal 
case is built into the transference of this thesis from the paradigmatic human case to the 
                                                 
36 Davidson himself argues: "These considerations [of intesionality and the requirement of rich supply 
of general and true beliefs] point in the direction of language, but they do not amount to a 
demonstration that language is necessary to thought. Indeed, what these considerations suggest is only 
that there probably can't be much thought without language" (1982, 477). 




animal case. Thus, to continue this line of argument is simply to maintain the anthropocentric 
a priori reasoning that brings us to a dead-end.  
My purpose is not to refute Davidson's holism. But in order to explain the 
interrelationships between stages of acquiring language, primitive beliefs, self-recognition, 
and primitive self-awareness, Davidson's holism must be revised so as to allow for the 
possibility of languageless beliefs. Evnine (1999, 291) makes a similar claim about 
Davidson's rigid holism, saying that it is not suitable to account for language acquisition. He 
suggests that the first stratum of language and the process of language acquisition are 
molecular and not holistic, and that this molecular structure does not stand in contradiction to 
local concentrations of holism (1999, 299-300, and ft.36). This idea is supposed to make 
Davidson's holism more adequate with respect to children. Davidson's reply to Evnine is 
rather ambiguous. On the one hand it reveals that he acknowledges the problem, but on the 
other hand it is a problem his answer fails to address. First he admits that there is a serious 
problem in this respect, and says:  
[W]e can get around this particular difficulty [of how an 
untranslatable child grows into a translatable adult] by 
distinguishing between saying that the child learns the 
language part by part (which could offend my holistic 
leaning) and saying that the child, at various stages, has 
partly learned the whole. (1999, 305)  
 
Thus, Davidson admits a difficulty in his holism. However, he later claims: 
My suggestion, with respect to the early stages of language 
acquisition, was that we should ask: in how many different 
ways can we represent the information conveyed by the 
child's utterances in our own language. The more ways we 
can represent what the child says, the less information the 
child's utterances convey. When the ways become as 
constrained as they are with accomplished speakers, the 
child is an accomplished speaker. (1999, 306) 
  
Note that although Davidson acknowledges the difficulty in his holism, he also ignores it by 
reasserting the argument from interpretation, and does not provide an answer regarding the 
first stages of acquiring a language.  
Before continuing with Davidson's reply to Evnine, it is worth emphasising again (see 




language and not the powers that make language possible (the same is true to the account of 
Stich that I discuss in the next chapter). As we have seen, Davidson adheres to the argument 
from interpretation and avoids discussing the mental mechanisms entailed by his theory 
regarding interpretation.  
Crucially here, had Davidson argued that the issue is not only mastery of language, 
but also the powers that makes language possible, it would be very problematic with respect 
to his own account regarding interpretation. That is, it is not enough that Davidson would 
agree that there are powers that enable us to gain mastery in our language; he would need to 
agree with Evnine that at least the first stages of language acquisition are molecular and not 
holistic. In other words, Davidson would have to agree that young children, during the years 
of acquiring the mastery of language, may have only a partial control in many concepts. This, 
however, stands in a sheer contrast to his own clearly defined claims. Moreover, Davidson, in 
his reply to Evnine, reasserts his argument from interpretation and abstains from relating to 
the considerations entailed by his theory (in the next quote below this reply is restated in a 
very clear way).  
But even a more general argument concerning the powers that make language 
possible does not necessarily hinder my critique, which focuses on the gap between 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning that takes language to be a necessary condition for certain 
mental capacities and the empirical findings that suggest the possibility that animals have the 
capacities in question. One may suggest that such an argument explains how young children 
learn language, but I would agree with that (such an argument can also be applied to the ways 
animals learn their kind of language or to the ways they acquire their communication skills). 
Significantly, I do not argue that animals may develop a human-like language. From the 
outset I assumed, like my opponents, that animals do not have language in the relevant sense 
of the concept, i.e., the sense of human-like language. My argument does not rest only on the 
analogy to the case of young children but is supported by the illustration that anthropocentric-





In any case, even had my adversaries claimed that the powers that make language 
possible (such as an innate capacity to develop a human-like language) are the crucial features 
for having certain mental capacities, such an argument does not entail maintaining the human 
paradigm of a full-blown language user as the only possible standard for the possession of the 
mental capacities in question. Rather, as I have suggested, they could have argued for 
different stages of possessing the capacities under examination—from the most primitive to 
the most sophisticated.  
Continuing with Davidson's reply to Evnine, Davidson clearly restates his position in 
the same 1999 paper:  
I think it is possible for an animal to have considerable 
learned mastery of an environment, to employ implements, 
solve problems, and generally perform many tasks that 
require memory, learning, and calculation, without ever 
entertaining propositional content. I would say such an 
animal does not have beliefs, it does not reason, it does not 
have concepts, and cannot have a language. Someone who 
disagrees with this is, I think, using some words with a 
different meaning than I give them. (1999, 309) 
 
Thus, Davidson still commits himself to his strong position (recall that my critique has been 
that Davidson equates beliefs, or thoughts, with propositional attitudes and consequently 
confuses between first-order and second-order beliefs (see footnote 17). This quote still fails 
to address the significant question about how animals manage to carry out all these abilities 
while lacking beliefs. However, this passage suggests, at least indirectly, that Davidson's 
difficulty with his opponents is their supposed terminological confusion.  
Now, if (1) Davidson refers to 'belief' as a term of art which, as such, can be applied 
only to adult humans, then his account of animal belief collapses into triviality; a denial of a 
capacity from animals on the basis of definition, and a very problematic definition, even with 
regard to many humans.38 But, if, alternatively, (2) Davidson does not refer to 'belief' as a 
term of art, then his argument is far too strong. First, it cannot account for stages of acquiring 
language and beliefs in infants and young children. Second, while Davidson does not deny 
                                                 
38 There is nothing inherently wrong with definitions, but Davidson's definition stands in problematic 




that animals can learn, calculate, solve problems, generalise and discriminate, it does not 
make sense to carry out all these abilities without entertaining beliefs, even in the most 
minimal sense of beliefs, unless one eliminates the agency of animals and relates to them as 
machines. This is what Davidson seems to be doing when he compares the animal case to that 
of heat-seeking missiles.  
It is clear that although Davidson may refer in the quotation above and in other cases 
to mere terminology, he argues much more than that. This is clear not only from his 
argument, but also from his failure to acknowledge that certain animals possess proto-beliefs. 
He is clearly arguing for a denial of animals' beliefs, and without this assertion his argument 
regarding animals' beliefs could simply have been summarised by stating that animals do not 
have beliefs in as much as beliefs are 'human-like' beliefs, or, more accurately, paradigmatic 
'human-like' beliefs. However, this is obvious from the very beginning.39
 
VI. How My Argument Damages Anthropocentric A Priori Reasoning 
Most of us are impressed by the sophistication of lionesses while hunting; we are aware of 
their 'plan', their cooperation and way of ambushing. We are also impressed by much 
sophisticated behaviour of young children. However, the issue throughout this chapter was 
not one's awareness of such cases. Given that there is a known body of work in cognitive 
ethology, comparative psychology and comparative biology, my aim has been to expose the 
anthropocentrism in the discourse of the animal issue, which facilitates the neglect of 
empirical findings by assuming that language is a necessary condition for abilities such as 
planning, hiding, ambushing, and so forth. Importantly, as I mentioned earlier, I do not argue 
that empirical findings should take precedence over a priori reasoning of any sort. Thus, I 
                                                 
39 Davidson's line of argument collapses our mental vocabulary. Children cannot believe and be 
surprised; animals cannot hide, pretend and so on. The mental, even in the human case, cannot be fully 
articulated. Accordingly, rather than limiting terms such as belief, thought and intentionality only to 
developed language users, one should point out whether the term is being used broadly to include 
borderline cases and even animals, or narrowly to include only language users. Dummett, for instance, 
denies that animals have genuine thoughts and concepts, but does not hesitate to attribute to them 
'proto-thoughts' which one cannot accurately express in our language since "any sentence that suggests 




have not argued that empirical findings should replace a priori reasoning. Rather, I have 
offered it as a point of reference that should be considered. In that respect, my own main line 
of argument against Davidson was conceptual in its nature.  
In what sense, then, does my suggestion to depart from anthropocentric a priori 
reasoning challenge and damage the view against which I have argued? I will attempt to 
answer this question in this part. 
 
A. My Proposal (Revisited) and Relevant Empirical Findings 
In denying certain mental abilities to animals, anthropocentric a priori reasoning clearly does 
not eliminate the fact that animals do many things that appear to be very sophisticated. For 
instance, it seems that animals can hide themselves as a defense, to waylay for a prey (in 
contrast to simply lying on the ground) and to warn their community of particular dangers.40 
Nevertheless, one may reply that what one has observed is inconclusive and may be 
interpreted in more than one way, and therefore the 'right' interpretation is only approximated. 
This is true especially when it concerns the issue of mental capacities in which observations 
are always indirect: one cannot see an intention, but only to infer its existence from the 
behaviour of a creature. In other words, from the fact that we have the impression that a 
chimpanzee performs an act of deception, it does not derive that the chimpanzee actually 
performs such an act.  
Yet, I would agree with such a reply. I have not argued that the empirical findings can 
establish a direct proof for the existence of certain mental states. As I have noted, my purpose 
in this chapter has not been to defend the claim that animals possess certain mental capacities 
such as beliefs and intentionality. Accordingly, I have not argued that animal behaviour and 
the similarities between humans and animals show that Kenny, Leahy, Davidson and others 
are simply wrong in claiming that animals do not have certain mental capacities. I have 
                                                 
40 Regosin (2002) argues that the alarm calls of Arabian Babblers (a type of bird) may be divided into 
different classes of alarm calls in reaction to possible predators. For instance, he reports that one class 
("pshews") was associated with flying avian predators and fleeing behaviour, while a second class 
("tsits") was associated with terrestrial predators and mobbing behaviour. He also reports that a third 
class of alarm calls ("trills") was associated with perched avian predators and monitoring behaviour. 




argued, rather, that there is an unexplained gap between their claims and the behaviour that 
many animals exhibit, and therefore empirical findings should not be ignored, but should be 
discussed in the research.   
In other words, the idea is that animal behaviour—and especially what appears to be a 
sophisticated behaviour—is an indication of something, but that anthropocentric a priori 
reasoning fails to discuss what it indicates. A similar failure occurs with regard to similarities 
between animals and human beings in the brain and nervous system.41
A potential reply from my opponents that they do rely on empirical findings by 
observing that animals are not language users is irrelevant here, and misses the very issue 
with which I am concerned in this chapter. As I have already argued in part II, like my 
opponents, my assumption from the outset is that animals are languageless, or at least that 
they do not have the kind of language that is supposedly required for the mental capacity 
under examination. Given this assumption, the problem that I have pointed out is due to the 
gap between what appears to be a sophisticated animal behaviour on the one hand, and 
reasoning that from the outset relates to a certain mental capacity as language dependent on 
the other. Based on such reasoning, any empirical finding which does not pertain to the 
discovery that animals have the putative required linguistic abilities for the capacity in 
question will be irrelevant. But as a consequence of the great rift between anthropocentric a 
priori reasoning and the empirical findings, as well as the agreement that animals do not 
possess a human-like language, the relevant empirical findings concern the behaviour and 
actions of animals as well as biological similarities.42  
 
 
                                                 
41 Or, as Searle puts it: "Whatever its surface logical form, any argument against animal intentionality 
and thinking has to imply the following piece of speculative neurobiology: the difference between 
human and animal brains is such that the human brain can cause and sustain intentionality and thinking, 
and animal brains cannot. Given what we know about the brains of the higher mammals, especially the 
primates, any such speculation must seem breathtakingly irresponsible. Anatomically the similarities 
are too great for such a speculation to seem even remotely plausible, and physiologically we know that 
the mechanisms that produce intentionality and thought in humans have close parallels in other beasts" 
(1994, 64).  




B. Every Debate has (at Least) Two Sides 
When it comes to attributing mental capacities to animals, the issue of how to interpret or to 
understand the observations is far from simple. Considering my aim in this chapter, this issue 
is highly relevant from the moment that there is a readiness to consider animal behaviour and 
other relevant empirical findings, i.e., while there is an attempt to incorporate it within a 
theory of mind. Moreover, in order to attempt to incorporate empirical findings in the 
research, one needs to depart from anthropocentric reasoning. In any event, the issue of the 
correct understanding of empirical findings concerns both sides of the debate, as I shall 
explain.  
We usually ask how we can be sure that empirical findings prove that animals have, 
indeed, a certain mental capacity (although I have not argued that empirical findings provide 
us with definitiveness or with evidence that animals have a certain mental capacity). Yet we 
do not usually ask how one can be sure that empirical findings do not show that animals have 
a certain mental capacity. In that sense, it seems that relating to empirical findings (like in the 
cases of Evnine, Dupré, Byrne, De Waal and others) is considered problematic from the 
outset, whereas neglecting them and leaving such findings unexplained (like in the case of 
Davidson and others) is not considered a problem.  
On the one hand, I have argued that certain behaviours of animals (or other empirical 
findings) should lead us to rethink the reliability of certain anthropocentric a priori accounts. 
Given this claim, all one needs to show is that there is some reasonable room for doubt with 
regard to anthropocentric accounts that deny the existence of a certain mental capacity in the 
relevant animals. At a later stage one should be able to explain why we should favour one's 
interpretation; for instance, one needs to show how the thesis that certain animal behaviour 
points to the existence of a particular mental capacity is more successful than other views 
(this also concerns the explanatory value of such a thesis. To be discussed in section C 
below). 
On the other hand, someone who totally denies a certain capacity from animals on the 




instance, animal behaviour that appears to be sophisticated and suggests a certain mental 
capacity is totally misleading. Given many biological similarities between humans and higher 
animals, providing a persuasive explanation would not be an easy task (again, many, of 
course, are aware of such similarities, but the issue is that they do not sufficiently relate to 
them). At the same time, he will have to show that by referring to human paradigm-based 
condition he does not repeat the mistake I have pointed to throughout this chapter.43  
In any case, precisely because the behaviour of an animal may invite different 
interpretations, one should be very cautious in deriving cut and dried conclusions regarding 
mental capacities in animals, both for and against.44 Byrne, for instance, provides some 
insight concerning intentional understanding in animals with regard to the ability to attribute 
intentions to others. Byrne reports that he and Andrew Whiten found strong indications for 
this (1995, 131-137). One example is what Byrne names 'righteous indignation': Byrne argues 
that in contrast to regular frustration, one can observe "a reaction specific to understanding 
that it had been deceived" (1995, 131). The example that Byrne provides for such a reaction 
concerns a chimpanzee who hit over the head the researcher who deceived her and 
subsequently ignored the researcher for the whole day (1995, 131). Once the apparent 
sophisticated behavior of animals is taken into consideration, and if we agree that it is not 
easy to justify that an animal has, say, the ability to deceive in a primitive (and non-
paradigmatic) manner, then it is also not easy to utterly deny this ability.45  
Nonetheless, the conclusions that I have examined in this chapter are clearly defined. 
For instance, we have seen that Davidson claims that given the available observation of 
animal behaviour, attributing beliefs to animals is instrumentally useful, but not true (1982, 
477). This statement is far stronger than possible statements such as, for example, that the 
issue is moot, or that attributing beliefs to animals is not only instrumentally useful but one 
                                                 
43 And here he faces the problem that his anthropocentric account does not fit in with gradual 
acquisition of mental capacities. I relate to this issue in section C below. 
44 Earlier I have emphasised that Davidson attempts to demonstrate how behaviour is misleading, but 
he does it only with regard to heat-seeking missiles, not with regard to animals. Moreover, the 
comparison between animals and heat-seeking missiles assumes a Cartesian conception of animals as 
automata, a conception that Davidson surely would have rejected. 




day might also be revealed as true. Davidson's statement that attributing beliefs to animals is 
not true is not based on showing that experiments on this matter were insufficiently 
controlled, and it is not based on doubts regarding similarities between the brains of humans 
and higher mammals but is rather based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning. As I argued 
earlier, Davidson only argues for the interrelationship between mental states, language, and 
interpretation of utterances. The bottom line is that given the idea that any thought or belief 
requires language—an idea based on the human paradigm—any attribution of such mental 
states to animals cannot be true.         
However, empirical findings such as animal behaviour may teach us something, or at 
least lead us in the right direction. As Byrne says about experiments concerning deception:  
For the 18 cases [of deception] that seem intentional, any 
one of them can still be challenged and an explanation 
devised that is based on a hypothetical series of coincidences 
in the past that might have given rise to learning by 
association. However, as the hypothesized coincidences 
become more and more far-fetched, and the histories of 
possible events that just might have reinforced these tactics 
grew longer and longer, we decided at some point it was 
simpler to accept that some primates can understand 
intentions. (1995, 134) 
 
In this self-consciously written paragraph, Byrne points to a sort of balance between possible 
theories and the empirical observation. The observations have not given cut and dried results, 
but they do point at the possibility that chimpanzees are able to deceive. This is a possibility, 
therefore, that deserves a careful attention. 
Yet in reply to Byrne, all that Davidson could have said is that attributing to some 
kinds of apes the ability to deceive is useful, but not true. This is because his anthropocentric 
a priori reasoning dictates that in order to deceive, the animal must have the concept of belief, 
and in order to be able to differentiate between 'the situation as it is' and 'what others may 
believe about this situation' the animal must have the concept of objective truth—a concept 
which requires language. Davidson would have similarly repeated his argument with regard to 
surprise. In other words, based on his anthropocentric a priori reasoning, from the outset 




chimpanzees; the requirement of language makes it redundant to examine the empirical data. 
This is how his reasoning bypasses, for instance, experiments concerning potential deception 
in chimpanzees. 
Now, let us imagine a situation in which an experiment will produce very clear results 
concerning the ability of chimpanzees to deceive. Let us even imagine that lots of thinkers 
and scientists who were sceptical about the ability of chimpanzees to deceive admitted their 
astonishment at this experiment. It is unclear what Davidson would have said in this case. 
Based on his theory, and based on his anthropocentric a priori reasoning, it seems that he 
would have to reject the possibility that chimpanzees could deceive. 
A salient characteristic of anthropocentric reasoning with regard to animals is that it 
is focused on negation in absolute terms of the possibility that animals have certain mental 
capacities. My critique shows that this reasoning does not invite us either to interpret or to 
attempt to understand sophisticated behaviour of animals. In that sense my critique also shows 
that this reasoning attempts to restrict the debate in this issue to philosophy of language. In 
contrast, I have offered to take the relevant empirical findings into consideration in order to 
enable the possibility of obtaining a better understanding of animal behaviour. Incorporating 
the relevant empirical findings into the research may not produce the results that many animal 
lovers have hoped for. It is a resource, however, that one should use in order to enable fruitful 
research.  
Importantly, the possibility of conducting a discussion about the correct interpretation 
of empirical findings is an advantage; it enables this approach to be self-critical. Thus, it 
enables one the possibility to recognise that one may be wrong and to attempt to device an 
alternative account that will provide a more satisfying explanation. And for that matter, 'a 
more satisfying explanation' might also be one that attempts to show that certain empirical 
findings are irrelevant for a certain research, for such an explanation would not be based on a 





Another issue that deserves attention is the assumption that both my opponents and I agree on, 
i.e., that animals are languageless, or do not have a developed language. Recall that this 
assumption is based on empirical observations. Thus, the neglect of the relevant empirical 
findings (namely, empirical findings that do not concern the issue of language) becomes even 
more problematic once one recalls this assumption. Namely, if my opponents would deny the 
use of empirical findings on the legitimate basis that it is available to many interpretations, 
then they would have to provide an argument that explains why using the empirical findings 
for establishing the assumption we agree on regarding animals not having language is 
justified, or at least legitimate, whereas the use of empirical findings in the case of mental 
capacities is entirely unjustified. Given what I have explained throughout this chapter 
regarding the possibility of having a certain capacity in a non-paradigmatic manner, providing 
such an explanation will be very difficult. 
 
C. Explanatory Value 
One criterion with which the success of an account can be measured is in its explanatory 
value. My account damages anthropocentric a priori reasoning by showing the rift between 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning and empirical findings, primarily by showing that as a 
consequence of relying on the human paradigm of being a 'language user', anthropocentric a 
priori reasoning cannot explain stages of acquiring certain mental capacities. Davidson, in 
particular, cannot explain the stages of acquiring language. 
Nonetheless, such an explanation is of extra importance because without it our 
possession of mental abilities is characterised in terms of 'all or nothing': either you have the 
ability to be self-aware or you do not; either you have the ability to form beliefs or you do not. 
Note that the main problem is not that an explanation for gradual acquisition of such mental 
capacities is not provided, but rather that it cannot be provided once we work from the human 
paradigm. For instance, consider the case of surprise: the very idea of gradual acquisition of 




necessary condition for the ability to be surprised. Gradual acquisition of this ability assumes 
that being surprised is possible even without knowing anything about the concept of objective 
truth. But the idea of gradual acquisition of this ability stands in contrast to the 
anthropocentric analysis of surprise, and thus, such an account simply cannot provide an 
explanation for the process by which young children develop the ability to be surprised. 
Similarly, Leahy's account of self-awareness is indifferent to the thesis that full-fledged self-
consciousness emerges from primitive types of non-conceptual self-awareness.46
Yet, Davidson claims that it is instrumentally useful but false to attribute beliefs or 
thoughts to animals. Davidson did not relate to young children while presenting his argument. 
The importance of relating to the case of young children is that one is exposed to the process 
of gaining mental capacities: a baby who is two days old cannot be surprised, but, following 
Davidson, it may be instrumentally useful to attribute to him this capacity from a certain 
stage. Nonetheless, surely from a certain point such an attribution is not only instrumentally 
useful, but true as well. Yet, Davidson's account concerning the concept of belief and his 
holistic position cannot address this issue (see also footnote 25). 
As I have argued earlier (in part V), when contrasted with the case of children, 
Davidson reasserts his argument and does not address the issue of the first stages of acquiring 
language. (In order to do that, he would have had to incorporate an argument concerning the 
powers that make language possible). In that sense his reply is very similar to the reply that I 
estimated on his behalf to the imaginary experiment in section B above. The main difference 
between the case of animals and that of children is that in the case of children, the 
'experiment' is not imaginary: children acquire language, as well as mental capacities, 
gradually. Based on the human paradigm, Davidson's account simply cannot provide an 
explanation for the case of children.  
One does not necessarily need to provide an account about the process of acquiring 
mental capacities. However, if one does not explain this, then one cannot simply deny the 
possibility of a primitive possession of the mental capacities under examination. Although in 
                                                 




many cases the correct interpretation of animal behaviour is, indeed, debatable, nonetheless, 
recalling the statement of Byrne quoted in section B above, from a certain point it is simpler 
to accept that some animals are, for instance, able to waylay and to cooperate in a kill, rather 
than imply a denial of these and other putative abilities. In other words, the explanatory value 
of anthropocentric a priori reasoning in the cases that I have examined is relatively low, even 
with regard to human beings.  
This can be clearly seen regarding competing a priori accounts. Although it is agreed 
that empirical findings may invite multiple interpretations, nonetheless, one must remember 
that conceptual arguments are not immune from mistakes. How are we to decide, then, 
between competing conceptual arguments? Consider, for instance, the highlight of Evnine's 
account that we have met in part V, namely, the idea that the process of acquiring language is 
molecular and not holistic. Like Davidson, Evnine provides a conceptual argument. Yet, in 
contrast to Davidson, Evnine's account can accommodate the idea that animals have primitive 
beliefs. So, again, how are we to decide which account is more reasonable or more 
preferable? It appears that the key issue is that Evnine's account is non-anthropocentric, and 
hence it is much more reasonable than anthropocentric a priori accounts, which are based on 
the human paradigm. Specifically, its explanatory value is higher: it simply explains more, 
and without creating unnecessary problems. Moreover, it can still accommodate the case of 
the human paradigm. On the one hand, it provides a general theoretical framework of gradual 
acquisition of language (and beliefs) which can accommodate the anthropocentric account 
with regard to normal, adult human beings. On the other hand, it appears to fit in much better 
than anthropocentric accounts with the empirical findings with regard to children. From the 
case of children, i.e., pre-linguistic creatures, it may be enlarged to the case of animals, i.e., 
non-linguistic creatures. At the same time, it does not explain 'too much': there is no risk that 
this framework could be seriously applied to machines or heat-seeking missiles since in these 






Note that I have not argued against a priori reasoning in general, but against anthropocentric a 
priori reasoning. I also have not argued that the empirical findings should prevail over a priori 
reasoning. Additionally, recall that the main argument that I have presented was conceptual in 
its nature. The requirements of anthropocentric a priori reasoning, I claimed, may very 
adequately represent the case of paradigmatic humans, and that is the advantage of this 
reasoning. However, the attempt to see this reasoning as an absolute model for having certain 
mental capacities, such as beliefs and thoughts, is a disadvantage. We can avoid this 
disadvantage by relating to behaviour of animals as well as children in order to assist us in 
analysing the development of mental capacities, in attempting to provide a sufficient account 
for our observations. In many cases, empirical findings (of any kind) are inconclusive and 
may be subject to several interpretations. But relating to the relevant empirical findings 
seriously via non-anthropocentric reasoning has a significant advantage over anthropocentric 




My aim in this chapter has not been to defend the claim that animals possess some mental 
capacities such as beliefs and intentionality. Rather, my aim has been to expose the 
anthropocentrism in the discourse of the animal issue and its implications.  
As this chapter stressed throughout, Kenny, Leahy, Davidson, and others have not 
addressed the possibility of having differing qualitative degrees of possessing a capacity. By 
keeping the human perspective as the only possible standard, they have developed an 
argument that proves what we already know: to have a human capacity—that is, to possess a 
capacity in the human manner of that capacity—one has to be human. Yet by arguing from 
this perspective (which is deeply embedded in our way of thinking and thus seems perfectly 
natural and legitimate), these philosophers have not really addressed the issue, or at best, they 




We tend to conceive of our mental states as language-based, since doing so allows us 
to mark a significant distinction between us and all other living creatures. I have called into 
question this tendency and disclosed its limitations. Moreover, in dealing with this aspect of 
our experience we have a very substantial body of work to relate to, since we think with 
words, reflect on thoughts using words, and hence, at least potentially, remain faithful to the 
subject-matter and carry out an accurate analysis. That is to say, we are much more disposed 
to dealing with the linguistic aspects of our lives than with non-linguistic aspects. Still, adult 
humans are conscious in many ways that cannot be accurately described in terms of states of 
mind with propositional content. However, references to such experiential states, either as 
recollection or as reflection, are usually soiled with language, and hence, by definition, miss 
their very essence. Only seldomly do we maintain a thought of the type 'what exactly 
happened to me then when I was so surprised', namely, when I experienced a surprise (and it 
is hard to explain this experience to others). Accordingly, it is much harder to locate the 
subject-matter in these cases, and to be accurate while focusing on it. This ubiquity of 
language has detrimental effects on the philosophical accounts of animals' mental capacities. 
It seems that a main reason for the denial of animals' sophisticated mental capacities is that it 
is very difficult for us to comprehend and theorise any non-linguistic mental state. It is thus 
much easier to formulate an argument against animals' mental capacity than to formulate an 
argument in its favour. At any rate, our interest in the linguistic aspects of our lives cannot 
and should not serve as a justification for making language the only standard for the 
possession of mental capacities such as beliefs and intentionality. 
The solution to the conceptual problem regarding animals' mental capacities should 
not be based on the elimination of a priori reasoning, but rather of the elimination of 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning. In order to conduct a non-anthropocentric inquiry, one 
does not have to stop being human but rather to draw on the elements that are shared by 
humans and animals, and to be willing to relate to empirical findings without categorically 
resisting it on an anthropocentric a priori basis. Moreover, one would need to consider the 




conceptualisation. The immediate and perhaps too familiar response is that many 
interpretations of empirical findings in support of animals are based on the highly emotional 
attitudes of animal lovers and pro-animal researchers.47 To a certain extent, I agree with that 
response. But one may consider that 'animal lovers' attribute a greater variety of mental states 
to animals since they are simply more familiar with their behaviour, or, more interestingly, 
because their observations are not inhibited by categorical negation of the possibility that 
animals may have certain mental capacities. Therefore, it might be that they are more 
attentive, and thus more competent to examine their behaviour.48  
Another common response is that pro-animal observers anthropomorphise the 
animals' behaviour. But we should note that not every ascription of intentionality to a dog, for 
instance, would be anthropomorphic. The delicate distinction here is that the ascription of 
intentionality to the dog would be anthropomorphic only if one is to argue that there is no 
difference between the intentional states of the dog and the intentional states of humans. This 
is not a mere terminological game; this opens up further inquiry into the degrees of 
intentionality (and other capacities) between lower and higher levels of animal mental 
capacities. While it might be tempting to search for clear-cut answers, this matter needs much 
more investigation without, perhaps, achieving any accurate conclusions in comparison with 
the human case. This issue also concerns the degree of specificity of knowledge regarding 
animal abilities that one expects. I deal with this in the next chapter. 
To conclude, we should break the cycle in which anthropocentric a priori reasoning 
serves as a criterion for cases that are not based on human paradigms. Avoiding 
anthropocentric a priori reasoning where it is irrelevant would prepare the ground for a 
methodology that could incorporate empirical findings into the research. Such methodology 
would produce a much richer and convincing account of animals' mental capacities—either 
                                                 
47 For instance, Fox claims: "Many people simply lack the ability to think clearly, objectively, and 
consistently about animals" (1986, 13). Frey: "[I]n the case of domesticated animals especially, many 
people, particularly lonely people, regard (and often want to regard) their pet as a kind of lesser human 
being, with a less rich but still plentiful mental life which explains why their cat or dog behaves as it 
does" (1980, 84).  
48 Glock makes the same point (2000, 60). Vicki Hearne (1982) provides a stimulating account of 




for or against their having certain mental capacities. This chapter has not aimed to solve the 
problem of anthropocentric a priori reasoning but to expose it, and by doing so, hopefully 





Indeterminacy of Content and Sceptical Atmosphere 
Anyone can run to excesses, 
It is easy to shoot past the mark, 
It is hard to stand firm in the middle.1
 
I. Introduction 
'Animals do not possess language, and hence we cannot be justified in attributing to them 
intentional mental states'. Would it be correct to interpret this claim to mean that we cannot be 
justified in such an attribution because animals are languageless and cannot report their 
experiences, and hence we do not know what goes on in their minds? Or would it be more 
adequate to interpret this claim to mean that we cannot be justified in such an attribution 
because language is a necessary condition of intentionality, a condition that animals lack? In 
the animal mind discourse, it is not clear whether this claim represents an epistemological 
issue or a conceptual one. In this discourse there is a tendency to confuse these two issues, 
which are, indeed, not always disconnected from one another.  
I take intentionality to be a general type of mental state, and one which includes 
desires, beliefs, and intentions.2 In that sense, the ability to provide reasons to an action refers 
to a specific sort of intentionality which is reserved for language users. However, the general 
approach to animal intentionality is influenced by the human paradigm, and thus 
intentionality is taken by many to be a language-dependent concept. Based on the 
paradigmatic case—that of normal, adult humans who possess rich linguistic capabilities—
                                                 
1 Ezra Pound, from "Canto XIII" (1954, 63). 
2 I consider intentionality to be a type of mental state that occurs, at least partially, in the brain. 
Following Davidson and others, I remain silent about the real nature of these mental states. That is, I do 
not offer a definition in terms of neuroscience. I partially accept Dennett's (1983) conception that 
belief, desire, etcetera are terms of convenience, i.e., they represent mental states or capabilities that we 
can classify under these terms in order to explain or predict an action. I also accept Dennett's idea that 
intentionality of any kind cannot be linked to any single brain state that can be pinpointed, for instance, 
as the belief itself. At the same time, however, I do not think of these terms instrumentally as Dennett 
does, although I do agree with his instrumental approach in relation to his project. In our daily lives we 
do generally manage to interpret the world in a way that enables us to survive and to flourish, which is 
not to say that our interpretations of many phenomena are necessarily in line with the real nature of 
things. Hence, I hold that the main premises of folk psychology can serve as reasonable working 
assumptions. For a similar position, see Horgan and Woodward (1985, 150). In contrast to eliminative 
materialism, I support the idea that there is no urgent need to reject some basic assumptions of folk 
psychology. Even if it will turn out that "there are no beliefs", the concept of belief is still strongly 
explanatory, as are other folk notions—for both the human case and the animal case. 
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one thesis maintains that there is an asymmetry between humans and animals regarding the 
justified ascription of intentionality. This asymmetry thesis, I argue, conflates epistemological 
issues and conceptual issues, which in turn creates double standards of doubt regarding 
intentionality attribution: actual doubt in the animal case, and methodological doubt in the 
human case.  
What is meant by 'actual doubt' and 'methodological doubt'? Within the debate about 
animal minds, the doubt as to whether animals have intentional states is real, i.e., actual. By  
contrast, when considering humans, the same claims (for instance, the claim that humans have 
beliefs) are justified solely in theoretical terms, i.e., methodologically, or for the sake of 
philosophy, while the mental capacities that humans possess are usually not called into 
question at all (this justification is usually given in the context of discussion about 
scepticism). The actual doubt should also be understood in the context of the sceptical 
atmosphere surrounding the discussion of animals' mental capacities, the atmosphere that has 
framed the subject and distorted the approach to the animal mind issue. 3  Part of this 
atmosphere is based on the difficulty of providing a positive account of non-propositional 
mental states. Such an account, by definition, steps out from the core discourse of philosophy 
of language which is very influential in this context.  
My focus in this chapter is on the issue of determinacy of content in the animal mind 
discourse. Within this issue, the epistemological problem of other minds and the conceptual 
problem concerning the conditions of intentional states represent two sides of the same coin: 
on the one hand it concerns the conditions for having mental states that consist of determinate 
content, and on the other it concerns the ability of a spectator to attribute determinate content 
to mental states. I show how the problem of indeterminacy of content is just as applicable to 
normal and/or adult humans as to animals, and that in many cases it is not a problem at all. 
The similarity between the human case and the animal case concerns non-propositional 
                                                 
3 The distorted approach that frames the discourse and hence the subject is not unique to the animal 
issue. Searle, for example, in commenting on cognitive sciences, claims that, "[a]s recently as a few 
years ago, if one raised the subject of consciousness in cognitive discussions, it was generally regarded 
as a form of bad taste, and graduate students, who are always attuned to the social mores of their 
disciplines, would roll their eyes at the ceiling and assume expressions of mild disgust" (1990, 585). 
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intentional states. The actual doubt concerning animals is a result of working with a standard 
that only fits the case of language-based intentional states, which is irrelevant to the animal 
case. This will entail that the actual doubt regarding animal intentionality be unjustified. I will 
also show that actual doubt regarding animals' non-propositional intentions, desires and 
beliefs, entails the employment of such doubt in the human case as well.  
In the following analysis, I will examine the issue of determinacy of content in the 
animal mind discourse, refuting the commonly held view that there is asymmetry between the 
animal case and the human case regarding our ability to determine the content of intentional 
mental states. 
 
II. The Asymmetry Thesis 
The Asymmetry Thesis embedded in animal mind discourse can be summed up as follows:  
There is an asymmetry between humans and animals 
regarding the justified ascription of intentionality because 
humans have language while animals do not. 
 
The claim here—which is held, explicitly or implicitly, by many philosophers—is that due to 
the language factor, there is a categorical difference between humans and animals regarding 
the way we should justify the attribution of intentionality to them.4 This thesis entails a 
confusion between conceptual and epistemological issues, which is represented in the 
extended asymmetry thesis: 
There is an asymmetry between the debate about the animal 
mind and the epistemological scepticism in the general case 
of the problem of other minds.  
  In the case of humans (a) 'we cannot know that other 
people have minds or mental states', or 'we do not know that 
p'.  
In the case of animals (b) 'we can know that animals 
do not have intentional mental states', or 'we know that not-
p'. 
 
                                                 
4 Hampshire (1959); Black (1968); Leahy (1991); Frey (1980); Davidson (1975 and 1982); Kenny 
(1989). 
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This thesis represents the immediate professional response, which argues for asymmetry 
between humans and animals concerning the attribution of intentional mental states. However, 
concerning non-propositional intentional states, this thesis is mistaken and confuses two 
different issues.  
The first issue is epistemological, i.e., arguments of type (a) are usually sceptical 
arguments that are based on our lack of knowledge of other minds. The second issue is 
conceptual, i.e., it concerns the conditions of having certain mental states. Thus, arguments of 
type (b) centre upon the conditions necessary for certain mental states. For instance, if 
language is considered to be a necessary condition for beliefs, then a creature who lacks 
language cannot have these beliefs. Thus, when one claims that one knows that not-p, or that 
one knows that animals cannot have beliefs, one establishes this statement about his or her 
knowledge that animals lack the necessary condition for having beliefs. Note that although 
one uses an epistemic vocabulary ("I know") to demonstrate arguments of type (b), such 
arguments neither concern an epistemological problem, nor are they sceptical arguments.5 In 
sum, the extended asymmetry thesis provides us with two different types of arguments that 
represent two different issues. 
The confusion between the issues is reflected in the mistaken idea that in the animal 
case we are faced with a conceptual problem concerning the condition of intentional mental 
states, while in the human case we are faced only with the epistemological problem of other 
minds. This confusion is at the basis of applying actual doubt in the animal case rather then 
methodological doubt as in the human case, and has become a rigid and powerful dogma that 
represents the tacit spirit of many arguments. Thus, it frames the animal mind discourse in 
such a way that promotes the discounting of the similarities between humans and animals 
                                                 
5 The conceptual issue concerns only the conditions of having certain mental states; it is like saying that 
'I know that there is no electric light in the room because I disconnected the electricity to it, and 
therefore there is no way that there could be electric light in that room'. The room lacks a necessary 
condition for 'having an electric light'.  
 50
regarding the problem of other minds, as well as the inattention to conceptual issues that are 
relevant to the human case, especially concerning non-paradigmatic cases.6  
While examining the issue of determinacy of content in the human case, I will show 
that the asymmetry thesis is mistaken as far as it concerns non-propositional intentional states. 
My argument will show that there is a symmetry in certain aspects between humans and 
animals, particularly in the way in which we justify the ascription of intentional mental states 
to them.7 This entails that there is no justification for the double standards doubt: for the same 
reasons that in very many cases one dismisses the problems of indeterminacy of content in the 
human case, one should also dismiss it in the animal case. At first the problem seems only 
conceptual, and not epistemological.8 However, it will become clear that the epistemological 
issue is of much relevance to our concern—especially with regard to the problem of 
indeterminacy of content.  
 
III. Indeterminacy of Content: The General Reasoning 
The argument of type (b), that 'we can know that animals do not have intentional mental 
states', or 'we know that not-p', typically maintains that language is a condition necessary for 
intentionality. This thesis about language stands in contrast to the idea that language clothes 
internal intentionality with words; and it becomes crucial especially when it concerns higher 
mental capacities, which, supposedly, cannot even be manifested in behaviour. This leads us 
to the problem of indeterminacy of content concerning the content of animals' mental states. 
Determinate content, the claim goes, can be attributed only to those who are able to 
possess determinate content, or content that can be specifiable, namely, specified accurately. 
Thus, creatures who can possess determinate content must be language users. Naturally, the 
requirement of determinate content also involves a constraint concerning the ability of the 
                                                 
6 McGinn also claims that there is confusion between epistemological and ontological issues (1995, 
732).  
7 I do not argue that language has no special role to play in the ascription of some intentional mental 
states to humans. I do argue, however, that language plays a much larger role in this philosophical 
debate than it should, and that language is unnecessary for the ascription of many kinds of intentional 
mental states. 
8 This view is taken by Nagel (1986, 19). 
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spectator to ascribe determinate content-possession to someone. This constraint concerns the 
conditions under which an attribution of content would be possible, or under which an 
interpretation of linguistic and bodily behaviour would be considered reasonable. We saw 
Davidson's example of such an argument in the previous chapter: 
That oak tree, as it happens, is the oldest tree in sight. Does 
the dog think that the cat went up the oldest tree in sight? Or 
that the cat went up the same tree it went up the last time the 
dog chased it? It is hard to make sense of the questions. But 
then it does not seem possible to distinguish between quite 
different things the dog might be said to believe. (1982, 474) 
 
Stich provides a similar argument, but is more explicit: 
If we were to suppose that animals do have beliefs, we 
would find ourselves utterly incapable of saying what they 
believe. But it is absurd to suggest that we can explain an 
animal's behaviour in terms of its desires and beliefs when 
we cannot say what it is that the animal believes. (1979, 18) 
 
These quotations emphasise our inability—as spectators—to determine the words that depict 
animal belief, and to attribute concepts to animals.9 The content of beliefs (and of attributed 
beliefs) is, for us, composed of words, but animals do not posses a language.10 Even if a dog 
possesses a primitive language, he certainly does not understand English or any other human 
languages, and hence the sentence 'this man is about to feed me' cannot express the content of 
his belief. The idea underlying such arguments is that our inability to attach terms that 
correctly represent to ourselves the content of the animal's intentional state reflects the 
                                                 
9  Intentionality allegedly cannot be manifested in the animals' bodily or linguistic repertoire. 
Subsequently, the argument goes, even if it can be manifested in the behavioural repertoire of animals, 
it is not considered an exhaustive justification since, by exploiting the slippery slope argument, their 
behavioural repertoire may lead to a deflationary argument which can work for too many kinds of 
animals, and sometimes even plants and machines.  
10 In line with my argument in chapter one, in saying that animals are languageless, I refer only to 
human-like language, which is the relevant language to our concern. However, note that in many cases 
the consideration of animals as languageless ignores the fact that animals communicate by making 
voice. Crucially, in many cases we are able to interpret this voice. For instance, Evans and Marler 
(1995) argue: "The alarm calls of vervet monkeys, ring-tailed lemurs, and chickens function like words 
in the sense that they are arbitrary acoustic labels that are reliably associated with defined categories of 
visual stimuli. We might thus begin to make the case that some of the differences between animal 
systems and language are quantitative rather than qualitative, although the difference between a 
'vocabulary' of a few calls and one of some tens of thousands of words, as in human adults, is a 
prodigious one" (1995, 371). For an extensive discussion on animal communication and its 
implications concerning the animal mind, see Griffin (1995, esp. 195-198). See also footnote 40 in 
chapter one. 
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impossibility of justifying an attribution of such a state, or, rather, of justifying its existence.11 
Our inability here is conceptual: I cannot see through a dog's mind not because of the other 
mind problem, but because there is nothing there to be properly expressed by a sentence. 
According to this reasoning, interpretation of bodily and 'linguistic' behaviour of animals will 
not suffice as justification. This is because representing to ourselves the content of animals' 
mental states, based on their behaviour, is not considered as approximation, but as an 
anthropomorphic projection: animals, the claim goes, simply lack the necessary infrastructure, 
i.e., language, to have intentional mental states. Lacking language, even the animal itself 
cannot formulate the object of its beliefs.12  
A similar reasoning occurs regarding concept possession. Even under the assumption 
that at least certain concepts are not language dependent, the dog still does not posses the 
concepts in the sentence 'this man is about to feed me', and thus one cannot attribute to the 
dog the desire to be fed by the man. Stich offers such an argument: 
 [C]onsider trusty Fido who sees his master bury a meaty 
bone in the back yard. Fido goes out the door and begins 
pawing at the very spot where the bone is buried. On the 
belief-desire account, Fido believes that there is a meaty 
bone buried in the yard and wants to get it. […] It surely 
cannot be quite right to say that Fido believes there is a 
meaty bone buried in the yard. After all, Fido does not even 
have the concept of a bone, much less the concept of a meaty 
bone or a yard. He may be able to recognise bones tolerably 
well, provided they are typical examples and presented under 
conditions that are not too outlandish. But this is hardly 
enough to establish that he has the concept of a bone or any 
beliefs or desires about bones. […] We cannot explain a 
dog's behaviour in terms of its beliefs since we cannot say 
what a dog's beliefs are. (1979, 18-19) 
 
The idea is that even if one tries to make sense of the concept of 'man' in dogs' terms, i.e., in 
terms of raw or primitive concepts, one will find it impossible to maintain this attribution. For 
instance: you say 'man' since it is convenient, but you do not really think that the dog 
possesses this term. So you replace 'man' with 'this thing', that is, 'this thing is about to feed 
                                                 
11 For this type of argument, see also Dennett (1969, 85). 
12 This, of course, implies denying any animals' intentional states—mental states that involve an object. 
If I desire X, then X is the object of my desire. Attributing to me the mental state of desiring X amounts 
to knowing the content of my desire. Frey (1980, 88), although I disagree with his account, was 
consistent in denying animals desires as well as beliefs. See footnote 16 in chapter one. 
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me'. The same reasoning stands here as well: the dog does not possess the concept of 'figure' 
or 'thing', and it even makes things worse, because these concepts (once one works from the 
human paradigm as the only standard) are considered abstract, and it seems far-fetched to 
attribute the possession of abstract concepts to dogs. The upshot of this reasoning is, again, 
that we cannot represent animals' intentional mental states adequately, and we therefore 
cannot justify their existence.13  
Note that such arguments—which are based on determinacy of content and rigid 
holism—would also deny normal adult humans many intentional mental states. If one takes 
this line of argument seriously, then one must conclude that we are not justified in ascribing 
beliefs to humans on the basis of ambiguity and rough predictions. However, if we are not 
justified in such ascriptions, then we could not have maintained our lives within societies. In 
other words, this consequence simply does not stand the test of reality regarding humans. As 
Searle puts it: "Where it really matters, where something is at stake, folk theories have to be 
in general true or we would not have survived" (1992, 58-59). 
Once faced with such reasoning concerning determinacy of content, one can offer 
examples of unarticulated beliefs in the human case in order to refute the need for determinate 
content. For instance, there is no specific content that stands for Smith's belief that he is in 
love. As a matter of fact, nothing can depict the content of such a belief non-arbitrarily (and 
this concerns self attributions as well). But this does not mean that Smith does not believe that 
he is infatuated. Smith can even have a second-order belief about it.14  
Consider another example: I leave my flat to go to the university. In my bag I have 
some books which I borrowed from the library. I put them consciously into my bag. Yet, I do 
not think about it in terms of: 'I believe it is about time to return these books to the library'; 'I 
put them into my bag because it will force me to return them to the library'; 'I will return these 
books only if I find the time', etc.  The fact is that I just put them in my bag, and neither I nor 
someone else can say whether I tried to force myself to return the books, or just tried to leave 
                                                 
13 Williams makes an ambiguous claim along this line of thought against animal belief (1973, 139).  
14 Note that this example as well as the example that follows were not meant to be decisive. Moreover, 
eventually I claim that within the terms of the reasoning that I describe, both examples are irrelevant.  
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it as an option. It is also a fact that sometimes I do return the books I have in my bag to the 
library, and that sometimes I do not. In this case, like many others in our lives, it seems that it 
is impossible to determine the content of the mental state that I was experiencing in relation to 
the action of putting the books in the bag (although it is possible to determine an alleged 
content). The crucial point, again, is that even I, in the first person, do not know what kind of 
proposition will fit in order to describe that situation adequately. Even if one would have 
provided information about how determinate 'determinate content' should be, it will beg the 
question regarding the epistemological issue as well as the conceptual issue: regarding the 
former, I can always be mistaken in ascribing to someone certain mental content, whether 
animal or human; regarding the latter, it seems that there is no determinate content in such 
situations—or perhaps there is no content at all.  
These examples demonstrate that there are many cases in which we have excellent 
grounds to consider ourselves justified in attributing intentional states to others, although the 
content of the attributed intentional states is not determinate, but only alleged or approximate. 
In other words, these examples show that the reasoning that underlies the idea of determinacy 
of content is too demanding. However, when considering the common argument regarding 
determinacy of content, it appears that the examples I just discussed are irrelevant. This is 
because in the cases that these examples describe, we have already assumed large 
isomorphism between networks of beliefs—similarity between the networks of intentional 
states of the person who attributes content and the other person to whom this content was 




IV. Similarity between Networks of Intentional States 
Stich offers the notion of similarity between networks of intentional states as a device that 
enables belief attribution in folk-psychology. He argues as follows: 
We are comfortable in attributing to a subject a belief with a 
specific content only if we can assume the subject to have a 
broad network of related beliefs that is largely isomorphic 
with our own. When a subject does not share a very 
substantial part of our network of beliefs in a given area we 
are no longer capable of attributing content to his beliefs in 
this area. (1979, 22) 
 
The main claim is that in attributing a belief, we tacitly use the notion of similarity between 
networks of beliefs.15 This idea can be characterised as follows: 
1. X can determine that Y has a belief only if X can express the content of Y's belief 
accurately, or can make it specifiable. 
2. In order for X to be able to express the content of Y's belief accurately, or to make it 
specifiable, it is insufficient that Y has a network of beliefs, unless this network is 
very similar to X's network of beliefs.  
3. Only language users can have very similar networks of beliefs.16 
Therefore, 
4. A justified attribution of content can take place only between language users.17  
                                                 
15 A similar position is held by Goldman in his discussion on simulation (1995b, 723).  
16 Although my appeal to language does not appear explicitly in Stich's text above, he makes all the 
moves that point to language as one of the necessary conditions for a justified attribution of beliefs—
attributing specific content cannot be carried out without language. Later on in his book (1983), Stich 
does refer explicitly to language: "[…] Fido does not express his belief verbally and is not a member of 
a linguistic community. So the fact that he does not distinguish squirrels from others (actual or 
possible) squirrel-like things generates puzzles about how his belief is to be characterized" (1983, 105). 
Collin Allen (1992, 551) points out that it is simply untrue that an animal cannot make that kind of 
distinction between an animal and an animal-like object. Either way, the important issue here is the 
animal case, in which language (in the relevant sense) does not take place. Thus, as I argued in chapter 
one, even if one would refer to the powers that make language possible, it will be irrelevant to the 
animal case. As to the case of pre-linguistic children, I have already said in chapter one that I do not 
equate their case with that of non-linguistic creatures and thus have not argued that children at the pre-
linguistic stage have the same cognitive capacities as animals. I argued that in both cases it seems that 
non-linguistic thoughts take place. (See the end of part V in this chapter for a discussion regarding the 
similar methodology of Stich and Davidson). 
17 Stich's claim (1983) regarding animal beliefs should be understood in the context of rejecting the 
concept of belief as it is understood within the domain of folk psychology. Stich is interested in going 
beyond folk psychology towards cognitive science while claiming that folk notions such as belief do 
not suit scientific inquiry, be it about humans or animals. My concern here is not in disputing that. My 
disagreement with Stich lies within the domain of folk psychology, i.e., with his positive account of folk 
notions. In any case, Stich is interested in preserving folk psychological notions for certain needs, 
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A. Premise 1 
According to premise (1), the issue is the possibility of attributing accurate or specific 
content. Note, however, that 'specific content' does not stand for the actual content that one 
has in mind given a certain belief, but for one's potential to ascribe an alleged specific content 
to other humans. This content is only estimated, but the crunch is that it makes sense to 
attribute such content because the other and I are both language users, and thus possess 
networks of beliefs which are largely isomorphic. This will not make sense in the animal case, 
however, since animals are languageless, and thus their alleged networks of beliefs are not 
largely isomorphic with ours. In other words, based on the similarity between networks of 
beliefs, one can still attribute to me beliefs in the examples discussed earlier (being in love, 
returning my books to the library). This is because the requirement is not for the actual 
content that I had—or did not have—in mind. The requirement is only to have a broad 
network of related beliefs that are largely isomorphic with one's own.  
The conclusion that belief attribution can take place only between language users is 
based, however, on the human paradigm, and cannot account for the case of pre-linguistic 
children and young children. Note that it does not matter that in the case of young children, as 
in the animal case, the content of their 'so called' beliefs is not specific or actual. The 
significant thing is that young children's networks of beliefs are not largely isomorphic with 
those of language users. Hence, the argument entails that we cannot justifiably pin down even 
the estimated content of pre-linguistic children's mental states, and consequently cannot be 
justified in ascribing beliefs to them. The case of older children whose language is only 
primitive is also problematic, since, according to the premises of this argument their networks 
of beliefs cannot be very similar to ours. Stich would probably agree with this criticism. 
However, the fact is that in our daily life we consider ourselves to be justified in attributing 
                                                                                                                                            
which are not scientific, and that is why he offers his account of these notions. The main thing at stake 
for our concern is not only his positive account of folk notions, but also the reasoning that it represents.  
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beliefs to pre-linguistic children and young children—especially as it works fairly well—
although such attributions are defeasible.18
 
B. Premise 2 
The requirement in premise (2), concerning networks of beliefs that are largely isomorphic 
with ours (i.e., adult, normal humans), is also problematic. The idea is that belief ascription 
requires sufficient similarity between mental networks (that of the ascriber and that of the 
subject to whom one ascribes beliefs). But this requirement is ambiguous because the 
conditions under which 'very similar' will be considered similar enough are unclear. Yet 
again, whatever the conditions are, this requirement cannot be employed in many cases of 
pre-linguistic children and older children who possess only a primitive language. This 
suggests that, for instance, one cannot make sense of the call 'Papa' or 'Mama' either in terms 
of belief or in terms of desire, since young children have neither the concepts of 'Mama' and 
'Papa', nor the concepts of 'parents' or 'family'.19
Like Davidson's holism and its consequences, which I discussed in chapter one, the 
main problem with the large isomorphism argument is that it assumes fully developed 
concepts of other subjects (that in turn assumes language), and fully developed 
interrelationships between concepts, as a background starting point of belief attribution. The 
result is that this argument provides the mechanism that enables one to justify that someone 
has beliefs as long as this person has fully developed concepts and fully developed 
interrelationships between concepts. In other words, this argument identifies the conditions of 
                                                 
18 Stich (1983, 8) is aware of problems arising in attributing beliefs to children and people with brain 
injuries as a consequence of his account, and claims that this consequence is embedded in the 
problematic nature of folk psychology. However it seems that the problem is not with folk psychology 
but with his argument: this argument cannot underlie folk-psychology, because in practice our 
attribution of beliefs in borderline cases can be successful. It is definitely successful in the case of 
children and animals, at least in the relevant respects: namely, when it concerns certain kinds of 
intentionality. I shall relate to this issue in due course. 
19 Beckwith provides an account regarding how children learn words, and in particular how they learn 
terms with abstract references. For instance, he argues as follows: "There can be no successful 
reference given a nominalist listener and a speaker making reference to categories that have no causal 
efficacy—for example, abstract objects such as that referred to by mental ascriptions. However, if the 
speaker refers to an abstract object (e.g., happiness), and the listener believes that the reference is to 
some concrete correlate of the abstract object (e.g., a smile) we can then have what might be considered 
semisuccessful reference" (1991, 85). 
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a justified attribution of intentional mental states that takes place among adult and normal 
humans. Based on the human paradigm, this argument is unable to explain the process of 
acquiring beliefs,20 which is so relevant to the issue of children and animal beliefs—especially 
due to the success of applying these folk notions.  
There is no doubt that the requirement of determinate content—based on large 
isomorphism of networks of beliefs—is useful and highly relevant in many cases, especially 
to the human case: language users possess mental states that can have very specific content, 
and can be formulated very accurately. For instance, as an adult human I can report that I 
opened the refrigerator because I wanted some vanilla yogurt that I bought today at the corner 
grocery; and that I bought only one vanilla yogurt, and wanted to eat it before my flat-mate 
could grab it (note that the important thing here is not that one can imagine reasons for my 
action, but that one can attribute to my beliefs specific content in that respect). There is no 
easy way, to say the least, to attribute this example to a very young child, but usually there is 
no need either: a cautious attribution of beliefs to young children and animals will avoid such 
accuracy and complexity. This detailed description of my plan and actions represents a case 
that is reserved for language users, but this paradigmatic case, as I shall demonstrate in part 
V, is irrelevant to humans under very many circumstances. 
The problem with the requirement of large isomorphism goes even further. To 
emphasise this point one may suggest the case of aliens. This ambiguous requirement cancels 
out any possibility to attribute beliefs to aliens who might be mentally superior to us, and 
whose language we may not understand. Such creatures—although their behaviour might give 
us the 'impression' of mental sophistication—may not have an expressible language (they 
might, for example, communicate telepathically). Accordingly, one will have to assume that 
our networks of beliefs are not largely isomorphic with their supposed mental network—even 
if it appears that we understand each other fairly well.21 It seems that the argument of large 
                                                 
20 See also the last paragraphs of part IV, section A and footnote 25 in chapter one. 
21 It is important to note that in some cases a report on the existence of a particular mental state would 
be insufficient if not accompanied by a certain action, i.e., a behaviour that will manifest this mental 
state. 
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isomorphism is based on analyticity, and hence leads to triviality: it provides us a way to 
justify that others have beliefs, given that they are like us, and given that we already know 
that they are like us. However, it prevents the possibility of accommodating a conceptual 
change. Additionally, it prevents a justified belief attribution to others who are not like us. 
Nonetheless, this is precisely the intriguing point in question given the success of this method 
and its explanatory value.  
This leads us to another issue in premise (1) concerning the possibility of determining 
content. The fact that the requirement only concerns the potential for another's mental state is 
the key to understanding the requirement of similarity between networks of beliefs. If the 
alleged content that one attributes to someone is supposed to work only 'in principle', then, at 
least indirectly, we ignore the possibility that there is no underlying fact in certain cases. 
Thus, it does not matter whether the alleged content adequately represents what I have in 
mind, for instance, while I am in love. What matters is that 'it makes sense'—that it is 
reasonable to attribute to a particular person certain mental content. That is, the potential to 
attribute content on the basis of large isomorphism eliminates the epistemological circularity 
in the human case by assuming that all humans have similar networks of intentional states.  
It is crucial to our concern that if it makes sense to attribute any content that seems 
reasonable—specific or not—in situations where it seems that there is no content, then it 
appears that there is no substantial reason to reject the idea that we can potentially ascribe 
approximate content to animals. In order to draw the conclusion that we can ascribe estimated 
content to an animal, we must be clearer about my claim concerning the epistemological 
circularity of the large isomorphism argument.  
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V. Epistemological Circularity 
The requirement of large isomorphism is based on epistemological circularity. This is how it 
works:  
Q: Who are the subjects to whom it makes sense to attribute content?  
A: People like me, you and her.  
Q: How do you know that they are (really) like you? 
A: I assume. I assume that their networks of beliefs are very similar to mine.  
Q: How do you know that?  
A: I assume, and for good reason: usually it works. However, obviously I can be wrong. 
I must assume, therefore, that one's network of beliefs is very similar to mine in order to be 
justified in ascribing content to one's mental state. There is a sense in which this account leads 
to triviality: I am justified in ascribing certain content to others if and only if it makes sense to 
do so. By the same token, it is clear that the large isomorphism requirement is in general very 
reasonable regarding normal, adult humans, as confirmed by our daily practice. Indeed, by 
and large we do not doubt that other humans have intentional mental states. If there is any 
serious or actual doubt in that concern, then it is only while facing an extreme situation (for 
example, while we try to maintain a conversation with a senile person). 
The epistemological circularity leads us to examine the rationale of arguments of type 
(a) (see part II above)—'we cannot know that others have minds or mental states'. As I 
mentioned earlier, within the context of the extended asymmetry thesis, this is the problem 
that one ascribes to the human case, while still considering the conceptual issue irrelevant in 
this case. The epistemological issue in type (a) represents the theoretical problem of other 
minds: the problem raised by the radical epistemological sceptic—the theoretical problem of 
other minds—is based on the theoretical worry that 'one cannot know that others have minds 
or mental states'. The epistemological sceptic holds that we do not have any reason to 
continue to believe as we do; thus, the crux of the theoretical other minds problem is that I 
may always be wrong while ascribing to you a certain mental state or even the possession of a 
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mind. This theoretical worry is unlikely to affect our daily lives; it cannot be taken seriously 
outside intellectual debates, and it would be the same apprehension whether it concerns 
humans or animals. Thus, it cannot take us further in our inquiry.  
Nevertheless, arguments of type (a) also lead us to a slightly different problem, 
namely, the practical problem of other minds, upon which it is worth dwelling. The practical 
problem of other minds does not revolve around radical scepticism about minds, but around 
specific doubts about certain cases. For instance, when a person dates someone for a while 
and wonders what the other person is feeling about the relationship, the person wishes he or 
she can see through the other person to get the real answer. While dealing with the practical 
problem of other minds, we have already rejected the main doubt of the radical 
epistemological sceptic. That is, we do consider others to have certain mental states, although 
this attribution can be mistaken. Similar to the theoretical problem, the practical problem of 
other minds applies both to humans and animals.  
The crucial assumption in the way out of the practical problem of other minds 
concerns the importance of language as a device for justification: my understanding of your 
report justifies a claim about the existence of your mental state. My ability to understand the 
content of your mental state and to depict it adequately with words justifies my attributing this 
mental state to you, and therefore the determination that you really have certain mental states 
is justified. In other words, if my attribution is justified, then it points to the existence of your 
mental state. However, from an epistemological perspective, language is irrelevant for many 
cases of attributing intentional states to humans—cases of unarticulated intentional states. 
These mental states are relevant for us because they represent a partial overlap between 
human and animal intentionality. In these cases, the problem of indeterminacy of content 
applies to humans as well.  
When humans cannot express their thoughts with words it does not seems to create an 
epistemological problem regarding the justification of attribution of such thoughts. For 
instance, consider a choreographer who reflects on her new project. Neither we—as 
observers—nor the choreographer herself (in many cases) can say what she believes or 
 62
desires during the process of creation and by the choreography she created. 22  More 
specifically, in many cases the choreographer cannot say why she desires a specific dancer to 
take the leading role, or why she believes that the project should be, for instance, in a 
minimalist style. Later on the choreographer might be able to report on her thoughts, but this 
will be a thought about earlier thoughts. However, the earlier thoughts are our primary focus. 
The example of the choreographer is not a paradigmatic case of normal linguistic 
activity, but this is the main point of our concern, since we are interested precisely in non-
paradigmatic cases. However, according to the line of argument that takes language as a 
justification for attributing intentionality—by enabling determinate content and attribution of 
determinate content—one cannot be justified in attributing desires and beliefs of the sort in 
the choreographer example. This is because neither we nor she can say anything about the 
real content of mental states that cannot be expressed (in contrast to 'described') with 
propositions.  
From the perspective of the practical problem of other minds—which is actually a 
problem that humans face almost everyday—the real content of one's mental state is always 
estimated. This is true whether the content is language-based or not, and whether there is 
content or not. 
Recall that Stich claimed that it is absurd to argue that it is possible to explain animal 
behaviour in terms of animals' desires and beliefs since we cannot say what it is that they 
believe.23 But in this case the same works for humans. The point here is that language cannot 
always serve as a justification for considering that others have certain mental states.24 Clearly 
                                                 
22 Harman makes a similar claim. He uses examples of a chess player and an artist who cannot express 
what led them to a certain action while playing chess or painting (1973, 85). 
23 Note that one can continue the line of argument that is based on lack of language by claiming that we 
do not know what animals feel, and hence that it is absurd to explain what appears to be pain behaviour 
as pointing to a possible present pain. This does not mean that they do not feel pain, but it does not 
mean that they do either. We simply cannot be justified in ascribing them pain, since we might be 
wrong. But this marks a confusion between the theoretical and the practical problems of other minds: 
we can be wrong in ascribing pain to humans, but it does not mean that we are not justified in this 
ascription. Such an argument which confuses the two problems of other minds is presented by Harrison 
(1991). See footnote 25, below. 
24 And clearly language does not provide necessity. Stich (1983, 54-56) agrees with that. He brings the 
case of a Mrs. T whose memory was fading. This case represents a salient anomaly, and does not stand 
as a parallel example to the regular and normal case that I brought, a case which refers us to very many 
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there is an asymmetry between humans and animals, but the assumption that language can 
justify the ascription of every kind of intentional mental state is unjustified. Again, this does 
not mean that language has no special role to play in the justification of an attribution of many 
intentional states to humans. But the crucial point is that language is simply irrelevant in the 
ascription of many kinds of intentional states. If I am right, then animals' lack of language 
should not create an epistemological problem in attributing to them certain intentional mental 
states. Our tacit theory, in the relevant cases of humans, also works in the animal case: one 
can be highly accurate in predicting animal behaviour, including specific behaviour. 
Thus, on the one hand, the other minds problem—as a theoretical problem—is a 
philosophical artifact that is irrelevant to our practical life. On the other hand, in daily life 
when it concerns the practical problem of other minds, one does not expect one's 
considerations about others' mental states to be infallible.25 Moreover, in the practical problem 
(as in the theoretical problem) there are overlapping cases between humans and animals in 
which we can be mistaken in our attribution of a mental state; but the possibility of mistake 
should not automatically project on the justification for attributing mental states to either 
humans or animals. 
A main difference between the theoretical and the practical problem is embedded in 
different expectations regarding the kind of knowledge that is available to us. On the one 
hand, if one expects absolute reliability, then one is in the realm of radical epistemological 
scepticism. On the other hand, if one does not expect such reliability, then there is only 
uncertainty to some degree. This uncertainty works for both animals and humans. In both the 
                                                                                                                                            
unarticulated thoughts of normal humans. There are relevant similarities between animals and mentally 
handicapped humans, but the references to abnormal cases can be misleading sometimes. In this case 
such reference causes us to overlook an important similarity between normal humans and animals. 
25 Harrison, for instance, is guided by the aspiration to infallibility. He claims the following: "There is, 
then, some value in the belief that animals suffer pain, for it provides a reasonably reliable guide to 
how they will behave. But it is not an infallible guide" (1991, 35). Harrison relates to animal's pain in 
terms of the theoretical problem of other minds. Note that his claim works in the human case as well. 
Consider also Kripke's puzzle (1979) in which he presents Pierre, the Frenchman who believes that 
'Londres est jolie'. We have excellent grounds to assume that he actually believes that 'London is 
pretty', but Pierre believes that 'London is not pretty'.  
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human case and the animal case we face similar degrees of fallibility.26  I claimed that 
arguments of type (a)—'we cannot know that others have minds or mental states'—are 
associated with the human case as a theoretical problem. This theoretical problem is a non-
starter for an account that aims to deal with animal or human intentional states. However, it 
appears that in the relevant aspects—i.e., regarding unarticulated intentionality—the practical 
problem of other minds, which is associated with the inability to achieve determinate content, 
also applies both to animals and humans. Accordingly, animal intentionality cannot be 
rejected on the basis of such an argument, and the actual doubt in the case of animals cannot 
be justified on the basis of this type of argument.  
This conclusion may sound trivial because, to begin with, the issue in the animal case 
was about the conceptual problem concerning the conditions of intentional states. However, 
we have seen that in the human case we do not have a problem attributing unarticulated 
intentional states, and that such attributions are actually based on the elimination of the 
epistemological problem—the practical problem of other minds. This, of course, is supported 
by the success of this method. We have already seen that both the conceptual issue and the 
epistemological issue apply equally to humans and animals when such mental states are 
concerned. Yet in the human case the way out of this is to assume large isomorphism between 
networks of beliefs.27  
* * * 
Importantly, the large isomorphism argument is not exceptional in its kind. For instance, it is 
closely related to Davidson's charity principle (1973). Both the charity principle and the large 
isomorphism requirement represent a getaway out of sceptical premises regarding other 
minds. Davidson claims that we do not know what the speaker believes, and therefore we 
                                                 
26 Philosophers have referred to different methods in an attempt to explain the attribution of mental 
states to others; for instance: the argument from analogy (Russell, 1948, 501-505); imaginative 
identification and simulation (Hare, 1963 and 1981; Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 1995a); theory-theory 
(Carruthers, 1996); a mix of simulation and theory-theory (Perner, 1996a); and inferences to the best 
explanation (Chalmers, 1996, 246). All these techniques, whether operated consciously or not, cannot 
satisfy infallibility, and were not formulated in order to satisfy infallibility.  
27 Again, if there is any serious or actual doubt in that concern, then it is only while facing an extreme 
situation such as while talking with an Alzheimer's patient. Note that in the relevant respects it is easier 
to communicate with animals than with humans who have brain damage. 
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cannot assign meaning to his utterances. The charity principle enables one to talk in terms of 
an injunction to optimize agreement between the interpreter and the interpretee. It guides us to 
interpret speakers as holding true beliefs. On the one hand, the charity principle assists in 
attributing beliefs, but on the other hand—because of the epistemological issue—those 
attributions are defeasible. This is the case with the requirement of large isomorphism of 
networks of beliefs regarding the real content of mental states—which is a sort of charity 
principle.28 Thus, in both cases we do not escape the possibility of making a mistake. The 
similarity goes further: although the attribution of content can be defeasible, the charity 
principle is a necessary condition of any act of interpretation. The large isomorphism 
requirement is also a necessary condition of content attribution. That is, in both cases one 
constructs a device, as it were, that enables either an interpretation or the attribution of 
content. In other words, in both cases this device is used to solve the epistemological problem 
for practical reasons.  
Eventually, like Davidson, Stich adheres to language as a necessary condition for 
belief attribution: as I mentioned earlier, like Davidson's holism, Stich's large isomorphism 
requirement assumes fully developed concepts of other subjects that, in turn, assumes 
language and fully developed interrelationships between concepts.  
However, in both cases, one has not really addressed the conceptual issue concerning 
the conditions of languageless beliefs and the attribution of languageless beliefs, but has 
relied on the paradigmatic model of intentionality as a language-based concept, and the cases 
of lack of language are either dismissed as impossible or are pushed to the margins. This 
situation is closely related to what we encountered in the first chapter. Now, however, our 
main concern is not the gap between the empirical findings and the anthropocentric a priori 
reasoning. Our main concern is the relevance of such an account—an account of the 
                                                 
28 Being aware of the problematic character of the issue, Stich, in contrast to Davidson, concludes that 
the issue of animal belief is moot (1979, 27-28). In his (1983) he changes his mind and claims that 
belief attribution, as a folk notion, is context-sensitive, and thus in certain contexts it might be 
reasonable to say that animals do have beliefs.  
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paradigmatic model of intentionality—to the actual doubt that one maintains while addressing 
the issue of animal intentionality.  
 
VI. How Actual Doubt Comes into Play 
 
Actual doubt comes into play once one is working from the human paradigm and compares 
language-based intentional states with intentional states which are not language-based. Let me 
restate the argument: we have seen that I must assume that one's network of intentional states 
is largely isomorphic with mine in order to be justified in ascribing content to one's mental 
state. This requirement is based on our background theory in the human case. This 
background theory establishes from the outset the epistemological issue in the human case as 
a purely theoretical issue, and does not consider the conceptual issue seriously, as it is based 
on the human paradigm and our daily practice (which is usually successful). In other words, 
the large isomorphism argument assumes the asymmetry thesis with which we started: 
There is an asymmetry between humans and animals 
regarding the justified ascription of intentionality because 
humans have language while animals do not. 
 
This asymmetry thesis is true, and the claim that it sustains, that 'we can know that animals do 
not have intentional mental states', is also true, but only as much as it concerns language-
based intentional states. However, the thesis and its claim are false and irrelevant to the case 
of non-linguistic intentional states. It is simply untrue that 'we know that animals do not have 
intentional states' when it concerns non-propositional intentional states. The argument of large 
isomorphism cannot explain what common sense takes to represent non-propositional 
intentionality of humans—common sense that in reality proves to work fairly well. Hence, in 
that respect, this argument does not separate the human case from the animal case, and thus 
does not show that there is an asymmetry between the human case and the animal case 
regarding unarticulated intentional states. This means that if there is reason to employ actual 
doubt in the animal case, then there is also reason to employ such doubt in the relevant human 
cases. Accordingly, if there is no reason to employ actual doubt in the relevant human cases, 
then there is also no reason to employ such doubt in the animal case. 
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Significantly, one cannot derive the inexistence of supposed intentional states from 
our inability to determine the content of these states. One might argue that the problem is that 
our inability works in both directions, and hence one cannot justify the attribution of non-
linguistic intentional states either. However, if one cannot say much about what goes on in the 
non-paradigmatic mind—such as that of pre-linguistic children and animals—then empirical 
findings should be taken into consideration here as they provide another point of reference 
that might be very useful, even in case they entail the denial that animals, or pre-linguistic 
children, have certain mental capacities. 
The empirical findings should be integrated before we decide to disqualify the theory 
(as Stich suggests), and before we decide to exclude the possibility that animals have beliefs 
(as Davidson suggests). The available empirical findings consist of scientific findings 
concerning the similarities between humans and animals, but also include daily life 
experience. Indeed, when we attribute unarticulated intentionality in the human case, and in 
cases where large isomorphism seems unlikely,29 we rely on the fact that we usually succeed 
in the attribution of mental states to others. This eliminates both the practical epistemological 
problem and the conceptual problem.  
This can work for animals as well. For instance, when the cat repeatedly stands near 
the tap in the kitchen and yowls we say that he asks for water, and sometimes we say that he 
asks for running water. The cat can neither say it to himself nor think it literally. The fact of 
the matter is that one does not know what goes in the cat's mind. This is why our linguistic 
description of the cat's want is only a representation of content that, although we cannot 
comprehend literally, we nevertheless project in order to formulate an inference to the best 
explanation—that the cat wants water from the tap. One has excellent grounds to assume it 
because it works fairly well: we know that once we will provide the cat this water, he will sip 
                                                 
29 In addition to the case of young children, one can think of people who are deaf and unable to speak 
from birth, and cases where there are great ideological differences between speakers. Note that in 
contrast to the mentally handicapped and people with aphasia, the types of humans that I mentioned 
here are normal. 
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it and go back to his corner.30 To emphasise this point, recall that Stich claims that "[…] Fido 
does not even have the concepts of a bone, much less the concept of a meaty bone or a yard" 
(1979, 18). However, in certain respects it seems that dogs know much more about bones than 
humans. Clearly Fido does not know what a bone is made of, but he recognises much better 
and much faster than humans which bone is real and which is not. Maybe there is no large 
isomorphism between animals' and humans' networks of intentionality. Due to our success in 
explaining and predicting animal behaviour, 31  however, it appears that our networks of 
intentionality are at least in partial overlap when it concerns non-propositional intentional 
mental states.32 If the success of this method in the relevant human cases implies partial 
isomorphism of our networks of intentional states, then this should be enough for the animal 
case as well.  
Earlier I mentioned that we tend not to seriously consider the conceptual issue in the 
human case because one is working from the human paradigm. It is reasonable to assume that 
elements that are irrelevant in this context underlie the surface—these are the same elements 
that are involved in the dismissal of the issue of non-paradigmatic humans. In our case in 
particular, though, an element that distorts the inquiry is a difference between animals and 
humans, or more accurately, between paradigmatic cases and non-paradigmatic cases: in the 
former case one can be far more accurate in attributing mental states to others because 
language enables the accuracy of both the mental states themselves and the attribution of their 
content by another. Yet, importantly, the possibility of being accurate does not necessarily 
                                                 
30 People simply use human terminology, because this is the only terminology they have at hand as 
humans, in order to depict something in the animal mind which they assume is in a partial congruence 
with ours. Sometimes they are highly sentimental, sometimes they are incorrect, and many times they 
are simply well-acquainted with animals and with ways to approach them and understand them. Daily 
experience proves them right. 
31 Animal behaviour stands in contrast to sophisticated 'behaviour' of computers. In the latter case we 
have a better explanation than attribution of intentionality to explain the behaviour, while in the former 
we do not. Moreover, in the former cases we also have great biological similarities, and behaviour 
which is more sophisticated by far. 
32 Yet again, this works for young children as well: young children use 'this' when they cannot attach 
the right term (for instance, 'toy') to a certain object. They do not know that 'this' can be an abstract 
term, and cannot provide an account of the relationship between their finger and the object to which it 
points. Yet, it is possible to understand their desire or belief and to attribute to them a mental state of 
wanting. One can determine that a young child wants the toy; the 'toy' is the alleged content of his 
mental state.  
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entail low chances of error. It might be that precisely because a spectrum of possibilities is 
available, one will go wrong in attributing a certain mental state to another human: you 
thought that your boss is angry with you because you were late to work yesterday, but you do 
not know that she does not even know that you were late, and actually is not angry with you at 
all, but simply has had a bad day. So although you have a good reason to attribute to her some 
mental states concerning your functioning as her employee, you are completely mistaken in 
capturing her mental state and its content. That is to say, the potential for accuracy in 
ascribing content cannot guarantee any actual accuracy. Still, in most cases, we do not have a 
better alternative than relating to others with a background theory (conscious or non-
conscious) concerning their spectrum of desires, intentions and beliefs.   
 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the commonly held view that there is asymmetry between humans and 
animals regarding our ability to determine content of intentional states. I have argued against 
this view that there is symmetry between humans and animals with respect to determinacy of 
content when it concerns unarticulated intentional states.33 In both cases there is a lack of 
accounts on unarticulated intentional states and in both of them one faces the same 
epistemological problems. However, in both cases the method of applying intentional states 
works fairly well. If it did not work, there would be no reason whatsoever to assume that 
networks of intentionality of paradigmatic humans are largely isomorphic, and there would be 
no reason to assume that these networks are partially isomorphic with those of non-
paradigmatic humans and other creatures. Accordingly, I have concluded that there is no 
reason to employ actual doubt in the animal case; or that if there is a reason to employ an 
actual doubt regarding animals' intentional states, then there is good reason to employ actual 
doubt in the relevant human cases as well.  
                                                 
33 It is hard for discourses to recognise the non-discursive and grant significance to it. And indeed, at 
the end of the day, philosophy of mind does not say a lot about animal intentionality. Among other 
things, this is a result of not being able to say much about languageless intentionality in a manner that 
suits the prevalent philosophical discourse in which language plays a main role. 
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In the preceding chapter, I related to the possibility that Davidson refers to intentional 
states such as belief as terms of art. Stich clearly does not refer to such terms as terms of art, 
but rather as folk notions. Nevertheless, a focal problem in Stich's account is his assessment 
of folk notions in relation to a scientific framework. He is aware of the impossibility of this 
attempt, since the very idea is to show that these notions do not suit scientific inquiry. But the 
main problem is his dialectical attempt to 'sciencify' folk psychology. At best, this attempt 
shows that folk notions do not suit scientific inquiry, or that they are problematic with respect 
to this specific framework.34 In any case, from this result one cannot conclude that folk 
notions are useless and should be abandoned, or that we cannot refine them.35
The latter point is of great significant to the vision of science. For instance, most of us 
believe that cigarettes damage health and cause cancer, especially lung cancer. Nonetheless, 
there are many exceptions of people who smoked all their lives, lived for many years, and did 
not develop lung cancer or other types of cancer. Should we abandon this theory only because 
there are many intriguing exceptions? Apparently not. Recalling the poem at the beginning of 
this chapter one may say that 'we stand firm in the middle': at the moment it seems too good a 
theory, at least for certain uses. Until now, scientists and physicians have not managed to map 
the issue in a determinant way. Yet for each case in which they are wrong, there are very 
many other cases in which they are right. However, rephrasing Stich's statement about animal 
beliefs with which he concludes his (1979), one can ask rhetorically: Do cigarettes cause 
                                                 
34 It is not surprising, therefore, that when analysing folk notions in the context of their function—the 
context of our social practices—they seem to work fairly well.  
35 Searle makes a similar claim regarding the elimination of consciousness in cognitive science as a 
consequence of difficulty in explaining this phenomenon. He claims that the fact that the first-person 
subjective experience of consciousness cannot be reduced to physical reality, i.e., to the objective 
perspective of third-person, does not mean that consciousness cannot be a proper object of scientific 
inquiry. The point is that the ideal of purely scientific inquiry should not entail the elimination of 
phenomena that we all experience (1992, 16-17; 116-124). With regard to Stich's attempt to replace one 
discourse with another, it is worth mentioning that even physicists do not have an agreed-upon unified 
theory that explains everything. 'String Theory', for instance, is not accepted by all physicists, and some 
of them do not even consider it a scientific theory, since there is no way to verify it yet. However, until 
there is agreement on such a theory, if ever, it would be legitimate for them to work with different tools 
that are sometimes incommensurable (for instance, Einstein's General Relativity is incommensurable 
with Quantum Mechanics).  
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cancer? To paraphrase my young son: 'A little bit they do. And a little bit they don't'.36 
Sometimes science (or the philosophical inquiry, for that matter) cannot provide the cut and 
dried criteria that we seek. Still, we never cease searching in hope of finding such criteria, and 
in many cases we do. Theories rise and fall, and sometimes theories that have been considered 
unscientific, eventually turn out to be scientific as a consequence of technological 
advancement.  
Finally, it is unclear that our social practices, which include the attribution of 
intentional states, can be reduced to a science, i.e., that these practices can be analysed 
exclusively within a scientific framework. 
                                                 
36 The original statement: "Do animals have beliefs? To paraphrase my young son: 'A little bit they do. 
And a little bit they don't' " (1979, 28).  
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Chapter 3 
Moral Status in the Mirror of Anthropocentrism 
From the place where we are right 
flowers will never grow in the spring. 
The place where we are right 
is hard and trampled like a yard.  
But doubts and loves dig up the world 
like a mole, a plow. 
And a whisper will be heard in the place 
where the ruined house once stood.1
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter aims to show that the issue of animals' moral status is obscured by 
anthropocentric discourse, which uses human paradigms as the sole point of reference. This 
problem is analogous to the issue explored in the first chapter regarding animal belief. This 
chapter examines the problem regarding animals' moral status.   
I argue that human paradigms have been mistakenly employed as conditions of moral 
status in general, or of moral entitlements that specify a particular moral status. The proposed 
moral status is defined in terms of moral agency—namely, it is based on conditions that can 
be satisfied only by adult, normal humans. Consequently, I argue, this reasoning equates 
between the proposed moral status and moral agency, characterising the former in terms of 
the latter. Had the proposed moral status that is defined in terms of moral agency been meant 
to include only moral agents, it would not constitute a problem. But in each example that I 
present, the proposed human paradigm-based moral status is said to include both moral agents 
and human moral patients, but not animals. It appears, then, that the implications of 
characterisng moral status in terms of moral agency mostly concern animals. 
This is a problematic situation: neither human moral patients nor animals satisfy 
human paradigm-based conditions. In that case, one should question what enables the 
situation in which a proposed moral status that is based on the conditions described above is 
taken to include human moral patients, but at the same time manages to exclude animals. 
This question is valid in two sets of cases: (1) cases where the moral status under examination 
                                                 
1 Yehuda Amichai, "The Place Where We are Right" (1996, 34). 
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is understood as a concept that specifies all those who deserve moral consideration; and (2) 
cases where the proposed moral status concerns a certain group of individuals, although it 
does not necessarily exclude the moral significance of other groups.  
With regard to case (1), I argue that excluding animals from the moral community on 
the basis of equating moral status with moral agency does not show that animals are not moral 
patients. Rather, it only shows that animals are not moral agents. One cannot argue the same 
with regard to case (2) because denying a particular moral status to a subject does not deny 
him or her any moral status whatsoever. Nevertheless, both cases are eligible for use at the 
next stage of my argument, while I attempt to answer the question posed earlier. The core of 
my argument is as follows:  
The anthropocentric reasoning in the examples that I shall examine does not influence 
human moral patients because it converts the gap between moral agency and moral patience 
to the gap between human beings and animals. This is done by considering human beings in 
general to be the paradigmatic case while considering animals to be the non-paradigmatic 
case. In other words, the human paradigm-based condition is taken, at the end of the day, to 
be a collective condition for a proposed moral status. As such, the original condition no 
longer stands for each individual. Rather, according to this manoeuvre, it is enough for the 
majority of individuals within a given species to satisfy this condition in order for all 
individuals within the species to be entitled to the proposed moral status. Significantly, I do 
not argue against the use of a collective condition. Rather, I argue that the divergence from 
the original proposed condition that is based on individual abilities to a collective condition is 
problematic and unexplained.  
This chapter is our first step towards the connection that I aim to uncover between 
anthropocentrism and morality. Accordingly, in part II I provide a general exposition of the 
concept of moral status; many issues that it raises will be discussed in subsequent chapters. In 
parts III and IV, which occupy most of this chapter, I develop my main arguments using 
examples primarily from Kant, Rawls and Fox. 
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II. Moral Status 
In this part, I present an introductory discussion of the concept of moral status that places 
signposts essential to this and later chapters. In section A, I present several aspects of moral 
status, and in section B I draw on the conditions of moral status. In section C, in order to 
clarify my use of the expression 'moral rights', I discuss the relationship between moral status 
and moral rights that are relevant to my argument.  
 
A. Aspects of Moral Status  
Moral status is a general concept that specifies all those who deserve moral consideration. 
Accordingly, it specifies all those who can be morally wronged. Having a moral status is a 
sort of 'social vaccination': it provides, first and foremost, a measure of security and 
protection; it secures and regulates the moral entitlements of the individual. The extent of 
moral status is primarily taken to include the very minimal standards of protection that are 
said to be moral, although its implications for individuals are affected by the moral theory in 
use.   
If an individual is endowed with moral status, then others are prohibited—at least to a 
certain extent—from doing things that harm this individual and violate his or her moral 
entitlements. In other words, someone who deserves moral consideration, or someone who is 
morally considerable, is recognised as having a moral claim on others who are able to 
recognise such a claim.2  
Broadly construed, moral status concerns aspects of protection such as liberty, dignity 
and other benefits. That is, having moral status determines the scope to which one's well-
being should be considered. The scope of moral status should be formulated as minimal 
standards that are supposed to protect the minimal good, i.e., the minimal well-being, of those 
who deserve moral status. Consequently, those standards are of high priority, although certain 
entitlements might be more imperative than others. At any rate, all this does not mean that all 
                                                 
2 Some claim that being morally considerable is not unique to sentient beings. They claim that moral 
significance can also be applied to insentient things such as plants, rivers, and mountains (See Naess, 
1973; Rolston, 1999). This issue concerning environmentalism is beyond the scope of this project. 
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those who deserve moral consideration have equal moral status or a full membership in the 
moral domain.  
Moral status also concerns obligations of individuals towards others, i.e., obligations 
of individuals to respect the moral entitlements of others. But if we are to characterise this 
concept in the most general terms, then moral status concerns, first and foremost, the 
entitlement of members of the moral community to be protected. This is because there are 
some individuals in the moral community who cannot act morally and who do not have 
obligations, namely, those whom we consider moral patients. 
This brings us to the issue of the distribution of moral entitlements among 
individuals. If some members of the moral community cannot act morally, does it affect their 
moral worth? In other words, do all members of the moral community have equal moral 
worth, or might some be 'more equal' than others? Does equality concern an equal distribution 
of moral entitlements, or does it concern equality of consideration? The distribution of 
entitlements might also vary in accordance with a certain calculus (for instance, in proportion 
to needs and interests). My discussion regarding moral entitlements and how they are to be 
distributed will be limited to the ways they are understood and presented by the philosophers 
that I discuss. This is because my primary aim is to criticise a certain philosophical discourse 
in order to identify the reasons by which animals are excluded from specific moral domains.  
 
B. Conditions for Moral Status 
A major issue in this chapter, which is highly relevant to the upcoming chapters as well, 
involves examining proposed conditions for moral status. I previously claimed that the 
concept of moral status specifies all those who deserve moral consideration, and that therefore 
it also specifies all those who can be morally wronged. But how are we to determine who can 
be morally wronged, i.e., who are those who deserve moral consideration? 
This issue is settled via conditions for moral status. Such conditions are said to set the 
threshold for moral concern, meaning whether the concern is of a particular kind (such as 
specific moral entitlements that can only be validly attributed to some members of the moral 
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community), or a moral concern in general. Common conditions for moral status in the 
literature—whether sufficient or necessary—are sentience, rationality, reason, being 
autonomous, having interests, having the ability to reciprocate, being self-conscious, and 
having the ability to understand morality and to perform moral judgments. Such conditions 
for moral status are based on the characteristics of the subject, which, the claim goes, entitle 
the subject to a certain moral concern. For instance, consider Bentham's famous statement 
regarding the condition for moral concern: 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation 
may acquire those rights which never could have been 
withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. […] It 
may come one day to be recognized, that the number of 
the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the 
os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for 
abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else 
is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the 
faculty of reason, or, perhaps the faculty of discourse? 
But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a 
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than 
an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But 
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? 
The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer? (1789, Chapter 17, 283n) 
 
According to Bentham, a creature deserves moral consideration by virtue of its ability to 
suffer.3 Bentham's statement opens a front that is highly relevant to this discussion. First, the 
ability to suffer represents a condition that enlarges the moral community to include many 
animals. Second, by focusing on what the subject may experience, rather than on how he can 
act, Bentham brings forward the idea of moral patience: many who are capable of suffering—
whether human or animal, whatever the exact definition of suffering is—cannot behave 
morally; and, in contrast to moral agents, cannot bear the burden of morality on their 
shoulders.  
The issue of moral patience is highly relevant to my main argument in this chapter. 
The distinction between moral agents and moral patients is well-established in the 
                                                 
3 I relate to Bentham's use of the term 'right' in footnote 6 below. 
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philosophical literature, and thus I do not wish to reiterate it.4 Usually the arguments in this 
matter point out the differences between moral agency and moral patience, and concentrate on 
the need to relate to moral patience.  
Given that the distinction between moral agency and moral patience is already 
established, it is important to note that my aim in using it is to show how a certain 
philosophical discourse fails to address it properly: by equating moral agency with moral 
status, the discussion is shifted from the differences between moral agency and moral patience 
to the differences between human beings and animals, without providing a proper justification 
for this manoeuvre. I will also expose the reasoning that enables this situation, which either 
excludes animals from the moral community or denies them certain moral entitlements (e.g., 
moral rights).   
 
C. Moral Status and Moral Rights: A Note on Terminology 
The issue of moral status and entitlements is closely related to the issue of moral rights. For 
instance, usually it is said that if an individual has a moral status, then she has moral rights, 
such as the right to liberty. The idea is that she has moral rights by virtue of having moral 
status. But having moral rights is often linked with the ability of the individual to claim it as a 
necessary condition. Thus, according to this reasoning, having the right to liberty assumes 
one's ability to claim liberty. In this sense, it seems that having moral status does not grant 
one any moral rights unless, to begin with, having moral status assumes the ability to claim 
this status and its derivatives.  
In the exposition of my main argument, I will provide examples concerning the 
conditions of both moral status in general and certain moral entitlements in particular, such as 
moral rights. An interesting question regarding moral rights is about where the concept of 
moral rights stands in relation to the general concept of moral status. I shall not address this 
question as it is irrelevant to my argument. This is because I am only concerned with the 
                                                 
4 Philosophers who have discussed this issue: Clark (1977); Regan (1979, 1983); Feinberg (1980a); 
Jamieson (1981); Kuhse and Singer (1985); Pluhar (1988 and 1995); Rachels (1986; 1990); Lomasky 
(1987); De Roose (1989); Singer (1990 and 1994); Huffman (1993); Rollin (1993); Warren (1997); 
Dombrowski (1997); Cavalieri (2001); Rowlands (2002); Tooley (1983). 
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reasoning behind denying both animal moral status in general or certain moral entitlements in 
particular while attributing them to human moral patients. This is although both the animal 
and the human case do not satisfy the required and explicit conditions. However, in order to 
avoid misunderstandings and to prepare the ground for further discussion in the next chapters, 
I shall now clarify my use of the expression 'moral rights', by presenting two different 
approaches to the concept of moral rights.  
 
1. Moral Rights as a Specific Moral Domain 
One might relate to moral rights as a specific domain within the concept of moral status. In 
this case, one has to present conditions on the basis of which it would be possible to single out 
those who deserve moral rights. At the same time, those who lack moral rights do not 
necessarily lack any moral status whatsoever.  
For instance, McCloskey denies moral rights to animals, arguing that "only beings 
which can possess things can possess rights" (1965, 126), where possession is to be 
understood literally. He provides the following example:  
Consider 'possess' in a literal use. Can a horse possess 
anything, e.g., its stable, its rug, in a literal sense of 
'possess'? (1965, 126) 
 
McCloskey claims that moral rights can be validly attributed only to those who can claim 
such rights by analogy to the idea that someone can possess something only if he can claim 
this possession. That is, his account is an attempt to characterise moral rights as language-
dependent.5 He also argues that attributing rights to humans who cannot possess things may 
be a useful lie or a mistake. According to McCloskey's approach to the concept of moral 
rights, it is clear that in order to have moral rights, it is not enough to be recognised as having 
claims for moral rights, such as the right to liberty or the right to life. In order to have moral 
rights one also needs to be able to claim them.  
Nevertheless, McCloskey does not deny that we have duties towards humans who 
cannot claim rights (or duties towards animals), but that the rights that such duties create are 
                                                 
5 See also White (1984, 120). 
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rights by analogy (1965, 127). Thus, it appears that McCloskey would agree that killing 
infants is not allowed—although their right to life is a right by analogy—unless there is a 
good enough reason to do so. Thus, denying rights to individuals does not amount to a denial 
of their moral status.  
However, there are positions that interpret the expression 'moral rights' differently to 
McCloskey.  
 
2. Moral Rights as Specifications of Moral Entitlements 
Singer claims that "[t]he language of rights is a convenient political shorthand" (1990, 8). 
While criticising Fox, Singer argues as follows: 
I have little to say about rights because rights are not 
important to my argument. My argument is based on the 
principle of equality, which I do have quite a lot to say 
about. (1978, 122) 
 
It may be that Fox intends to suggest by this argument 
[concerning Singer's whole approach in the mirror of the 
nature of rights itself] no more than that animals cannot 
possess moral rights. If so, I would not wish to challenge his 
conclusion; but I would wish to emphasize that moral rights, 
in this sense, are at best one aspect of morality. (1978, 123) 
 
Singer is not interested in attributing moral rights to animals, but rather in equal consideration 
of interests. Accordingly, Singer tries to avoid using 'rights talk'. However, when he talks 
about rights, he does not commit himself in any way to a rigid concept of rights according to 
which only someone who satisfies the conditions for being a right bearer can have rights. He 
uses it merely as a specification of a certain moral entitlement. In his case, it is the principle 
of equal consideration of interests.6
                                                 
6 In that sense, Singer explicitly continues in the tradition of Bentham. Bentham claimed as follows: 
"The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could 
have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny" (1789, 283n. See section B above for the 
full quote). Singer quotes this passage and claims the following: "Although Bentham speaks of 'rights' 
in the passage I have quoted, the argument is really about equality rather than about rights. Indeed, in a 
different passage, Bentham famously described 'natural rights' as 'nonsense' and 'natural and 
imprescriptable rights' as 'nonsense upon stilts.' He talked of moral rights as a shorthand way of 
referring to protections that people and animals morally ought to have; but the real weight of the moral 
argument does not rest on the assertion of the existence of the right, for this in turn has to be justified 
on the basis of the possibilities for suffering and happiness. In this way we can argue for equality for 
animals without getting embroiled in philosophical controversies about the ultimate nature of rights" 
(1990, 8). 
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According to this reasoning, having moral claims does not entail one's ability to claim 
them. Rather, it is enough to be recognised as having moral claims on others who are able to 
recognise such sort of claims. Thus, in order to have a moral right one does not have to be 
able to claim that right in the literal sense (for instance, 'I have the right not to be harmed 
without a good reason'). Moral rights, according to this reasoning, are nothing more than the 
specification of moral entitlements: instead of saying that 'X is deserving of liberty', one says 
that 'X has the right to liberty'. 
If moral rights were to require the ability to claim them, then many human beings, 
such as infants, the senile and the comatose would not have any rights, not even the right to 
minimal respect, because they have no such ability. Arguing from the position of McCloskey, 
the reply would be that these humans have rights by analogy. Or, one could respond that such 
human beings do not have rights, but that they have moral entitlements: for instance, they 
cannot claim their right for respect, but society endows them with entitlement to respect.  
Nevertheless, the idea that underlies Singer's reasoning is that what really matters is 
not 'how you name the moral entitlement', but 'what the entitlement amounts to'.7 The former 
option is a sort of casuistry, whereas the latter is the real issue at stake because it focuses on 
whether a creature is morally considerable or not. And, indeed, whether a creature has a right 
in the full sense or a right by analogy, the important thing to our concern is that, in either case, 
the creature is recognised as having a moral claim upon others. For instance, it seems that 
McCloskey would agree that parents have a duty to keep their healthy born infant alive, 
although the infant's right to life is only a right by analogy.  
*** 
On the one hand it is essential to distinguish between a moral right or entitlement that is 
endowed by society, and a moral right or entitlement that can be literally claimed by its 
bearer. On the other hand, every moral consideration can be formulated in terms of full- 
fledged rights that supposedly could only be claimed by the subject to whom they are 
attributed. For instance, one might claim that Singer's principle of equal consideration in 
                                                 
7 See footnote 6 for the quote from Singer.  
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interest must be conditioned by the ability of the creature to claim it. However, such an 
approach, although it may have its merits, will take us to the issue of the very nature of rights 
in general or of certain moral entitlements in particular, and to the nature of their normative 
existence. But this issue does not harm my argument, as I shall explain. 
In the examples that I discuss in the following pages, human moral patients are 
already granted moral status or certain moral entitlements—such as moral rights—although 
they cannot claim those entitlements. Therefore, I am not concerned here with the 
entitlements that an individual can literally claim but rather with the conditions to the 
entitlements with which an individual is endowed. In such cases the pressing issue is not how 
to name the entitlement in question, but what is the entitlement in question and what are the 
conditions for it.  
This fits very well with my approach to moral status as a general concept that 
includes all kinds of moral entitlements. Therefore, I apply my thesis in this chapter to the 
conditions of the moral status in question—whether I examine the philosophical discourse 
regarding the very condition for a being to be morally considerable, or whether I examine 
specific kinds of moral considerations, such as moral rights. Accordingly, when I criticise 
arguments against attributing moral status in general, particular types of moral status, or 
moral rights to animals, I do it on the basis of proposed conditions that, as I argue, do not suit 
moral patients—neither humans nor animals. By doing so, I will also uncover the reasons for 
attributing to human moral patients the moral entitlement in question, while denying it to 
animals, as is my aim in parts III and IV. 
 
 82
III. Anthropocentrism and Conditions of Moral Status 
I argue that conditions of moral status in general and of certain kinds of moral status in 
particular are based on anthropocentric reasoning, i.e., that human paradigms have been used 
as either necessary or sufficient conditions for a proposed moral status. Basing moral status 
on human paradigms such as reason (Kant, 1785a, 1785b) and consciousness (Carruthers, 
1992) means that the conclusions derived apply only to these paradigmatic cases, since these 
capacities are shared only by paradigmatic humans. Thus, conclusions based on these 
capacities will be applicable only to moral agents, i.e., adult, normal humans who are 
conscious and possess reason. In other words, basing moral status on human paradigms 
characterises moral status in terms of moral agency, and thus equates between the proposed 
moral status and moral agency. 
Human paradigm-based conditions exclude animals from the outset from the 
proposed moral domain. Seemingly, this problem does not concern only animals, but human 
moral patients as well. This is because human paradigm-based conclusions will not apply to 
many human moral patients, such as people who are mentally handicapped, in a vegetative 
state, or senile.8 None of these humans are conscious to the required degree, able to reason, or 
capable of participating in the moral discourse. Hence they do not even have moral 
obligations towards others. Such conclusions, therefore, are based on premises that from the 
outset lack the potential to include moral patients—be they human or animal—in the 
proposed moral domain. Nevertheless, as we shall see during the progression of my argument, 
although this situation is unlikely to affect human moral patients, it directly influences the 
case of animals.  
As a matter of fact, the approaches to the conditions of moral status that I present here 
are not problematic in themselves. They are problematic because although they are based on 
                                                 
8 Some philosophers demonstrate this using the argument from marginal cases concerning humans who 
always fall short of the requirements suggested for moral status. I will expand on that argument in 
chapter five. Normal humans such as infants and little children are moral patients, although they are 
also potential moral agents. A further aspect in which conditions based on the human paradigm fall 
short is in that of future generations (who cannot reciprocate, cannot suffer and cannot feel pain). The 
issue of future generations highlights the need to relate to non-existing entities that only have the 
potential to develop some mental abilities. See Feinberg (1980a). 
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human paradigms, they are also taken to include human moral patients who, by definition, 
cannot satisfy human paradigm-based conditions. However, were human paradigm-based 
conditions used only for the paradigmatic case of moral status, i.e., the moral status of moral 
agents (as opposed to other conditions which were used for the case of moral patients), they 
would have been very reasonable conditions. 
Since I relate to moral status as a general concept, my argument concerns cases that 
deny any moral status to animals as well as cases that deny only a certain moral status to 
animals. In both cases, I am interested in showing how one denies moral entitlement to 
animals while not denying it to human moral patients, although neither of them satisfy the 
required conditions. Specifically with regard to animals, I argue that this reasoning merely 
shows that animals do not satisfy the conditions for being moral agents and does not show 
that animals are not moral patients.   
As I mentioned earlier, I do not wish to re-establish the distinction between moral 
agency and moral patience. However, although this distinction is well-known, my arguments 
show that it does not receive sufficient consideration. In this Part I will use this distinction in 
order to demonstrate how the proposed moral status is equated with moral agency due to the 
employment of human paradigm-based conditions. In part IV I use the distinction between 
moral agency and moral patience in order to show how the anthropocentric reasoning 
converts this distinction to the distinction of human beings versus animals.9
In what follows, I demonstrate my claim regarding anthropocentric reasoning. In my 
examples I refer to Kant's moral theory, to Carruthers' condition for moral concern, and to 
Rawls' social contract theory.  
 
A. Kant 
For Kant (1785a, 1785b) morality is a domain based on reason and applies only to creatures 
of reason. In contrast to moral agents—adult, normal humans—moral patients are not 
creatures of reason and consequently cannot be considered part of the moral domain.  
                                                 
9 See also footnote 16 in this chapter. 
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Basing his moral theory on a condition that only moral agents can satisfy introduces a 
serious problem for Kant. The fundamental idea of Kant's deontological moral theory—the 
concept of duty—and thus his moral theory as a whole, cannot be applied to many human 
moral patients; duty for Kant is a self-given law, and hence Kant calls it an autonomous law. 
But if human moral patients such as the mentally handicapped, the senile and the comatose 
cannot act autonomously, do not have duties, and cannot perform any duties, then it is unclear 
to what extent they can be considered moral entities. Moral patients—be they humans or 
animals—simply do not fit within the central theme of Kant's moral theory. 
However, Kant does not mention this problem. He demonstrates his claims in this 
matter, i.e., regarding amoral entities, only with respect to animals, even though his claims are 
applicable to many humans as well.  
Kant's idea is that since animals lack reason, they are simply not moral entities. Since 
they are not moral entities, all putative relations with animals cannot be said to be moral; 
rather, they are amoral. Kant also claims that since animals are not self-conscious, they are 
not ends in themselves, and accordingly our duties towards them are indirect; for instance, the 
duty not to be cruel to animals is not directed towards animals, but towards humanity. That is, 
duties towards animals are virtually indirect duties towards humans from which, 
coincidentally, animals can benefit. In this sense, insofar as it concerns animals, our indirect 
duties 'towards' animals are not duties at all.10  
In sum, Kant does not grant animals any moral importance. He sees them as utterly 
undeserving of moral consideration on the basis of a human paradigm.  
 
                                                 
10 Ritchie argues with a voice similar to that of Kant: "Cruelty to animals is rightly supposed to be an 
offence against humanitarian feeling. Our duty to animals is a duty to human society" (1894, 183); or 
"we may be said to have duties of kindness towards the animals; but it is incorrect to represent these as 
strictly duties towards the animals themselves […]" (1894, 184).   
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B. Carruthers 
A radical example of a human paradigm-based condition of moral status can be found in 
Carruthers' early writings on animals. Carruthers claimed that consciousness—to which he 
relates in its full-blown sense, i.e., self-consciousness—is a pre-condition for sympathy and 
moral concern: 
[S]ince there is no reason to believe that any animals are 
capable of thinking about their own thinkings in this way 
[reflexive thinking], none of their mental states will be 
conscious ones. If this account were acceptable, it would 
follow almost immediately that animals can make no moral 
claims on us. For non-conscious mental states are not 
appropriate objects of moral concern. (1992, 193) 
 
Full-blown consciousness is a capacity paradigmatic of adult, normal humans. Therefore, this 
approach is anthropocentric and makes linking animals and morality problematic from the 
outset.11 Moreover, this anthropocentric reasoning cannot account for the moral status of 
some human moral patients, unless one employs other conditions in the background.  
In his discussion, Carruthers relates to non-conscious experience in the human case 
only with regard to adult humans, such as the famous example of the absent-minded driver 
(1993, 170-171). But these cases already assume, and for good reason, that the humans 
involved are conscious to a certain degree: the driver might be non-conscious with regard to 
the route she is driving in and to what she is doing with the gear stick, but Carruthers agrees 
that she is conscious of other things at that time. However, significantly, Carruthers does not 
relate to the difficult cases, the cases of human moral patients who are entirely non-conscious, 
or at least not conscious to the required degree. Like Kant, he demonstrates his claim only 
with regard to animals. 
*** 
Kant and Carruthers aim to define the necessary condition for a being to be morally 
considerable. Thus, the conditions they propose concern the limits of the moral domain. If one 
                                                 
11 This view is one-dimensional in that it approaches morality as well as consciousness in terms of 'all 
or nothing'. The 'all or nothing' attitude is extremely significant, because it ignores intermediate 
positions: it conceals the possibility that there could be different degrees of moral status. For a 
developed critique of Carruthers' position, see Bernstein (1998, 133-137).    
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does not satisfy these conditions one cannot be considered a moral entity, and therefore not 
deserving of moral status. However, Kant and Carruthers establish moral status on the basis of 
human paradigms and thus characterise moral status as moral agency, practically equating the 
concepts. Such anthropocentric reasoning denies the proposed moral status to animals on the 
basis that they are not moral agents.  
In contrast to Kant and Carruthers, Rawls does not aim to exclude animals from the 
moral domain, as I shall demonstrate in the following section. Rather, he claims that animals 
cannot be part of his theory of justice and the social contract, and thus they are not entitled to 
the status that this contract provides to its parties.  
 
C. Rawls 
Anthropocentrism is intrinsic to social contract theories, which assume relationships of 
mutuality between moral persons. The main aim of these theories is to settle the 
interrelationships among human beings which will allow them to live together. As such, this 
type of theory is based on the case of moral agents, and hence focuses mostly on them. 
Nevertheless, contractarian theories aim to apply to human moral patients as well. Rawls, for 
instance, strives to form the theoretical basis of the state—that is, to formulate the 
interrelationships between men as moral beings in terms of principles of justice which 
characterise the links between men in a welfare society. Welfare society is based on the social 
contract that is signed on the basis of agreement upon the conditions of normative and just 
settlement.  
Rawls takes justice to be the main concept under focus in relation to the moral 
consideration of individuals and their interrelationships. In this sense he approaches the issue 
of moral status in terms of justice, and formulates the general scheme of do's and don'ts in 
terms of his conception of justice. For instance, in the opening of his book he claims the 
following: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice 
that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 
For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It 
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does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are 
outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by 
many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal 
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice 
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of 
social interests. (1971, 3-4) 
 
Rawls' theory of justice is a moral theory (1971, 46), but Rawls is careful to relate to 
this theory as a specific domain within morality that, as such, has its limits: 
[W]e should recall here the limits of a theory of justice. Not 
only are many aspects of morality left aside, but no account 
is given of right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of 
nature. A conception of justice is but one part of a moral 
view. (1971, 512)12
 
In contrast to the cases of Kant and Carruthers, Rawls does not deny moral status to animals, 
but argues that animals and human beings have different statuses.13 I am interested in Rawls' 
reasons for excluding animals from the specific moral domain provided by his social contract. 
Therefore, my main concern is with Rawls' condition for being part of the social contract and 
for being in the range of his conception of justice. 
Rawls aims to distinguish between human beings and other animals. He asks: 
On what grounds then do we distinguish between mankind 
and other living things and regard the constraints of justice 
as holding only in our relations to human person?  
(1971, 504. My italics) 
 
Rawls answers by offering the conditions for being a moral person. Moral persons are those 
who are assumed to (1) have a conception of their good, and, (2) have acquired a sense of 
justice to a certain minimum degree (1971, 505).14 In other words, moral persons are moral 
agents or potential moral agents. Aware of the issue of permanent moral patients, Rawls 
maintains that human moral patients—those who are not moral persons—may present a 
difficulty for his account of equality and the guarantees of justice, but only a minor one as 
they are included within the scope of the theory of justice (1971, 17; 510). As for animals, 
                                                 
12 See also Rawls (2001, 19). 
13 Rawls claims: "[T]hey [animals] have some protection certainly but their status is not that of human 
beings" (1971, 505). 
14 Rawls also claims that moral personality in that respect is "defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily 
realized in due course. It is this potentiality which brings the claims of justice into play" (1971, 505). 
See also Rawls (1971, 509).  
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Rawls states that they are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and claims that the 
contract doctrine cannot be extended in a natural way to include animals (1971, 512).  
Rawls, however, is clearly less radical than Kant. In the above quote, he claims that a 
conception of justice is only one aspect of morality.15 Namely, yet again, Rawls relates to his 
conception of justice as a distinction within morality, and thus the moral status that is based 
on justice is not meant to exclude animals from the moral community. Nevertheless, 
qualifying or being disqualified as a moral person (or falling within or without the scope of 
the theory of justice), is, significantly, defined in accordance with human paradigms—the 
condition of moral personality. Thus, neither human moral patients (or at least many of them) 
nor animals satisfy the condition of moral personality. Rawls, however, excludes only the 
latter from the social contract while the status of the former is secured. 
 
                                                
D. Summary 
We have seen that human paradigms are used as conditions for either moral status in general 
or for a certain kind of moral status in particular, and thus the proposed moral status is 
characterised in terms of moral agency. In other words, Kant's and Carruthers' attempts to 
exclude animals from the moral community are unsuccessful because they rest on equating 
moral status with moral agency: reason and consciousness are shared only by adult, normal 
human beings. They are shared neither by the senile and the comatose, nor by animals. 
Accordingly, it does not show that animals are not moral patients. Rather, it shows that 
animals are not moral agents.  
There is a similar situation concerning Rawls' theory of justice: basing the moral 
status that is provided by the social contract on human paradigms is also applicable only to 
moral agents. This should create a serious problem for individuals who do not fit within such 
framework, i.e., the case of moral patients. Nonetheless, there is an important difference 
between Rawls on the one hand and Kant and Carruthers on the other: Rawls does not aim to 
exclude animals from the moral community. Accordingly, in contrast to Kant and Carruthers, 
 
15 Rawls also acknowledges duties of compassion and humanity towards animals (1971, 512). Yet he 
avoids stating whether these duties are direct or indirect. I discuss this issue in chapter four. 
 89
he does not deny that animals are morally considerable, or that they have moral worth. While 
he claims that animals do not satisfy the condition of moral personality, this does not mean 
that they cannot be granted moral status that is not based on a conception of justice.  
Human paradigm-based conditions should have created a problem not only to 
animals, but to human moral patients as well. Yet the implications of this situation mostly 
concern animals. It may be argued that human moral patients can be included within the 
proposed domain of morality via extra principles. However, in this case their moral status 
would not be based solely upon consciousness, as Carruthers suggested, nor would it be based 
solely upon reason, as Kant suggested. Additionally, being part of the social contract and 
benefiting from the protection it provides would not be based solely on Rawls' condition of 
moral personality.  
Thus, the question remains the same: what enables including human moral patients, 
but not animals, in a proposed moral status that is based on a human paradigm? I shall attempt 
to answer this question in the following part.  
 
IV. Shifting the Centre of Gravity  
The denial of animals' moral status (either moral status in general or moral status of a 
particular kind) should have been understood as a specific example of the larger problem of 
moral patience. Indeed, many philosophers who use marginal cases to argue for animals' 
moral status based on the distinction between moral patience and moral agency aim to 
demonstrate precisely this point.16
  My aim is different: it appears that blurring the gap between moral agency and moral 
patience by basing moral status on human paradigms does not have crucial consequences for 
human moral patients. Accordingly, it does not lead to problems in attributing moral status to 
                                                 
16 As we shall see throughout the dissertation, in contrast to supporters of the argument from marginal 
cases that use the distinction between moral agency and moral patience, my overall answer to this 
question will not go along the lines of finding a common denominator shared by both human beings 
and the relevant animals. And, indeed, note that I did not argue that since human moral patients are 
included in a proposed moral domain, therefore animals are also included in this domain. Rather, I 
raised this issue as one that deserves an answer. In this respect I only argued that the anthropocentric 
reasoning does not show that animals are not moral patients.    
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moral patients such as infants and the mentally handicapped. Thus, my aim is to uncover the 
reasons for this situation: analysing this issue will show that the distinction between moral 
patience and moral agency is converted, so to speak, to the distinction between paradigmatic 
cases on the one hand and non-paradigmatic cases on the other, whereas the former includes 
all human beings and the latter includes animals. This manoeuvre is generated by applying the 
condition for the proposed moral status in a collective manner. Applying a condition in a 
collective manner means that all people deserve what is enabled by a certain condition as long 
as the vast majority of people fulfil it. Note, however, that I do not argue against the notion of 
a collective condition, but rather against the way the transition from an individual-based 
condition to a collective-based condition is carried out. My argument, which I discuss in the 
following section, will be demonstrated by considering Kant, Rawls, and Fox.  
 
A. The Transition to Collective Conditions 
I argue that anthropocentric reasoning shifts the gap between moral agency and moral 
patience to the gap between human beings and animals. This is done by considering human 
beings in general to be the paradigmatic case, whereas animals are considered to be the non-
paradigmatic case. In other words, we shall see that the anthropocentric reasoning does not 
influence human moral patients because the proposed human paradigm-based conditions are 
applied in a collective manner. This allegedly qualifies all people to deserve what this 
condition makes possible.  
    
1. Kant 
Kant's example concerning amoral subjects to whom one owes indirect duties (in contrast to 
direct duties in the case of moral subjects) did not concern infants and the mentally 
handicapped, but only animals. Kant circumvents the issue of human moral patients by 
avoiding their case: 
Our author here commits an extravagance, in that he 
discusses duties towards inanimate things, animate but 
irrational creatures, and rational beings. We have duties, 
though, only towards other people; inanimate things are 
totally subject to our will, and the duties to animals are 
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duties only insofar as they have reference to ourselves. 
Hence we shall reduce all duties to those towards other 
people. (1785a, 177. My italics) 
 
Kant classifies animals as irrational creatures. He avoids relating to mentally handicapped 
humans or the senile. Thus, he classifies all humans as rational beings, and does not make any 
distinction within them. Accordingly, people whom we classify as irrational, and lack reason, 
are also considered moral entities. It also appears that, in one way or another, Kant considers 
the necessary condition of morality—reason—in a collective manner: 
Our author now points out special duties that we have to 
particular kinds of people, namely, duties in regard to 
differences of age, sex, and station. But all these duties are 
deducible from the foregoing universal duties to mankind. 
(1785a, 213. My italics)17
 
Man must regard himself as a legislating member in the 
kingdom of ends, or of rational beings. (1785a, 234) 
 
Kant's lack of account regarding human moral patients, and his use of the expressions 
'mankind' or 'being a member in the kingdom of ends', may lead one to conclude that Kant 
relates to the necessary condition of moral status that he offers as a collective condition—a 
condition that is shared by 'humanity' rather than by 'all people'; or at least that he sees human 
moral patients as benefiting from the fact that they are part of human society.18
Either way this marks an implicit divergence from Kant's original necessary 
condition: on the one hand it appears that Kant's original condition—being a creature of 
reason—is not a necessary one, because Kant considers human moral patients to be moral 
entities even though they do not satisfy this condition. Thus, it seems that another condition 
runs implicitly in the background. On the other hand, if Kant does not use another condition, 
but relates to reason as a collective condition without any further explanation, then he justifies 
the moral status of human moral patients by claiming that they are humans. This alternative 
                                                 
17 In this quote it may seem that Kant relates to human moral patients—maybe very old people—but 
this is not so. He simply refers to specific types of duties, but does not question his own condition of 
reason in regard to individuals who do not satisfy it.   
18 At any rate, Kant is very explicit in his statement that we have duties towards people (and mankind), 
and he did not argue that moral agents do not have direct duties towards human moral patients. Haksar 
claims that although the mentally handicapped may lack freedom and rationality, from a Kantian point 
of view they may still have them at a deep noumenal level (1979, 23). 
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runs the risk of replacing the conditions of moral status with the conditions of being human. It 
is very likely that such conditions are not only anthropocentric, but speciesist as well.19  
We have already seen that Kant does not relate to the fact that human moral patients 
do not fit in with the main narrative of his moral theory, and focuses on showing how animals 
do not satisfy the condition that he requires. Kant shifts the distinction of moral agents versus 
moral patients to that of human beings versus animals by approaching the condition of reason 
in a collective manner. Hence human moral patients are included in the moral community, 
whereas animals are not.   
 
2. Rawls 
A similar situation concerning human moral patients can be found in Rawls' theory of justice. 
First, Rawls considers moral personality to be a sufficient condition to be included in the 
scope of his theory of justice (1971, 505), but avoids clarifying whether it is a necessary 
condition as well. Second, Rawls softens his requirements for moral personality by 
considering the sense of justice a collective condition that is shared by the majority of 
mankind:  
Whether moral personality is also a necessary condition I 
shall leave aside. I assume that the capacity for a sense of 
justice is possessed by the overwhelming majority of 
mankind, and therefore this question does not raise a serious 
practical problem. That moral personality suffices to make 
one a subject of claims is the essential thing. We cannot go 
far wrong in supposing that the sufficient condition is always 
satisfied. Even if the capacity were necessary, it would be 
unwise in practice to withhold justice on this ground. The 
risk to just institutions would be too great. (1971, 506. My 
italics) 
 
Thus, human moral patients who do not satisfy the condition of moral personality—including 
those who do not have the potential to satisfy it—are part of Rawls' theory of justice, but 
animals are not. Originally the condition of moral personality was applied individually, but 
according to this quote it is applied collectively: human moral patients are part of Rawls' 
theory because the majority of human beings satisfies the proposed condition. As I mentioned 
                                                 
19 Although it is not necessarily so, it depends on the justification that one provides for such conditions. 
I will expand on this point in chapter six.  
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earlier, such a manoeuvre that takes the relevant condition to be a collective condition is 
suspected of 'converting' the condition of the proposed moral status to this of being human. In 
the case of Rawls' theory of justice, we are talking about converting the condition for being 
part of the social contract (and hence for being part of his theory of justice) to this of being 
human. 
Note that the problem here is not that in practice Rawls considers human moral 
patients to be part of his theory of justice. Indeed, I agree with Rawls that the condition of 
moral personality does not raise a serious practical problem for human moral patients. The 
problem is that his justification for the inclusion of human moral patients in his theory clashes 
with his own account regarding the condition of moral personality. The main issue in Rawls' 
discussion about the basis of equality (1971, 504-512) is finding a theoretical foundation for 
including individuals in the theory of justice. Yet human moral patients do not satisfy the 
required condition even if it is only a sufficient one. Rawls sees all humans as having equal 
moral status by virtue of being moral persons. But human moral patients are not moral 
persons. Thus, in effect, Rawls does not explain how the status of human moral patients is 
equal to that of human moral agents.  
Rawls deals with the application of his conception of justice that is, as he claims, only 
one aspect of morality, and does not deny the moral significance of animals. However, what 
we have attempted to understand is why Rawls denies the relevant set of moral entitlements 
provided by his conception of justice to creatures of type (A) but not to creatures of type (B), 
even though neither type are moral persons. That is, the question remains as to why animals 
are undeserving of being part of the social contract and enjoying its goods, whereas human 
moral patients who also do not satisfy the required condition deserve to be in the contract and 
are entitled to its goods.  
The answer to this question is that Rawls circumvents the theoretical problems with 
human moral patients by attaching their case to that of human moral agents, thus avoiding a 
sufficient account of their case. More accurately, he does not provide a sufficient account of 
the divergence from his original condition of moral personality. He simply claims that the 
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overwhelming majority of mankind satisfies the required condition. In other words, human 
moral patients are part of the social contract because the majority of mankind satisfies the 
required condition.20
By attaching the case of non-paradigmatic humans to that of paradigmatic humans, 
the argument shifts from the issue of moral agency versus moral patience to that of human 
beings versus animals. This is because the paradigmatic cases are taken to include all humans, 
and the non-paradigmatic cases are taken to include only animals.  
A potential rejoinder from Rawls may be based on his attempt in Theory of Justice to 
settle the interrelationships among human beings in a way that will enable them to live 
together. More specifically, Rawls can point at the circumstances of justice, what he refers to 
as "the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary" 
(1971, 126), in order to emphasise the purview of his theory. These circumstances arise out of 
a problem for individuals who must cooperate together in agreeable terms. Rawls claims that:  
[T]he circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually 
disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the 
division of social advantages under conditions of moderate 
scarcity. (1971, 128) 
  
The main issue at stake, then, is what characterises human society, with an emphasis on 
'society', i.e., on the characterisation of human beings within communities (1971, 129-130). 
Thus, Rawls could argue that human moral patients are part of his theory of justice in general 
                                                 
20 Rawls is right to claim that the majority of mankind are moral persons, but the empirical data 
portrays a more complex picture. For instance, here are three examples: 
(1) It is estimated that 4.5 million Americans have Alzheimer's disease (see the Alzheimer's 
Association site, http://www.alz.org/AboutAD/statistics.asp#1. The site refers to: Hebert, L. E., Scherr, 
P. A., Bienias, J. L., Bennett, D. A. and Evans, D. A. "Alzheimer Disease in the U.S. Population: 
Prevalence Estimates Using the 2000 Census". Archives of Neurology August 2003; 60(8): 1119-1122). 
(2) It is estimated that 5.3 million American adults aged 18 to 54 have social phobias (see 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm. The site refers to: Narrow W. E., Rae D. S. and Regier 
D. A. "NIMH epidemiology note: prevalence of anxiety disorders". Population estimates based on U.S. 
Census residential population age 18 to 54 on July 1, 1998. Unpublished). 
(3) It is also estimated that about 6-7.5 million Americans are mentally retarded (see 
http://www.healthatoz.com/healthatoz/Atoz/ency/mental_retardation.jsp). See also the following link at 
the site of the World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs265/en/). 
These are only three examples, and they make one wonder whether reason, autonomy, moral 
personality or even consciousness, can really take us far when stipulating them as conditions of moral 
status.  
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and of the social contract in particular because they are part of human society, and hence they 
are part of the circumstances of justice.  
This claim from Rawls can be backed up by one of his statement about the objective 
circumstances of justice (Rawls also relates to the subjective circumstances of justice):  
[M]any individuals coexist together at the same time on a 
definite geographical territory. These individuals are roughly 
similar in physical and mental powers; or at any rate, their 
capacities are comparable in that no one among them can 
dominate the rest. (1971, 126-127) 
 
Clearly individuals are different from one another in many respects, but are nonetheless 
roughly similar, especially once one relates to them as a community, or as members of human 
society, rather than as merely individuals. Rawls does not refer to human moral patients in his 
discussion about the circumstances of justice, and his assumptions are based on the case of 
moral agents. However, continuing his line of argument, one may claim that although human 
moral patients are different from most people, in many relevant respects they are similar, and 
more importantly, they are clearly part of human society. This line of argument that one might 
extricate from Rawls' account, therefore, gives him a principled basis for arguing that animals 
do not fall within the scope of justice: animals are entirely irrelevant to the issue at stake 
because, the claim goes, they have nothing to do with human society in respect to the 
circumstances of justice that characterise it.  
My critique does not focus on the aim of Theory of Justice, nor do I claim that my 
critique damages the main aim of Rawls' seminal project. I also do not find a problem in 
demarcating the aim of Rawls' theory to human society. This possible rejoinder from Rawls is 
indeed legitimate and in itself reasonable. It is, however, unsatisfying, as I shall explain. 
Earlier I asked why creatures of type A (human moral patients) are included in Rawls' 
theory of justice and hence in the social contract whereas creatures of type B (animals) are 
not, despite the fact that neither group satisfies the required condition. Rawls' possible reply 
based on the circumstances of justice is that human moral patients are part of the social 
contract because they are part of human society, on which his theory is focused.  This possible 
answer is unsatisfying because it is inconsistent with the explicit condition of moral 
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personality that Rawls offered in order to establish the guaranties of justice. Namely, the 
explanation based on the circumstances of justice regarding why human moral patients are 
guaranties of justice whereas animals are not is inconsistent with the supposedly individual-
based condition that Rawls provided earlier. Recall that human moral patients do not satisfy 
the required condition of moral personality, which is based on individual abilities, even 
though it is only a sufficient condition.  
In fact, Rawls' possible line of argument that is based on the circumstances of justice 
supports my analysis that the condition of moral personality is converted to a sort of a 
collective condition that applies to the community as a whole. Yet again, note that I have not 
argued against the notion of a collective condition. As in the case of Kant (and the case in Fox 
that I shall anaylse below) the problem that I have pointed at is not that the proposed 
condition is applied in a collective manner, but rather that the explicitly proposed condition is 
presented as an individual-based condition whereas, practically speaking, it is a collective 
condition. This manoeuvre, I argued, is what enables the inclusion of human moral patients 
alongside the exclusion of animals in a proposed moral domain in which both types of beings 
do not satisfy the required condition. The possible rejoinder from Rawls explains why human 
moral patients are part of his social theory—but I have not argued that they should be 
excluded from his theory. At the same time, Rawls' possible rejoinder has still not provided a 
sufficient account to my main contention regarding the divergence from his original condition 
of moral personality—a condition that is based on the human paradigm.  
Indeed, the question of why animals are undeserving of being part of the social 
contract whereas human moral patients who also do not satisfy the required condition deserve 
to be in the contract, would have been irrelevant had Rawls avoided the condition of moral 
personality and referred to conditions that are based on the circumstances of justice. In this 
case, the issue from the outset was not about individual abilities that a being do or do not 
possess, and thus the comparison between animals and human moral patients would have 
been irrelevant. Moreover, my contention that Rawls' argument is based on the human 
paradigm might have been inappropriate, because the circumstances of justice relate to 
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society as a whole. That is to say, human society is being lead by moral agents and includes 
other beings of different sorts (potential human moral agents and human moral patients as 
well) and since Rawls refers to the normal conditions in which cooperation in human society 
is both possible and necessary, then it is clear why the emphasis is on the case of moral 
agents. (In fact, chapter six illustrates that my line of argument is similar to this in that it 
relates to human society as a whole.)  
However, if this explanation is to be consistent with Rawls' discussion about the basis 
for equality (1971, 504-512), in which he explicitly refers to the case of human moral 
patients, then Rawls should not have argued that the condition of moral personality is the 
grounds by which we distinguish between mankind and other creatures—grounds by which 
we hold the constraints of justice as holding only between humans (1971, 504). This is 
because the condition of moral personality does not separate the human case from the animal 
case, but rather separates the case of human moral agents from all other cases—both human 
moral patients and animals. Thus, in order for this possible line of argument that I presented 
on behalf of Rawls to be consistent with his discussion on the basis of equality, Rawls' focus 
on the condition of moral personality should have been followed by an explanation that makes 
it clear that the condition of moral personality is relevant only for moral agents and potential 
moral agents. In this case Rawls could have claimed that this condition is based on the human 
paradigm, that is, on the case of moral agents and potential moral agents, because they are 
those who have the ability and the responsibility to settle the interrelationships between 
individuals within human society. At the same time he could have avoided struggling to 
explain the case of human moral patients in his discussion on the basis of equality by arguing 
that they are part of human society, and therefore part of his project.  
In short, Rawls' possible reply based on the circumstances of justice is legitimate and 
has the potential to make my argument irrelevant, but is inconsistent with the explicit 




Fox also provides an example of denying certain moral entitlement to animals, but not to 
human moral patients, by using a manoeuvre that takes us from an individual to a collective 
condition for the moral entitlement in question. Fox takes autonomy to be a necessary 
condition of moral rights—a condition that animals cannot satisfy. He claims that: 
[A]ll (and only) those beings which are members of a species 
of which it is true in general (i.e., typically the case at 
maturity, assuming normal development) that members of 
the species in question can be considered autonomous agents 
are beings endowed with moral rights. (1978a, 112)  
 
Fox takes this condition to apply to all autonomous subjects, independent of their species—
even if they are extraterrestrials (1978a, 112ft; 1986, 63). However, he also considers the 
proposed necessary condition to be the typical case for human beings, and hence, like Rawls, 
does not provide a sufficient account of the case of moral patients. In effect he offers 
autonomy as a collective condition: most people satisfy this condition, and hence all people 
enjoy what it enables.  
 The gap between Fox's necessary condition for moral rights on the one hand and its 
collective application on the other becomes more problematic while examining his proffered 
necessary conditions for autonomy: 
I have drawn attention to certain cognitive capacities (critical 
self-awareness, concept manipulation, and the use of a 
sophisticated language) because these are the essential tools 
or vehicles by means of which an agent's autonomy is 
evolved, made known to himself reflexively, and manifested 
or expressed. The possession of these cognitive capacities, 
therefore, is a necessary pre-requisite for autonomy, which is 
the capacity for self-conscious, voluntary, and deliberate 
action, in the fullest sense of these words. (1978a, 111-112) 
 
Human moral patients do not possess most of these pre-requisites. For instance, like animals, 
the permanently comatose, the senile, and even the mentally handicapped are not self-
conscious in the fullest sense of these words. Thus, both human moral patients and animals do 
not fulfil Fox's pre-requisite for autonomy, and therefore, both cannot be considered 
autonomous.  
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Nevertheless, Fox appears to suggest that it does not matter that human moral patients 
do not satisfy the required condition for moral rights—namely, being autonomous—because 
he does consider them to have moral rights. What matters, thus, is that they belong to a 
species in which being autonomous is a typical characteristic.   
Fox does not explain the sharp transition from a condition based on individual 
capacities to a collective condition. Consequently, human moral patients are granted moral 
rights due to being part of a species whose overwhelming majority is autonomous. Thus, it 
appears that the explicitly proffered condition—being autonomous—is not the only condition 
of the moral entitlement in question, i.e., moral rights. And, yet again, one finds that the 
distinction between moral agents and moral patients is 'converted' to the distinction between 
human beings versus animals.21
 
B. Where does all this Leave Animals? 
The anthropocentric reasoning that uses human paradigms as conditions of a proposed moral 
status in general, or specific kinds of moral considerations such as moral rights, does not 
affect human moral patients because human paradigm-based conditions are taken to be 
collective conditions for a proposed moral status.  
In contrast to the original condition, the collective condition does not stand for each 
individual. The collective condition is satisfied by the majority of human beings, and thus 
stands for all individuals within our species; human beings in general are considered to be the 
paradigmatic case, whereas animals are considered to be the non-paradigmatic case. 
Accordingly, the center of gravity is no longer designated by the distinction between moral 
agents on the one hand, and moral patients on the other. Rather, it is marked by the distinction 
between human beings on the one hand and animals on the other.  
                                                 
21 The denial of a certain moral entitlement to animals by the manoeuvre from an individual to a 
collective condition by means of attaching the case of human moral patients to that of moral agents, can 
be found in other authors as well. See White (1984, 120) with regard to moral rights and the scope of 
the language of rights. White claims that being a person is a necessary condition for moral rights; 
Cohen refers to free moral judgment as a necessary condition for moral rights (1986, 866).  
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The truth is that there is no real and urgent conflict in applying either moral status, a 
particular moral status, or any other basic moral entitlements such as moral rights, to human 
moral patients. Conflicts in this matter always mark the exceptional and the unique, and are 
usually typical of theoretical or methodological disputes. For instance, whatever the explicit 
conditions for moral rights, most people consider human moral patients as having such 
rights.22 In the case of Fox, human moral patients are considered to have moral rights via the 
transition to a collective condition. However, as we have seen earlier in the discussion on 
McCloskey, a denial of such rights to human moral patients would usually be accompanied by 
a claim that these are rights by analogy.23 Namely, the denial of such rights to human moral 
patients is tangential to formality, because such individuals are still recognised as deserving to 
be treated in a way that is consistent with such rights. For instance, consider the right of the 
mentally handicapped not to be inflicted with unnecessary pain, or the right of the comatose 
to be treated respectfully. The point is that in these instances, it does not matter what you call 
these entitlements because the important thing is what the entitlement amounts to. Yet in 
contrast to human moral patients, McCloskey does not claim that animals have rights by 
analogy.   
However, the situation resulting from anthropocentric reasoning—the situation in 
which the paradigmatic cases are taken to include all humans and only humans, while the 
non-paradigmatic cases include only animals—does affect animals: either (1) they are denied 
any moral status, or (2) they are denied a certain moral status or certain moral entitlements.  
What are the implications of these two possibilities for animals thus far? The 
implications are very clear with regard to option (1) (the denial of any moral status): animals 
do not have any moral worth whatsoever. We have seen that Kant does not grant any moral 
status to animals, and thus they can be wronged, but they cannot be morally wronged. Kant 
does recognise animals as sentient creatures, and consequently he recognises that the notion 
                                                 
22 This can be seen by analogy to my argument in chapter two. Doubts regarding the moral status of 
some humans are usually only methodological, whereas doubts regarding the moral entitlements of 
animals are actual.    
23 See my discussion on McCloskey in part II of this chapter.  
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of cruelty to animals is not meaningless (1785a, 212; 1793, 434-435; 1798, 238). Yet by the 
same token, he claims that humans do not have any substantive duties towards animals, 
because they do not have any direct securing status. In other words, our duties in the case of 
animals are not towards the animals themselves, but rather towards humanity. 
Animals' lack of direct securing status does not imply that humans have free reign in 
animal treatment. Rather, it means that what we can or cannot do to animals is mediated 
through our direct duties to humans. For instance, Kant explicitly claims that vivisecting 
animals is an act of cruelty that has a praiseworthy aim (1785a, 213). Thus, it can be said that 
vivisecting animals is justified because it helps in fulfiling our direct duties towards humans. 
However, it would have not been justified to vivisect animals had it not served a human aim.24  
The implications of option (2), however, in which animals are denied moral status of 
a particular type, remain thus far unclear. What we can say at this point is that this option 
appears to leave room for animals to be morally considerable entities. On the one hand we 
already know that Rawls stated generally that we owe animals duties of compassion and 
humanity, but on the other hand we do not yet know whether these duties are direct or 
indirect. Fox denied that animals deserve moral rights; his main concern was about the 
condition for moral rights, but we shall see that he claims that animals are morally 
considerable creatures. Moreover, Fox states that we should not inflict unnecessary pain upon 
animals or be cruel to them (1978a and 1986). On the other hand, this claim has not been 
examined yet, and thus we are not clear at this stage about moral entitlements outside the 
scope of rights-holders according to Fox.  
These issues, which are highly important for us and deserve our full attention, will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
 
                                                 
24 Kant's view of indirect duties towards animals can be defended in relation to his moral theory and its 
foundation. For such a defence, see Leahy (1991, 183-186). The significant point, however, is that 
Kant's moral theory is constructed in a way that excludes animals from the moral community. Thus, 
going back to Kant's motivations in order to justify his theory will at best justify his motivation but is 
still irrelevant to my concern. 
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V. Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined the anthropocentric approach to the issue of animals' moral status. I 
argued that basing a proposed moral status on conditions paradigmatic to humans entails that 
the proposed moral status is defined in terms of moral agency.  
Working from the human paradigm is not necessarily a problem: taking human 
paradigms to be necessary conditions of moral status may bring out salient and significant 
aspects of moral status in general or of a specific kind of moral status—one that is reserved 
for adult, normal human beings in particular. For instance, clearly Rawls' social contract 
cannot exist without moral agents. Thus, as I claimed earlier, had the Rawlsian notion of 
moral personality that is defined in terms of moral agency been meant to include only moral 
agents, it would have not created a problem. Other conditions that are not based on the human 
paradigm could have been formulated in order to include moral patients in the social contract. 
However, in the examples that I have discussed, human moral patients have been included 
within the proposed moral domain, which is, as we can recall, based on a human paradigm.  
I criticised this reasoning, and claimed that ultimately its implications concern only 
animals. Accordingly, I showed why the consequences of anthropocentric reasoning do not 
affect human moral patients; that is, due to the transition from an individual-based condition 
to a collective condition, the human paradigm-based condition is taken to include all humans 
and only humans, whereas the non-paradigmatic cases include only animals.  
The manoeuvre of applying a certain condition in a collective manner brings us to the 
situation in which the main issue at stake is no longer the distinction between moral agency 
and moral patience, but rather the distinction between human beings and animals. I have not 
argued that the latter distinction is irrelevant, but rather showed that the accounts concerning 
the former distinction were insufficient. 
Significant for our concern in this chapter is that the anthropocentric reasoning that 
we have encountered has not really denied that animals are moral patients. I argued that 
anthropocentric reasoning simply shows that animals are not moral agents, but this does not 
show that animals are not moral patients. In the case of Kant and Carruthers, animals have 
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been defined as amoral entities on the basis of human paradigms. Therefore, I argued, they are 
excluded from the moral community because they are not moral agents.   
The cases of Rawls and Fox are somewhat different: in these cases the explicit claim 
is that animals do not deserve a particular moral status. In the case of Rawls animals are not 
part of the social contract, and hence are not guaranteed justice; in the case of Fox animals 
cannot have moral rights. In both cases, however, it appears that animals can still be seen as 
moral patients that deserve at least some moral protection, i.e., animals can still be morally 
considerable even without the guarantees of justice and without moral rights. However, in the 
cases of Rawls and Fox, animals are still excluded from the specific moral domain because 
they are not moral agents. This is because the explicit conditions suggested by Rawls and Fox 
are based on human paradigms. 
Among other things, my aim in the next chapter is to examine what Rawls and Fox 
endow animals with, and what exactly they deny animals. 
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Chapter 4 
Animals' Moral Status and Duties 
Let fear break through. 
You who were made to negate the world, 
you whose only vouchsafe may lie in negation, 
have caught yourself in flagrante delicto: 
you have taken pity.1
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that anthropocentric reasoning fails to show that animals are 
not morally considerable, but rather shows that animals are not moral agents. Additionally, we 
have seen that Rawls' denial of equal justice, or the 'status of justice', to animals does not 
entail a denial of their moral status, and that the same applies to Fox's denial of moral rights to 
animals. In this chapter, I examine the implications of Rawls' and Fox's accounts for animals. 
Rawls and Fox see animals as morally considerable by virtue of their ability to suffer 
and to experience well-being. Thus, they both grant welfare to animals to a certain extent by 
holding that animals are entitled to well-being. Rawls, for instance, claims that the fact that 
animals are sentient imposes some duties on us. My claim here is that recognising animals as 
being entitled to well-being is a view that must take the animal itself as the object of well-
being (rather than the animal's owner, for instance). In other words, developing the claim that 
animals are deserving of a particular moral status by virtue of their ability to suffer and to 
experience well-being paves the way to direct duties towards them.  
Despite Rawls' and Fox's view that animals are moral patients who deserve to be 
treated in a way that supports their well-being, they seem to imply that humans are under no 
serious obligation to ensure animals' well-being. Rawls claims that we have duties towards 
animals, but avoids stating whether they are direct or indirect. Yet we shall see that 
understanding these duties as direct duties is inconsistent with his account. Fox also sees 
animals as moral patients, but claims that we have no duties towards them. This situation 
appears to be problematic in relation to the claim that animals are morally considerable by 
                                                 
1 David Avidan, from the poem "The Desert Generation" (1966, 15).  
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virtue of their ability to suffer and to experience well-being. The resultant account does not 
commit us—humans—in any substantial way to animal well-being. On the one hand, there is 
an agreement that animals should be treated in ways that support their well-being because they 
can experience well-being. On the other hand, however, there is no articulation of what we 
owe to animals by virtue of their ability to experience well-being in terms of direct duties, and 
there is a refusal to define what we owe to animals solely on the basis of this ability (by 'what 
we owe to animals' I do not refer to particular aspects of do's and don'ts, but to the very ability 
to integrate such standards into the proffered explanatory system). Alternatively, the definition 
is mostly associated with human needs and interests. I would argue that without direct duties 
towards animals, the specific and limited moral status that Rawls and Fox grant to animals 
could not be substantiated. 
The contributions of this chapter are in demonstrating that Rawls and Fox should be 
committed to direct duties towards animals if they grant moral status to animals, and in tracing 
the source of their problematic accounts to their anthropocentric approach to moral status. 
This approach aims to separate the human case from the animal case by using a human 
paradigm-based condition for the inclusion of all humans in a proffered moral domain. This 
creates a simplified framework regarding the conditions of moral status. I shall propose a 
general non-anthropocentric framework that can both include animals in the moral domain 





II. Animals as Objects of Welfare 
Two frequent consequences of the anthropocentric approach to the conditions of moral status 
are that animals are denied any moral status, or alternatively that they are denied a certain 
moral status—that of humans. Claims of the latter sort are usually accompanied by a claim, 
either explicit or implicit, that animals are morally significant, although their moral worth is 
less than that of humans. Basically, this amounts to a claim that animals are entitled to welfare 
or some moral protection that requires humans to behave towards them in certain ways. Such 
an approach can be found in the accounts of Fox and Rawls to which I will relate in this part.2  
Both Rawls and Fox agree that animals are morally significant by virtue of their 
ability to suffer and to experience well-being. This, I argue, entails that humans have direct 
duties towards animals. Rawls and Fox seemingly agree with this claim, but I show that their 
accounts are highly problematic. In the case of Rawls, the idea that humans can have direct 
duties towards animals appears to be inconsistent with his account. And in the case of Fox, the 
explicit claim is that humans have no duties towards animals.  
Welfare can be characterised in many ways, but it is understood—and sufficient to 
our concern—that first and foremost it concerns the basic well-being of a creature, i.e., its 
basic needs and interests. In other words, granting animals welfare is supposed to support 
their well-being (in contrast to the well-being of human society), and thus it must be based on 
the idea that animals have some capacities that enable them to experience well-being—even if 
only to a minimal sense. This recognition must be based on the assumption that animals are 
sentient beings that can feel pain and are subjects of life that are distinct from plants, for 
example.3 As subjects of life, they not only have needs, but also wants or desires, such as the 
desire to avoid pain.4
That is, acknowledgement of animals' welfare entails a recognition that animals' 
mental and physical abilities are relevant to their well-being; animals' abilities such as the 
                                                 
2 In addition to Rawls and Fox, see Nozick (1974, 35-42); Townsend (1979); Becker (1983); Cohen 
(1986, 866); Leahy (1991, 198-201).  
3 Skorupski (2000, 254). 
4 Kenny (1989). 
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ability to feel pain serve as conditions of well-being. At the very least, there must be 
something intrinsic to animals that validates the claim regarding animal welfare. Otherwise, it 
would not be based upon consideration of animals' well-being but rather on indirect duties 
which encompass the well-being of humans from which animals benefit only incidentally.  
In sections A and B, I present the problematic accounts of Rawls and Fox, 
respectively, on duties in regard to animals. In section C, I examine the relationships of their 
accounts to their claim that animals are morally considerable creatures.   
 
A. Rawls on Duties towards Animals 
In his discussion on the limits of his theory of justice, Rawls relates to the status of animals: 
Last of all, we should recall the limits of a theory of justice. 
Not only are many aspects of morality left aside, but no 
account is given of right conduct in regard to animals and the 
rest of nature. A conception of justice is but one part of a 
moral view. While I have not maintained that the capacity 
for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the 
duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give 
strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it 
does not follow that there are no requirements at all in regard 
to them, nor in our relations with the natural order. Certainly 
it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a 
whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for feelings 
of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which 
animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion 
and humanity in their case. (1971, 512)5
 
Rawls recognises animals as creatures who can feel pain and pleasure, and for that reason he 
states that it is wrong to be cruel to them. It seems, therefore, that Rawls means that we owe 
animals duties of compassion and humanity—such as the duty not to be cruel—by virtue of 
their ability to feel pain and pleasure.  
Rawls does not specify whether duties of compassion and humanity to animals are 
direct or indirect. Nonetheless, at least in a first approximation, it is reasonable to interpret 
them as direct. For instance, assuming that the wrongness of being cruel to animals is based 
                                                 
5 Note that in saying that "it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures 
lacking this capacity", Rawls does not relate to human moral patients, but to animals: first, we have 
seen that Rawls includes human moral patients in his theory of justice. Thus one owes human moral 
patients strict justice. A second reason by which it is clear that he refers to animals and not to human 
moral patients is that in this discussion he refers to issues beyond the theory of justice, issues of which 
he did not provide an account. 
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on animals' ability to feel pain and pleasure, this duty must be directed towards the animals 
themselves. Interpreting the duty not to be cruel as a direct duty towards animals also gains 
support by virtue of the following two reasons.  
First, Rawls claims that animals deserve some protection, but that their status is 
different from that of humans because the latter are included in his theory of justice (1971, 
505). This fits in with Rawls' claim above that his conception of justice is only one aspect of 
morality, meaning that exclusion from the theory of justice does not mean that animals are 
amoral entities that do not deserve any moral consideration.  
Second, interpreting duties of compassion and humanity in general and the duty not to 
be cruel in particular as indirect duties would not substantiate Rawls' recognition that animals 
can feel pain, and therefore it would be problematic when taken together with the very idea of 
compassion. This is because indirect duties would not be directed towards animals but rather 
towards human beings or towards humanity (as in the case of Kant), they are only mediated 
through animals. Consequently, animals can benefit from such duties only accidentally. As 
such, again, indirect duties could not substantiate Rawls' recognition that animals are sentient 
creatures, and cannot account for what it seems that he is interested in endowing them. 
However, seeing duties of compassion and humanity towards animals as direct duties 
seems to be inconsistent with Rawls' account concerning the guarantees of equal justice in 
general and natural duties in particular.  
Rawls provides some characteristics of natural duties:6  
Now in contrast with obligations, it is characteristic of 
natural duties that they apply to us without regard to our 
voluntary acts. Moreover, they have no necessary connection 
with institutions or social practices; their content is not, in 
general, defined by the rules of these arrangements. Thus we 
have a natural duty not to be cruel, and a duty to help 
another, whether or not we have committed ourselves to 
these actions. It is no defense or excuse to say that we have 
made no promise not to be cruel or vindictive, or to come to 
another's aid. […] A further feature of natural duties is that 
                                                 
6 Here is a partial list of natural duties that Rawls provides: "The following are examples of natural 
duties: the duty of helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without 
excessive risk or loss to oneself; they duty not to harm or injure another; and the duty not to cause 
unnecessary suffering" (1971, 114). 
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they hold between persons irrespective of their institutional 
relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral 
persons. (1971, 114-115. My italics) 
 
The natural duty not to be cruel is highly relevant here. The natural duty not to be cruel makes 
sense only with regard to creatures who can suffer from cruelty. Accordingly, it would be 
reasonable to suggest that it consists not only of human beings, but of some animals as well, at 
least animals that have a central nervous system. Nonetheless, it seems that the natural duty 
not to be cruel cannot be applied to our relationships with animals. The main issue for our 
concern is the condition of moral personality. 
Rawls claims that natural duties "obtain between all as equal moral persons". 
However, animals are not moral persons, and thus cannot be among those who are eligible for 
natural duties. In other words, assuming that the duty not to be cruel to animals is a natural 
duty, humans do not owe this duty to animals because animals do not satisfy the condition of 
moral personality. This is not because animals are not equal moral person, but rather because 
they are not moral persons.   
However, we have seen earlier that Rawls states very clearly that humans owe duties 
of compassion and humanity to animals, and it seems that among these he counts the duty not 
to be cruel to them. So if people do owe animals the natural duty of non-cruelty, then being a 
moral person is not a decisive feature of those to whom we own natural duties. Yet in this case 
it would be unclear by which standards Rawls determines whether or not moral personality is 
a decisive requirement. For instance, in the previous chapter we saw that by using the 
condition of moral personality Rawls singles out those who should be treated in accordance 
with the principles of justice—that is, those who deserve equal justice (1971, 504-505). 
Moreover, we saw that he strives to apply the condition of moral personality only to humans, 
including moral patients, but not to animals. Thus, Rawls uses the condition of moral 
personality in order to distinguish humans from animals. Accordingly, he cannot simply use 




This brings us to a related issue concerning the problem of applying natural duties 
towards animals. Natural duties are principles for individuals that govern the conduct of 
individuals in the state. These principles follow from the principles chosen by the parties in 
the original position; in Rawls' words: "These principles [for individuals] are understood as 
the outcome of a hypothetical agreement" (1971, 115).7 Rawls also claims that the principles 
of natural duty are derived from a contractarian perspective (1971, 115). In other words, 
natural duties should not apply to animals because animals are neither part of the original 
position nor part of the social contract. Accordingly, even if the barrier of moral personality is 
removed only for the purpose of applying some natural duties towards animals, and 
specifically the natural duty not to be cruel, we are still left with a situation in which the 
application of natural duties to animals does not fit in with Rawls' conception of justice—a 
conception that includes only human beings (1971, 17; 512).  
A possible objection might be that the natural duty not to be cruel to animals is not a 
direct duty, but an indirect one. I emphasised earlier, however, that indirect duties towards 
animals are not duties towards animals, but rather duties towards human beings that are 
mediated through animals. In other words, an indirect duty not to be cruel to animals would 
mean that one should not be cruel to animals because it harms human beings (e.g., the owner 
of the animal, or even the person who intends to act cruelly). This will not substantiate Rawls' 
recognition of animals' ability to feel pain and pleasure. Consequently, such duties will be 
defined on the basis of human needs and interests, and hence will virtually collapse into the 
Kantian conception of indirect duties. 
Another objection that one may put forward, that is perhaps even more apparent than 
the former, is that the duty not to be cruel to animals is not a natural duty. However, if it is not 
a natural duty, then it is unclear what kind of a duty it is: What is the basis of this duty? Is it a 
direct or indirect duty? These questions apply not only to the duty not to be cruel to animals, 
but to duties of compassion and humanity in general. As a matter of fact, these questions take 
                                                 
7 See also Rawls (1971, 333). 
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us back to the starting point of this discussion, in which we have tried to find out what Rawls 
means when he speaks of duties towards animals. 
In sum, there are reasons to classify duties of compassion and humanity as either 
direct or indirect, but it appears that each alternative is problematic. Classifying these duties, 
and specifically the duty not to be cruel to animals, as direct is inconsistent with Rawls' 
account concerning natural duties. Rawls might resolve this problem by claiming that these 
duties are indirect. However, classifying these duties as indirect is problematic in relation to 
Rawls' recognition that animals are sentient creatures because such duties cannot substantiate 
this recognition, and thus will virtually collapse into the Kantian conception of indirect duties 
towards animals.  
 
B. Fox: Against Duties towards Animals 
Fox denies animals moral rights, but still sees them as moral patients or recipients whose 
moral status is limited: 
In other words, although animals do not have even 
potentially full moral status, they may be assigned a limited 
moral status in terms of which (a) they may be included 
within an extended moral community, (b) certain principles 
of human conduct can be applied, and (c) an appropriate 
degree of moral sensibility can be generated. (1986, 80)8
 
Fox recognises animals as creatures who can experience well-being, and agrees that they can 
suffer pain, and that it is better for them not to be in pain (1986, 161). In other words, he bases 
the attribution of a limited moral status to animals on their ability to suffer (1986, 70). This 
entails that animals' well-being is grounded in the experience of the animals—the experience 
of pain, and maybe other associated experiences as well. Thus, well-being is something that 
the animal itself deserves.  
More specifically, Fox claims that we should not inflict unnecessary pain upon 
animals or be cruel to them without a sufficient reason (1986, ch.6). Now, if the statements 
'we should not inflict unnecessary pain upon animals' and 'we should not be cruel to animals' 
are to be substantiated, then they should correlate to direct duties towards animals in this 
                                                 
8 See also Fox (1986, 70). 
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respect: the duty not to inflict unnecessary pain to animals, or the duty not to be cruel to them. 
Interpreting these statements in terms of direct duties gains extra validity due to Fox's claim 
that animals deserve a limited moral status. 
 However, Fox's understanding of the statement 'we should not inflict unnecessary 
pain upon animals' cannot be interpreted as a direct duty towards animals. Although Fox 
appears to consider animals to be moral patients (even if only to a limited extent), and thus 
sees them as creatures who have at least some moral significance, he also claims that humans 
have no obligations or duties towards them: 
I wish to argue now that only within the context of a moral 
community do rights and obligations (duties) arise at all. 
This is so first of all because rights are possessed solely by 
persons. (1986, 51) 
 
If moral obligations are contingent on rights and their 
possession by certain beings, then since animals have no 
rights, humans cannot have correlative obligations toward 
them. It follows that we have no duty in the strict moral 
sense to prevent animal suffering. Therefore, if it is wrong 
to inflict suffering on other sentient creatures, this must be 
for reasons other than the failure to heed or be bound by a 
moral obligation not to cause harm. (1986, 70) 
 
Fox states that humans do not have obligations or duties to animals because animals do not 
possess moral rights. This statement is problematic with regard to his claim that animals do 
have a limited moral status, but this issue will be discussed later (see section C below).9 What 
is relevant to our current concern is that Fox claims that not inflicting unnecessary pain to 
animals, or not being cruel to them, cannot be formulated in terms of direct duties towards 
animals. Therefore, if we have any duties in that respect, then at best, they must be indirect, 
i.e., duties to human beings that are mediated through animals.  
In that case, how does Fox legitimise his claim that one should not inflict unnecessary 
pain on animals? He provides several answers. First, he claims that our empathy towards 
                                                 
9 Note that in the last quote above Fox claims that we have no duty towards animals, but qualifies that 
we do not have duties to them "in the strict moral sense". Nonetheless, he does not explain what the 
'non-strict sense' of having duties is in this case, and how it fits in with his claim that animals have a 
limited moral status. As we shall see, ultimately it appears that not having duties in the strict moral 
sense is basically preparation for the idea that humans do not have direct duties towards animals (as can 
also be understood from the end of the last quote above). 
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animals, our awareness of the evolutionary continuity between animals and ourselves, and our 
awareness of ecology and the environment as vital to humans, are sufficient reasons for seeing 
cruelty as morally wrong (1986, 70-74). Additionally, Fox claims that inflicting pain on 
animals demeans and degrades humans (1986, 74), and that animals' well-being is not only in 
the interest of animals, but in the interest of humanity as well.  
Fox does not describe the considerations he provides for not being cruel to animals as 
duties, which is consistent with his claims that humans do not have duties towards animals, 
and that animals do not have intrinsic value (1986, ch.1). Accordingly, Fox does not really 
anchor the reasons for seeing cruelty as morally wrong in animals' ability to suffer or 
experience well-being for their own sake. Indeed, most of the considerations that he provides 
concern human interests and abilities and human well-being. For instance, when Fox claims 
that cruelty is demeaning, he connects it to the idea that it is inhuman, and adds that cruelty is 
beneath human dignity (1986, 77). Similarly, when he refers to ecology and the environment, 
he points to the importance of other species for the flourishing of the human species. In his 
other considerations, an analogous approach can be found in which cruelty is described as 
morally wrong based on a reference to human interests and abilities. Fox's reference to 
empathy might be seen as an exception in this respect. He denies that we can put ourselves in 
animals' shoes, but claims that we can easily recognise animal suffering (1986, 71). Thus, for 
Fox animal suffering serves as a mediating element in the set of reasons for not being cruel to 
them, and it appears that his main reasons concern human beings.  
Yet again, embedding the claim of the moral wrongfulness of animal cruelty in 
animals' abilities would entail a direct commitment to animals, while anchoring it in human 
needs and interests is consistent with Fox's claim that we do not have duties towards animals. 
Thus, it appears that Fox takes animals' ability to suffer to be a reason for seeing cruelty to 
animals as bad for humans: it is an act that humans should attempt to avoid because it harms 
humans, not so much because it harms animals. Indeed, Fox claims that it is morally 
acceptable and even necessary for humans to use animals for research. Thus, it is permissible 
to cause pain to animals in order to fulfil human ends:  
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If suffering can be labelled "unnecessary," then this is 
presumably by contrast with suffering which is deemed to 
be "necessary." What kind or degree of suffering is properly 
regarded as necessary? Within the context of laboratory 
animal research, the most general answer would seem to be 
whatever kind or degree of suffering has to be produced to 
obtain a particular statistically significant result within the 
framework of a given, ethically acceptable experiment. 
(1986, 166) 
 
In other words, we—humans—decide what pain will be considered unnecessary according to 
our own ends. Namely, human ends define whether inflicting pain to animals is cruel or not.10 
Establishing cruelty to animals, or infliction of unnecessary pain on animals, as morally 
wrong by virtue of human needs and interests, enables Fox to characterise those acts as 
morally right on the basis of other human needs and interests. Accordingly, Fox's 
characterisation of 'unnecessary' suffering turns out to be almost lexical: 
To sum up, suffering is unnecessary when it is morally 
unacceptable, meaning excessive or preventable. (1986, 167) 
 
Thus, what animals can feel and experience becomes almost irrelevant for considering a 
certain act towards them as morally wrong or right. Relevant only are the needs and interests 
of human beings. The ability of animals to suffer and to experience well-being is only a 
substratum for human needs and interests. This conclusion fits well with Fox's claim quoted 
above, that "if it is wrong to inflict suffering on other sentient creatures, this must be for 
reasons other than the failure to heed or be bound by a moral obligation not to cause harm" 
(1986, 70).11
*** 
In sum, Fox's position is that humans have no duties towards animals. We have duties 
involving animals, but they are directed towards humans. In the case of Rawls, we have seen 
                                                 
10 Gewirth argues in a similar way: "[T]o the extent to which animals have in a similar way the quality 
or property of being debilitated by pain, they have in a similar way the right justified by this quality, the 
right to immunity from wanton infliction of pain. When, however, the freedom and well-being of 
animals conflicts with those of humans, the generic rights of the latter take priority, for the reasons 
indicated by the Principle of Proportionality. […] And to the extent to which eating of animal flesh is 
needed for the physical well-being of humans, the killing of animals is also justified on this ground" 
(1978, 144-145). 
11 In the final stage of the research I learned that a year after publishing his book, Fox published a paper 
("Animal Experimentation: A Philosopher's Changing Views." Between the Species 3, 1987) in which 
he repudiated most views expressed in his book, views which he now considers anthropocentric. 
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that if we take the duty not to be cruel to animals as a direct duty, then it would be 
inconsistent with his account of natural duties. Seeing this duty as indirect means that it is 
directed towards humans, and hence animals can benefit from it only accidentally. This latter 
option in Rawls' discussion collapses into the Kantian conception of indirect duties that are 
directed towards human beings, but are mediated through animals. This is true for the position 
of Fox as well. 
The problem we encounter at this stage is the contradiction between acknowledging 
animals' moral considerability on the one hand, and not grounding it in any securing status on 
the other, thereby allowing the violation of animals' basic well-being. This issue will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
C. Rawls' and Fox's Problematic Accounts on Animal Moral Consideration 
Until now I have presented and analysed the positions of Rawls and Fox from the perspective 
of duties. In this part I attempt to do the same with regard to the moral status with which they 
endow animals. I show that the problematic positions of Rawls and Fox concerning what 
humans owe to animals are anchored in the ambiguities of their accounts with regard to 
animals' moral status. 
Surely the texts of Rawls and Fox show some commitment to animals' well-being. 
Yet, the text remains unclear about what it forces us to accept, because it appears that humans 
do not have direct duties towards animals. This situation is particularly salient in the case of 
Fox, who denies that we have any duties towards animals whatsoever. The case of Rawls is 
less obvious, but we have seen that creating direct duties towards animals entails an 
inconsistency in his account regarding natural duties and the condition of moral personality. 
Nonetheless, it would not be far-fetched to interpret the duties of compassion and humanity as 
indirect duties while holding fast to the meaning of compassion and humanity: compassion 
and humanity in this case, as in the case of Fox when he speaks about humanness, relate to us 
as human beings. 
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However, this problematic situation regarding duties takes place in a context in which 
both philosophers agree that animals are morally considerable—meaning that they have at 
least a partial moral status—even though their moral worth is not equal to that of humans. 
Rawls makes it clear that justice is only one aspect of morality, and Fox claims that animals 
are morally considerable. We have seen that Rawls and Fox recognise animals' ability to 
experience well-being in its basic forms, and hence it appears that they both see animals as 
morally considerable due to this ability. The defining characteristics of basic entitlements to 
well-being concern the individual himself, not other individuals. Therefore, the meaning of 
animals' moral status is unclear if it does not entail direct duties towards animals—namely, to 
the subjects of moral status.  
 
1. Rawls  
Aside from the problems that attributing direct duties to animals causes Rawls' account of 
natural duties with respect to the condition of moral personality, direct duties towards animals 
are also problematic with respect to the basic structure of society that he proposes. Even if 
natural duties are applicable to animals, it is still unclear when and how people decide on what 
they owe to animals. On the one hand, it is unclear why people have any interest in taking 
animals into consideration 'within' the original position. The original position aims to design 
the basic structure of human society, and animals are not part of it. On the other hand, if a 
decision regarding animals is to be made at a later stage, then the way it will be carried out 
remains unclear, as is the stage in which this decision should be taken, as I shall explain. 
In Justice As Faireness–A Restatement (2001) Rawls emphasised that "justice as 
fairness is a political conception of justice: that is, it is designed for the special case of the 
basic structure of society and is not intended as a comprehensive moral doctrine" (2001, 19). 
The conception of justice as fairness established the case of humans within society. This 
means that when the case of animals is considered, it will be restricted by this conception. As 
Nussbaum criticised Rawls: "This approach seems inadequate […] because it postpones the 
important issue of animal welfare until a late stage of political planning, after society's basic 
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institutions are already designed […]" (2001, 1528).12 Moreover, once society maintains itself 
in accordance with the principles of justice, what interest has it in changing its ways in order 
to care for the well-being of animals? Recall that animals' well-being concerns, first and 
foremost, the animal itself, not human beings. If, however, society has an indirect interest in 
promoting animals' well-being, then it will entail indirect duties from which animals can 
benefit only accidentally. 
Thus, Rawls' account leaves us unclear about the sense in which animals are morally 
considerable. Indeed, he is interested mostly in the human case, which is legitimate and, as I 
stated in the previous chapter, to which I do not object. The problem is not that Rawls does 
not provide a list of do's and don'ts for regulating our behaviour towards animals. Rather, the 
problem is that it is unclear how Rawls could provide such a guideline in a way that will be 
consistent with his theory of justice. As I have already mentioned, Rawls' text clearly shows 
some commitment to animals' well-being. Yet developing his conception without providing a 
general account regarding animals creates a situation in which his account about justice 
subjugates the other aspects of morality,13 and hence avoids direct duties towards animals. 
Had Rawls argued for direct duties towards animals, he would have had to change the 
conditions of decision making in the original position in order to leave room for direct duties 
towards animals. And were that the case, it might have entailed that animals are part of the 
theory of justice, or at least we might have had a general idea regarding the way animal basic 





                                                 
12 For criticism of Rawls' contract theory in regard to animals, see Nussbaum (2004). As I stated in 
chapter three with regard to Kant (footnote 24), Fox's and Rawls' moral theories can be defended in 
relation to the foundation of their moral theories. Yet again, such an attempt can defend their moral 
theories only in regard to their motivations, and is irrelevant to my concern. 
13 A similar claim is expressed by Midgley (1983, 64).  
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2. Fox  
Fox delineates at length his conception regarding animals' moral status. He argues as follows: 
The fact that they can suffer, although morally significant 
because it gives animals the status of moral patients or 
recipients, is not by itself a sufficient ground on which to 
accord them equal moral status with humans and other 
autonomous beings, if such there be. (1986, 70) 
 
Fox claims that animals are morally considerable, i.e., they are moral patients of a sort, by 
virtue of their ability to suffer. Nevertheless, we have seen earlier that he also claims that 
rights and obligations (or duties) arise only in the context of a moral community (1986, 51). 
Since animals are not part of the moral community, humans do not have any duties to them 
(1986, 70). However, Fox later argues that sentient animals may have a limited moral status 
by virtue of which they may be part of an extended moral community (1986, 80). But if 
animals are part of the extended moral community, and rights and duties arise in the context 
of a moral community, then moral rights to animals should arise. In this case, why not 
approach the animal case in terms of duties? Fox does not provide an answer to this question.  
Fox might reply that being part of the extended moral community is not a sufficient 
condition for having rights (and hence no correlative duties arise); only members of the 
central moral community have rights, i.e., only those who have full moral status have rights. 
However, if humans do not have any direct duties towards animals, then this explanation does 
not lend much weight to being a part of the extended moral community or for being a moral 
patient. Basically, this approach does not distinguish in any substantial way between animals 
on the one hand and rivers and forests on the other. The only difference is that Fox 
acknowledges that animals are subjects by virtue of their ability to suffer and to feel pain. 
Nevertheless, he does not go the extra mile to claim that this entails direct duties towards 
animals. Significantly, having direct duties towards animals can fit in with Fox's claim that 
animals are not equal moral persons.    
This potential reply of Fox, i.e., that being part of the extended moral community is 
not a sufficient condition for having rights, is problematic from another angle. I have argued 
that being part of the extended moral community, but not having rights, does not give much 
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meaning for being a moral patient. In this case, why is it that human moral patients have rights 
while the animals that Fox considers to be moral patients do not? On the one hand, Fox claims 
that human moral patients are part of the immediate extension of moral community, and adds 
that this endows them with equal moral concern (1986, 62). On the other hand, he explicitly 
claims that this does not grant human moral patients full moral status.14 In this case, Fox still 
has not provided a reason for considering human moral patients to be rights-holders, but has in 
fact complicated things even further. In the previous chapter we have seen that in his (1978a) 
Fox claims that human moral patients are part of the moral community by virtue of being part 
of a species in which autonomy is the typical case.15 This was also allegedly the reason for 
granting moral rights to human moral patients, while denying animals these rights. Now we 
see, however, that like animals, human moral patients are not full members of the moral 
community. A dubious reply might be to argue that membership in the moral community via 
autonomy as a collective condition makes human moral patients equal members in the moral 
community. Animals have been included in the moral community due to other reasons, and 
that is why they are not equal. At any rate, Fox summarises the issue by saying that it is 
impossible, unwise and dangerous to separate humans who have full moral status from 
humans who do not have full moral status (1986, 62). 
Like Rawls', it appears that for Fox, too, the moral status of rights-holders has 
subjugated the moral status of animals. Fox is faithful to his claim that animals do not have 
rights, and hence that there are no correlative duties that we owe them. Accordingly, he avoids 
talking about duties with regard to animals. But the ambiguity of Fox's account grows even 
stronger when he makes the following statement: 
As I have consistently asserted throughout, however, it does 
not follow that humans may use animals in any way they 
wish, that animals are merely means to our ends, or that 
animals' capacities and interests need not be taken into 
                                                 
14 Fox argues: "[A]lthough underdeveloped or deficient humans are also, like animals, not full members 
of the moral community because they lack autonomy, they must nevertheless fall within the most 
immediate extension of the moral community and as such are subject to its protection" (1986, 61). 
15 In his (1986) Fox continues this line of argument, but also claims that our natural emotional response 
to humans is a relevant factor in that matter. I discuss this issue in chapter six.  
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account by us when we act. Indeed, I hold that they should 
be (1986, 88). 
 
This statement appears to be reasonable with regard to Fox's claim that animals are moral 
patients. However, it is highly problematic when taken with Fox's claims that (1) animals do 
not have intrinsic value, and that (2) we do not have any duties towards them. The problem 
with this statement as well as with his overall account is that although Fox is definitely aware 
of animal needs and interests, he does not substantiate them in his moral discourse. On the one 
hand he takes animals' ability to suffer as the reason for their being moral patients, but on the 
other he does not relate to their case in terms of duties. In other words, Fox does not provide 
us with any clear picture regarding animals' moral status. By saying 'clear picture' I do not 
mean an accurate list of do's and don'ts but rather, as I did in relation to Rawls, I refer to a 
proposal that will enable Fox to substantiate his own claim that he does not consider animals 
to be merely means to human ends. If animals are not merely means to human ends, then their 
own needs and interests should be taken into account, at least to a minimal extent. Fox's thesis, 
then, is unclear on how he expects us to take animal needs and interests into account. For Fox, 
animals are not a significant parameter because we do not have duties towards them, and he 
does not provide any other standard by which we may regulate our behaviour to animals, 
whether as means to an end or as ends in themselves, in order not to act arbitrarily.   
*** 
In the next part I argue that the source of Rawls' and Fox's difficulty regarding animals' moral 
status is found in their anthropocentric approach. I also suggest a general non-anthropocentric 
framework that can accommodate the idea of direct duties towards animals. Later on, in part 
IV, I suggest a conception that substantiates the moral status of animals by including direct 




III. Anthropocentric Reasoning and the Complexity of Morality 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Kant and Carruthers claim that animals do not have 
moral status. The difficulty we are facing in this chapter is the incompatibility between the 
approval of animals' moral status that is based on their ability to suffer and to experience well-
being on the one hand, and problematic accounts regarding duties towards animals on the 
other. In each case we face a problem with regard to direct duties towards animals and with 
our ability to substantiate animals' moral status.  
I trace the origins of this difficulty in the anthropocentric approach to the issue of 
moral status which binds us to a single condition based on a human paradigm. In this part I 
again raise the problems of anthropocentric reasoning and suggest an alternative framework. 
This framework—morality as a complex concept—avoids the problems that were created as a 
result of establishing moral status in general, or a certain moral status, on a single condition 
that is shared only by moral agents. 
There are common elements to Kant, Carruthers, Rawls and Fox with regard to the 
conditions of moral status—either moral status in general or of a particular type. First, they 
provide a single condition for attributing the proposed moral status. Thus, the proffered 
condition of the proposed moral status is very easily identified, and by and large is structured 
in terms of 'all or nothing': either you have consciousness to the required level or you do not; 
either you have reason, or you do not. In each case, this condition is supposed to tell us very 
quickly whether one is eligible for the proposed moral status or not. Second, in all these 
examples, as we have seen, the conditions for the proposed moral status are based on human 
paradigms—usually a mental capacity shared only by adult, normal human beings. 
We have seen that in Kant and Carruthers, anthropocentric reasoning denies animals' 
moral status. Fox's and Rawls' accounts concerning the moral considerability of animals first 
appear to be entirely different from that of Kant and Carruthers, but ultimately there are 
aspects in which they are similar. For instance, Fox uses a human paradigm-based condition in 
order to exclude animals from the central group of the moral community—the community of 
rights-holders. He still sees animals as moral patients, but he also argues that humans do not 
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have any duties towards animals. In this sense, Fox's position converges into the Kantian 
position such that animals may benefit from moral considerations, but only accidentally; their 
well-being is effectively dependent upon duties towards human beings and therefore is 
subjugated to human needs and interests. In the case of Rawls, the condition of moral 
personality is also defined in accordance with the human paradigm. On the one hand, it does 
not exclude animals from the moral community altogether, but only from a certain part of it. 
Yet, on the other hand, it is unclear how direct duties towards animals may arise in Rawls' 
thesis. The benefit of animals is clearly desirable to all these authors. Nonetheless, even in the 
cases where animals are taken to be morally considerable, it does not appear to provide them 
direct protection. Thus, their benefit is dependent upon human needs and interests.  
The simple framework that results from the anthropocentric reasoning is problematic 
with regard to subjects who do not satisfy the required conditions for either moral status in 
general or for a specific moral status. From a theoretical point of view, this problem concerns 
not only animals but many humans as well. As we have seen in chapter three, these authors do 
not provide an additional condition that would establish the theoretical basis for including 
human moral patients in the relevant moral domain. Rather, most of them attempt to solve the 
problem that anthropocentric reasoning creates regarding human moral patients by converting 
the explicit individual-based condition to a collective condition. Thus, the case of human 
moral patients who do not satisfy the required condition is linked to the paradigmatic case, 
that of moral agents.  
This manoeuvre represents the attempt to characterise moral status in general, or a 
certain moral status, as a well-defined concept, i.e., a concept based on a particular mental 
capacity as a necessary or sufficient condition. But even if the conversion of the original 
condition into a collective condition might solve the problem with regard to human moral 
patients, it still creates a divergence from the original proffered condition. For instance, in the 
case of Rawls, we started with the claim that moral personality is a sufficient condition, but 
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eventually we discovered that even as a sufficient condition it should not always be satisfied.16 
The same goes for Fox's necessary condition (autonomy) and Kant's necessary condition 
(reason). In other words, developing the conditions of a proposed moral status in order to 
grant it to human moral patients entails that the original proffered condition is not the 'real' 
condition of moral status, or that other conditions hover in the background. For instance, 
being autonomous is different from not being autonomous but being part of a species whose 
majority is autonomous. Thus, implicitly, other conditions arise in the background of the 
anthropocentric framework, and hence it is not as simple as it aspires to be.17  
Moreover, the anthropocentric reasoning entails problems in classifying moral 
patients in the central moral community. We have seen that human moral patients are 
considered to be part of the moral community, or part of its immediate extension. Kant 
considers human moral patients to be moral entities by relating to them as rational beings, 
Rawls endows them all the goods of the social contract, and Fox sees them as rights-holders. 
However, bringing human moral patients into the moral community via a collective condition 
does not change the fact that many of them cannot act morally and are neither expected to be 
engaged in relationships of mutuality nor to have duties. In short, it does not change the fact 
that they are not moral agents.  
According to the lines of argument based on human paradigms (reason, moral 
personality, autonomy, and so forth), the concept of moral patience is routinely located away 
from the centre of the analysis. Kant, for example, did not refer to mentally handicapped 
                                                 
16 In the previous chapter we saw that Rawls may reject this analysis by arguing from the circumstances 
of justice. Yet we also saw that this reply would be inconsistent with his explicit condition for being 
part of the social contract, that is, the condition of moral personality, which is based on one's abilities in 
accordance with the human paradigm. 
17 The way in which the transition to a collective condition forces the issue can be seen very clearly in 
the way that Fox moves back and forth between an individualistic terminology and a collective 
terminology. For instance, he claims that "my argument is that the relevant features of humans (other 
than their capacity to suffer and enjoy) that explain why they have rights are their possession of a 
certain kind of consciousness, particular cognitive and linguistic abilities, and the capacity to 
comprehend, undertake, and carry out obligations and to expect the same of like beings" (1978a, 112. 
My italics). In this quote, the features by which humans have rights are described in an individualistic 
manner. But this is entirely different from having rights by virtue of being part of a species in which 
autonomy is the typical case. Moreover, what would Fox say about an individual (an animal or an alien) 
who is autonomous, but belongs to a species in which autonomy is not the typical case? It is not clear 
whether Fox will apply the autonomy condition in an individualistic manner or in a collective manner.   
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people in establishing his case for morality, nor did Rawls construct his contractarian theory 
with them in mind. In this sense moral patience is considered an atypical part of morality; an 
area of exceptional cases. This is to say that the issue of moral patience is not a co-constitutive 
part of the narrative of their system, but a supplement.18
The anthropocentric and seemingly simple framework with regard to the conditions of 
moral status stands in conflict with the conception of moral status as complex, non-
anthropocentric, and not based on a single element. Providing a theoretical solution to 
different subjects and groups who do not satisfy the condition of moral agency becomes a 
possibility once moral status is viewed as a complex concept. In other words, understanding 
moral status as a complex concept can provide a theoretical account for the moral 
consideration of both moral agents and moral patients.19 By the same token, approaching 
moral status as a complex concept may accommodate the differences between these subjects 
and groups as well as the distinctions within them. Seeing moral status as a complex concept 
tells us from the outset that conditions based on human paradigms do not tell the full story. 
Moral status as a multifaceted concept is, of course, essential to the animal case, because such 
a view leaves room for the possibility that animals have a particular moral status, defined 
independently of conditions based on human paradigms. 
Even before making reference to complicated moral resolutions, it is clear that 
morality is a concept undergoing construction and modification. The attempt to pin down the 
object of morality by using human paradigm-based conditions brings us to the situation 
whereby it either slips away or multiplies. For instance, taking morality to be a concept 
shared only by those who understand it results in the exclusion of many human moral patients 
from the moral community, since many of them do not share such understanding. But this 
result is simply unrealistic: no moral system of any significance will exclude human moral 
                                                 
18 Indeed, this situation is very salient in the case of Rawls: Rawls developed an insightful and seminal 
theory, but only towards the end of his book he presented the condition of moral personality in some 
detail (after mentioning it throughout the book). Once he presented the condition, Rawls briefly 
discussed the problem it creates to human moral patients and how can it be solved. 
19 Singer and Regan (like Bentham) provide a solution regarding the case of moral patients. But we 
shall see in chapter five that they rely on a single foundation to moral status. See also footnote 23 below.  
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patients from the moral community. This situation illustrates the complexity of morality and, 
more specifically, the complexity of the conditions of moral status, and thus underscores that 
an extension of the proposed condition is required. It is reasonable to consider morality a 
multifaceted concept, incapable of being reduced to a scientific style of investigation, an 
investigation that tends to search for essences and to sterilise social, cultural, historical and, in 
many cases, methodological factors.20 Morality, and moral status in particular, is a dynamic 
concept that, among other things, is a function of social reality.21 Furthermore, social reality 
itself is a concept undergoing construction and modification.22  
As a complex concept, morality can accommodate gradual and modular levels of 
moral concern that can be based on different foundations.23 In contrast to anthropocentric 
reasoning, a multifaceted conception avoids the problem of being unable to justify the 
inclusion of human moral patients in the moral domain. This is because there is nothing in this 
framework that restricts us from associating more conditions in order to justify the inclusion 
of human moral patients in the moral domain. Associating more conditions is not meant to 'fill 
the gaps', but rather to justify what one is arguing for. As we have seen, Kant, Carruthers, 
Rawls and Fox recognise all humans as having moral status (I will continue to discuss this 
issue in chapter six). Thus, including human moral patients in the moral community should be 
justified. Once one adds another condition or develops a proffered condition in order to justify 
the case of non-paradigmatic humans, there should be no reason to rely on a human paradigm-
based condition and there should be no barrier to develop another condition in order to justify 
                                                 
20 Kuhn (1970). 
21 Morality has many faces, and it is manifested from different angles in moral practice as well as moral 
theory. For instance, are happiness, utility, or well-being at the core of morality? Or are there some 
conjoined deontological principles that cannot be overridden, come what may? Or, how can we make 
sense of sympathy towards animals, and how do we approach the fact that many humans do not feel any 
sympathy towards them? Even if we agree that the well-being of humans is more important than the 
well-being of animals, then we are still left with a very complicated calculus and different views about 
the nature of well-being and its distribution across species. A simple set of principles does not 
guarantee simple application: the problems I am pointing at are already apparent in the formulation of 
the normative concepts in terms of how they should be understood.  
22 A similar view is taken by Anderson (2004). Anderson's reservation in this regard is that one might 
solve the problem by providing a broad basis to moral status. Yet, broad basis to moral status entails 
other problems to which I will relate in chapters five and six.   
23 In chapter five I argue for this latter position, claiming that many pro-animal philosophers reproduce 
the mistake of anthropocentric reasoning in their attempt to locate a unified basis for the moral status of 
humans and animals. 
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the inclusion of animals in the moral community in general or in a particular moral domain. In 
other words, not relying on human paradigms is a step towards a non-anthropocentric 
reasoning.24  
Taking morality to be a complex or multifaceted concept is particularly essential for 
the issue of human moral patients, mainly because it is a far more realistic attitude considering 
our moral practice in which the mentally handicapped and the senile are considered to have 
moral status for all intents and purposes. The claim here is not that until now the issue of 
moral patience has not received any attention, but completely the opposite: precisely because 
the mentally handicapped, the senile and the brain damaged are taken to be morally significant, 
we should aim to identify the reasons by which we consider them as such. We should not be 
satisfied by attempting perfunctorily to manipulate the original explicit condition that is based 
on a human paradigm. Again, it is evident that we do not attribute to the senile the right to 
respectful treatment due, for instance, to their capacity for rational judgment, as they do not 
possess this capacity. We relate to the senile as moral persons by virtue of other conditions 
that they clearly satisfy.  
I suggested that moral status should not be based on human paradigms, i.e., that 
human paradigms should not qualify one for moral status. Yet human paradigms, such as 
those that I have discussed in chapter three and the present chapter, may serve as conditions of 
paradigmatic models of moral statuses that will determine one's status as a moral agent. Once 
we define all humans as moral entities, such models can provide us with the do's and don'ts of 
moral agents at the normative level; a moral agent has many entitlements, but he or she has 
many duties as well. In other words, human paradigms may serve to determine the spectrum 
of moral agents' entitlements and duties at the normative level. Morality as a multifaceted 
                                                 
24 I do not aim to justify animal moral status, but I rely on the assumption that they do deserve this 
status. Significantly, however, this assumption is not unwarranted. First, building on this assumption is 
justified in this project whose primary aim is to critically analyse the anthropocentric reasoning of the 
animal issue. Second, and more importantly, I rely on Rawls' and Fox's claim that animals are moral 
patients. To be sure, Kant and Carruthers argue that animals are not morally considerable. Yet in 
chapter three I showed that their arguments are mistaken and unwittingly exclude from the moral 
domain not only the animals but many humans as well. My conclusion in this regard has been that Kant 
and Carruthers have not managed to show that animals are not moral patients. All that they have 
managed to show is that animals are not moral agents.  
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concept is also essential to the possibility of different kinds of moral agency. For example, a 
25-year-old normal human being is a moral agent, but so is a 14-year-old normal human 
being. Nonetheless, they are not moral agents in exactly the same sense: our expectations from 
them with regard to the moral practice are different.25
A non-anthropocentric approach to the condition of moral status will be suggested in 
the following chapters, but the important point here is that once we avoid using human 
paradigms as the sole or main prism through which to view moral status, we thereby eliminate 
the need to sharply separate the human case from the animal case. Therefore, we would not 
need to manipulate conditions in an attempt to show why, for instance, only humans have 
moral rights, or why we have duties only to humans. 
The focus of the next part is the possibility of substantiating animal's moral status and 
duties towards animals. 
 
IV. Substantiating Animals' Moral Status 
The aim of this part is to show how animals' moral status can be substantiated based on Rawls' 
and Fox' claim that animals are moral patients. I show that if one is committed to the claim 
that animals have moral status, then one should agree to direct duties towards animals. In 
section A, I briefly summarise the implications of Fox's and Rawls' accounts with regard to 
animals' moral status. In section B, I argue for direct duties towards animals. In the final 
section, I discuss a possible objection concerning the gap between moral theory and moral 
practice.  
 
                                                 
25 I do not consider my position regarding morality as a complex concept to be original. In the meta-
ethical level I take it to be a branch of particularism, although not necessarily of its strongest version. 
The particularist is mainly interested in showing that there are no basic principles that always serve as 
the basis of a moral action by adapting a holistic view of reasons for action. A similar position can be 
taken in regard to the very foundation of morality and moral status. Considering the complexity of our 




A. Revisiting the Problem of Substantiating Animals' Moral Status  
Throughout this chapter, we have seen the problematic result of anthropocentric reasoning 
with regard to duties towards animals. Let me demonstrate this on Fox.  
Since Fox does not acknowledge duties towards animals, he cannot consider the 
imperative 'not to inflict unnecessary pain on animals' to be a duty. Accordingly, this 
imperative is characterised in a way that does not provide a substantive recognition of animals' 
ability to experience well-being. In chapter three (part II) I claimed that moral status in the 
most general terms—which include those who cannot act morally and who do not have 
obligations—primarily concerns the entitlement of beings who belong to the moral 
community, to be protected. The entitlements that should be protected may vary in accordance 
with the specific moral status that one is endowed with, but at any rate some entitlements must 
be protected in order to substantiate the moral status of the being. However, lacking a 
theoretical standard by which we could begin to regulate our behaviour towards animals, we 
do not get any clear idea regarding the meaning of animal moral status.  
The main problem emanating from Fox's failure to consider the imperative 'not to 
inflict unnecessary pain on animals' a duty is that from the outset this imperative is defined in 
accordance with human needs and interests instead of animal needs and interests.26 That is, the 
potential to violate animals' well-being, and hence to violate their basic needs and interests is 
intrinsic to the imperative not to inflict unnecessary pain on animals. Thus, when Fox talks 
about refraining from causing unnecessary pain to animals, what he refers to is not the trivial 
point that when an animal is undergoing a medical treatment it is better to anesthetise it so that 
it suffers less pain. Rather, he refers to the pain caused to animals that undergo experiments 
for human purposes, experiments that are painful anyway and that stand in contradiction to 
everything that well-being stands for. Basically, the point of such an 'imperative' not to inflict 
                                                 
26 Here is the quote from Fox again: "If suffering can be labelled 'unnecessary,' then this is presumably 
by contrast with suffering which is deemed to be 'necessary.' What kind or degree of suffering is 
properly regarded as necessary? Within the context of laboratory animal research, the most general 
answer would seem to be whatever kind or degree of suffering has to be produced to obtain a particular 




unnecessary pain boils down to the idea that 'if you do not have to inflict pain on animals, then 
you should not do it'.  
In other words, this imperative commits one only in circumstances that do not 
impinge upon human needs and interests. Fox appears to be arguing, thus, that where such an 
imperative impinges upon human needs and interests, human needs and interests should 
prevail. Although Fox acknowledges animals' entitlement to well-being, he also refuses to 
acknowledge duties that correlate to this entitlement. Accordingly, the meaning of attributing 
moral status to animals becomes obscure, and this attribution does not seem to provide them 
with any clear protection. In sum, we are left with a moral status that lacks significant force. 
So how can we substantiate animals' moral status? 
 
B. Direct Duties towards Animals 
How can the moral status with which one endows animals have a significant force? I argued 
that the concept of moral status in its most general terms concerns the entitlement of beings 
who are part of the moral community to be protected. Indeed, not all those who deserve moral 
consideration have equal moral status. Still, if we consider moral status as the scope of one's 
entitlements, then this scope must be protected.  
In this sense, a creature who has a moral status—whether agent or patient—is always 
guaranteed certain relevant entitlements that should be correlated by duties. Understanding 
morality as a complex concept enables this arrangement to fit in with the way I have 
characterised moral status: we define some entitlements as secured and closed units—
entitlements that are so basic to the creature that one must not violate them. By defining these 
entitlements as minimal standards, they receive high priority. This is how our explanatory 
system could clarify the behaviour that we are forced to embrace given that we endow moral 
status to animals.  
  At the beginning of this section, I asked how the moral status with which one 
endows animals can have a significant force. The answer is by acknowledging direct duties 
towards animals. Once we clarified that animals, like humans, also have some basic needs and 
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interests that should be considered, we effectively granted animals certain entitlements. 
Furthermore, if animals are morally considerable not in an accidental way, i.e., not via duties 
to humans, then the moral theory must take them to be morally considerable in a direct way. 
Recall that the recognition of animals as sentient beings is the very reason for Fox and Rawls 
to support animals' well-being and to acknowledge them as moral patients. Accordingly, based 
on the recognition of animals as deserving a moral protection, the moral theory should see 
animals as entitled to human behaviour that supports their well-being.  
The point here is that agreeing that animals are entitled to behaviour that supports 
their well-being amounts to an agreement that they have a moral claim on us and that we 
recognise this claim. Thus, again, animals' entitlements concerning their basic needs and 
interests should have correlative duties that must be direct in order to substantiate animals' 
entitlement to well-being. The reasoning behind this, as I began to explain earlier, is that the 
defining characteristics of a basic entitlement to well-being concern the being itself, not other 
beings.  
To further illustrate this point, consider the example of a direct duty—in a moral 
system that acknowledges direct duties towards animals—to avoid inflicting unnecessary pain 
upon animals. Although Fox formulated this as an imperative, if it is to be more than a mere 
declarative statement, then it must be formulated as a direct duty. As a direct duty, it means 
that one must not inflict unnecessary pain upon animals because this duty is based on animals' 
ability to feel pain. Namely, the duty not to inflict unnecessary pain upon animals should be 
formulated in relation to animal needs and interests, and accordingly, one must not manipulate 
this duty in relation to human needs and interests. Hence, harmful experiments that are carried 
out without anesthesia and that leave the animal in a devastating situation, are unjustified.  
They are unjustified because they violate a basic entitlement of the animal by which it is 
recognised as moral patient. The same goes, for instance, to the case of calves in the veal 
industry who are confined to their cages in a way that makes them almost unable to move 
(including shifting between standing up and lying down). This, together with specific food 
that they get in order to keep their iron level low, is being done in order to produce a tender 
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and pale-coloured flesh, which is in the interests of many people. Caging calves in a way that 
almost entirely limits their ability to move and feeds them in a specific way that makes them 
unable to develop normally, violates their basic needs and interests, and should be banned if 
one is to substantiate their moral status. 
What might Fox consider a violation of animals' moral status, i.e., a violation of their 
basic entitlements? There is no clear answer to this question, to say the least. Fox claims that 
we should not inflict unnecessary pain upon animals or be cruel to them without a sufficient 
reason. Yet he does not ground this claim in any securing status and, moreover, he establishes 
the moral wrongness of the imperative not to inflict unnecessary pain on animals mostly on 
human needs and interests. Thus, human needs and interests prevail over animal needs and 
interests from the outset. In the same vein of what I argued earlier, the imperative not to inflict 
pain boils down to the idea that 'if you can avoid inflicting pain on animals, then you should 
avoid it'. The crux, though, is that what one may or may not avoid is defined in accordance 
with human needs and interests. This is a reasoning that, from the outset, enables almost every 
harmful action towards animals as long as this action is not being done out of mere cruelty, 
but out of human needs and interests. That is, the scope of discretion is limited to the question 
of whether the considered action is really in the needs and interests of human beings. In this 
way, Fox avoids a real confrontation with his claim that animals are moral patients, and turns 
the acknowledgement of animals as moral patients to be relevant only when it does not 
impinge upon human needs and interests. This is a blatant bias against animals because it 
conveys the idea that human needs and interests simply prevail over animal needs and 
interests without providing any justification for this. 
I proposed relating to animals' moral status, as well as to moral status in general, as a 
closed unit of security and protection that guaranties their well-being. This would provide an 
answer to the question of what would be considered a violation of animals' moral status. The 
answer is that the disregard of animals' basic needs and interests defined as the minimal 
standards for their well-being, would be considered a violation of their moral status. As long 
as the agreement for animal's well-being is not substantiated in such a way, animals' 
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entitlement to well-being in general and not to be inflicted unnecessary pain in particular are 
meaningless.  
What I have proposed here is part of my critical discussion of anthropocentric 
reasoning in the animal issue. This reasoning conveys, among other things, the idea of a single 
foundation to moral status (either the moral domain in general or of a particular moral domain 
that subjugates others). In this critical discussion, I have argued that Fox's position regarding 
animals' moral status collapses into the Kantian conception of indirect duties, and that a 
similar situation emerges from Rawls' account. Recall that considering duties to animals as 
direct would be inconsistent with Rawls' account of natural duties. Rawls indeed relates to 
animals as moral patients, but we have seen that human needs and interests subjugate animal 
needs and interests. Yet my contention that we do not get a clear idea regarding animals' 
moral status is not based on the fact that Fox and Rawls did not suggest practical ways to deal 
with the issue of animals. Nor did I base this contention on the fact that they did not provide a 
list of do's and don'ts with regard to animals. (In the case of Rawls, these issues were not his 
aim to begin with). Rather, I argued this on the basis that their accounts, though endowing 
animals with moral status, do not appear to provide any room for substantiating animals' 
moral status. As I stressed throughout, my aim has not been to develop a normative moral 
theory that provides a list of do's and don'ts regarding our relationships with animals. In line 
with my critique towards Rawls and Fox, my aim in arguing for direct duties towards animals 
is to provide a theoretical account that will enable the possibility of a list of do's and don'ts in 
the frame of a moral theory. My account regarding direct duties towards animals illustrates the 
human commitment that emanates from endowing animals with moral status, even if only as 
moral patients.  
Taking moral status to be a complex and multifaceted concept enables entitling 
different humans and different creatures gradual levels of moral concern in proportion to their 
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interests and needs.27 This does not mean that humans should relate to animals in the same 
way as they relate to humans, or that animals and humans have the same entitlements. Indeed, 
to claim this is to assume that what is good or right for humans is always good or right for 
animals as well. But just as in the human case, granting direct duties to animals means that 
there are some entitlements for animals that, all things being equal, humans should not violate. 
In other words, a direct duty is supposed to be formulated with respect to individuals' 
entitlements, its definition is supposed to be formulated in a way that guarantees the 
entitlement of an individual, and its violation is permissible only in certain agreed-upon 
circumstances. 
The idea that we have direct duties towards animals cannot be harmed by the claim 
that animals do not have any duties to human beings. This is because entitlements (like rights) 
correlate certain duties even if these duties are not manifested in the same being. Indeed, 
many duties towards humans are based on mutuality. The crucial point, however, is that these 
duties are paradigmatic of duties of moral agents towards other moral agents, and as such they 
represent only a partial list of duties. Duties that are based on mutuality (or at least 
straightforward mutuality) can take place only between moral agents, and therefore mutuality-
based duties are entirely irrelevant to the examination of duties towards moral patients—
whether they are humans or animals. Moreover, recall that Rawls and Fox support direct 
duties towards human moral patients, i.e., humans who cannot reciprocate.28 That is, one must 
                                                 
27 Singer and others claim that the reason for neglecting this possibility is speciesism. I am generally in 
agreement with this claim, although I try to avoid this sweeping charge as much as possible. See also 
footnote 5 in chapter six. 
28 A possible objection that every duty presupposes mutuality is a sort of psychological or ethical 
egoism. Among other things, such a claim denies that some duties are based on intrinsic value. For 
instance, in some cases the failure of an individual to fulfil a certain duty does not exempt her, morally 
and legally speaking, from fulfiling the same duty towards this individual. If there are not intrinsic 
value based-duties, then acting dutifully even towards human moral patients assumes potential 
mutuality and is accordingly based on self-interest: the real motivation to fulfil my duties towards 
humans moral patients would be promoting my interest that others will treat me the same way should I 
become a moral patient. This would imply that duties towards humans are indirect: moral patients 
cannot act dutifully in return, but their relatives can. Moral agents can act dutifully in return. However, 
in this scenario, it is self-interest that motivates the moral agent to act. In other words, the mutuality 
assumption also implies that direct duties are virtually directed only towards the acting agent himself, 
whereas others—moral patients or agents—towards whom the duty was supposedly directed, serve only 
as a means. The mutuality thesis also implies that there are no purely moral prohibitions and that 
morality is entirely instrumental; for instance, the imperative 'thou shalt not kill' would not be based on 
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not confuse duties that we have towards others with duties based on mutuality. In other words, 
the fact that animals (as much as human moral patients) cannot perform a duty in return is 
irrelevant as a claim against direct duties towards animals.29  
 
C. Moral Theory and Moral Practice: A Possible Objection 
I have argued that once we include a creature in the moral domain, there are basic needs and 
interests that must not be violated. This holds true regardless of whether this subject is human 
or animal, because that is the whole point of granting moral status, even if it is a limited moral 
status. A possible objection to this idea with regard to animals is that it is likely that in our 
moral practice, human needs and interests would prevail over animal needs and interests. I 
will deal with this objection in the level of the theory in chapter six. Here I shall only relate to 
the gap between practice and theory in this matter.  
Moral practice provides us with conflicts, but conflicts are products of circumstances 
that do not fall within the scope of normal situations assumed for the fulfilment of duties. 
Such an objection thus aims to manipulate the moral theory that attempts to regulate our 
behaviour towards animals in order to neutralise problems of application in our moral 
practice. Such an objection is usually biased against animals, taking morality from the outset 
to be based upon humans' well-being.30  As Irvine puts it: "[W]hat is often at issue, in 
contemporary moral deliberation about animals, is not whether human or animal lives are 
                                                                                                                                            
value of life and respect for living creatures, but would be conditioned by the idea that if one does not 
kill others, then one's chances of survival are increased. 
29 An attitude which is 'blind' to degrees of moral status or to the difference between moral agency and 
moral patience can be found in quotes from Scruton: "[I]f dogs have rights, punishment is what they 
must expect when they disregard their duties" (1996, 67). Or: "By ascribing rights to animals, and so 
promoting them to full membership of the moral community, we tie them in obligations that they can 
neither fulfill nor comprehend" (1996, 67). In these quotes Scruton does not seem to recognise that 
having rights or entitlements does not necessarily entail obligations of the same individual—although it 
may entail obligations of others. Infants do not have any obligations, but it sounds odd to say that they 
do not have a right or entitlement to life and to basic well-being (whatever the concept of 'right' or 
'entitlement' in use). The crux of the matter is that it does not really matter whether we agree that infants 
have a right to life or prefer to see it as a manner of speaking. The significant thing is that we all agree 
that it is our duty to keep infants alive for their own sake and that it is our duty to provide them the 
means to flourish. DePaul suggests that moral patients can be wronged intrinsically without considering 
them right-holders (1988, 529-532). For distinctions concerning different kinds of rights and duties and 
the interrelationships between these concepts, see Feinberg (1980b and 1980c).  
30 For instance, see Mackie (1977, 193). 
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more valuable, but simply whether animal lives are valuable enough to merit some degree of 
inconvenience or change in practice on the part of humans" (2004, 73-74).  
A similar statement to that of Irvine regarding animals can be applied to the issue of 
affirmative action that aims to change the distribution of resources in our society, e.g., in cases 
of accepting individuals from disempowered groups to universities. Often deliberations on 
those issues, which may entail a redistribution of resources and therefore a change in our 
practice, are influenced by the inconvenience to the privileged groups. The change in the rules 
of resources-distribution might engender protest from members of the privileged group who 
would argue that the new system of rules is discriminatory. In other words, such a change may 
bring problems of application in our social practice. The important thing here, though, is not 
the application itself, but the agreement that it is based upon. This agreement represents a set 
of regulations of behaviour of certain individuals—regulations that once they are agreed upon, 
the way to their application, albeit complicated, is open. In other words, setting direct duties 
towards animals is a step in the direction of a normative moral theory that would regulate our 
behaviour towards animals and would set limits to it. Setting such duties opens the way to 
their application in our practice.  
Having a moral theory does not immediately affect the moral practice, and indeed, 
problems of applications in attempting to fulfil the moral theory abound. There is a perpetual 
gap between moral theory and moral practice. Ideal moral standards are not always fulfiled in 
the real world, and in our moral practice, many entitlements and duties stand in contradiction 
to one another. (In addition, our moral practice always invites problematic situations). This 
concerns not only problems between humans and animals, but problems within human society 
as well. For instance, all things being equal, who should we save from the fire, a pregnant 
woman or a young child? However, the definition of a duty should not be based upon 
exceptions or difficult cases; indeed, hard cases make bad law. First and foremost, moral 
status is supposed to guarantee and secure some basic needs and interests for a being at the 
theoretical level. Once we have set the ideal, we should aim to fulfil it in our moral practice 
(as we shall see in chapter five, in my discussion on partiality and impartiality, problems of 
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application in our moral practice are here to stay). In many cases the change in our moral 
practice cannot be implemented immediately, but the process by which applying new ideals is 
carried out is not in our focus. It is important to note, however, that similarly to Irvine's claim 
that I quoted earlier, many times the real issue is not about whether animals deserve certain 
entitlements but rather about our readiness to accept and to recognise of their needs and 
interests and to act upon them.  
At any rate, if one agrees that animals are entitled to a certain level of moral status, 
then when a conflict arises between human and animal entitlements—in the secure realm of 
each —only then will one face a conflict that will have to be resolved in our moral practice.31 
Some are disposed to claim that animals' moral worth is less than humans' moral worth. 
Accordingly, human needs and interests should prevail over the needs and interests of 
animals. Yet from such a claim, given that one defines moral status as a closed unit of security 
and protection, one cannot derive that human needs and interests always outweigh the latter. 
In other words, the fact that a certain need or interest is human does not in itself provide a 
sufficient reason to violate the needs or interests of animals.32
*** 
In sum, direct duties are supposed to substantiate animals' moral status, a status that they have 
gained by virtue of their ability to suffer and to experience well-being. Setting direct duties 
towards animals is supposed to eliminate the ability to manipulate animals' well-being from 
within the moral theory itself, and to preclude situations in which conflicts between human 
and animal entitlements in the moral practice have been neutralised at the theoretical level. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Significantly, the problem I pointed out earlier, regarding the situation where there are no direct 
duties towards animals, does not concern problems of application in our moral practice. Fox's claim that 
we can use animals in painful experiments is not based on exceptional circumstances in which it is 
unreasonable or impossible to avoid it, nor is it a result of a possible conflict such as rescuing your 
child from a fire, and thus failing to save the dog.  




Both Rawls and Fox agree that animals have a particular moral status that is based on their 
ability to suffer and to experience well-being. Accordingly, we find claims of the sort that 
animals deserve to be treated in such a way as to support their well-being. Yet at the same 
time, it becomes apparent that humans are under no serious obligation to ensure animals' well-
being, and that animal welfare is bounded by human needs and interests. This situation does 
not provide us any clear idea regarding the possibility to substantiate animals' moral status in 
the theoretical level. Among other things, this situation is a result of ambiguity with regard to 
animals' moral status. Yet it is mainly a consequence of anthropocentric reasoning that 
separates humans from animals by working from the human paradigm.  
Moral status sets and regulates the minimal standards that aim to protect basic needs 
and interests. We have seen that granting moral status, even if limited, to animals, by virtue of 
their ability to suffer and to experience well-being, cannot be meaningful without 
acknowledging direct duties towards animals. Animals' moral status should protect their well-
being by regulating their entitlements in accordance with our duties in this regard. In this way, 
having direct duties towards animals would substantiate their moral status. 
The protection to which animals are entitled as moral patients is to be understood in 
terms of the alternative framework that I have proposed and will further develop in the next 
chapters as part of my critique of anthropocentric reasoning and of the argument from 
marginal cases. The model of morality as a complex concept acknowledges different 
foundations of moral statuses. Thus, it does not force us to approach the animal issue in 
absolute terms of 'us' (humans) and 'them' (animals). In addition, we do not need to 
manipulate the conditions of moral status by a transition from an individual-based condition to 
a collective condition that supposedly includes all and only humans (due to this transition 
Kant, Rawls and Fox manage to rely on a single condition for their proposed moral status). 
According to the model of morality as a complex concept, moral behaviour towards 
individuals within the scope of morality could be standardised in relation to the specific levels 
of entitlement to moral status. On the one hand, this framework acknowledges both the 
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entitlements and the obligations of moral agents, and enables one to distinguish between 
different kinds of moral agents. On the other hand, it can accommodate the entitlements of 
moral patients—be they human or animal, and is able to provide animals protection in 
proportion to their basic needs and interests (for instance, direct duties towards animals could 
be standardised with respect to animals' basic needs and interests in relation to their species). 
Clearly, some needs and interests prevail over others, but this should not entail that human 
needs and interests must outweigh those of animals. 
A moral theory provides standards for behaviour, but it also provides the potential for 
change. As such, it always stands in tension with moral practice. And, indeed, acknowledging 
animals' moral status entails many problems of application; surely direct duties towards 
animals cannot always be easily applied in our moral practice. However, where there are no 





The Scope of the Arguments from Marginal Cases 
'[T]is a pity…that truth, brother  
Toby, should shut herself up in such  
impregnable fastnesses, and be so 
obstinate as not to surrender herself  
sometimes up upon the closest siege.1
 
I. Introduction 
If we agree that infants, for example, are object of moral concern, then autonomy is artificial 
and arbitrary as a necessary condition of moral status because infants are not autonomous to 
the required level. If the condition of autonomy includes potential autonomy, to enable the 
inclusion of infants in the moral community, then it still excludes the mentally handicapped 
from this community as they lack the potential to be autonomous to the required level and 
thus do not satisfy the necessary conditions of moral status.  
This is an example of an argument from marginal cases.2 While many arguments 
against animals' moral status centre upon the segregation of humans and animals, the AMC 
emphasises the similarities between human abilities (especially in marginal cases) and those 
of animals (particularly higher animals). The starting point of the AMC is that there must be 
something in virtue of which all humans deserve moral status. The AMC inherits this idea 
from certain premises of traditional arguments—premises concerning the conditions of moral 
status that usually consist of certain mental abilities (that presumably, according to traditional 
reasoning, only humans possess). The AMC's strategy is to show that in any given set of 
conditions it appears that either some animals satisfy these conditions, or that some humans 
do not satisfy them.3  
I start by presenting the principles behind the AMC and identifying its general 
structure, which emphasises the similarities between humans and certain animals. This 
                                                 
1 Laurence Sterne, from Tristram Shandy (1759-1767, 183). 
2 Hereinafter: AMC. By 'marginal cases' I always refer to non-paradigmatic human beings such as 
infants, the mentally handicapped, the senile, the comatose, and similar cases.  
3 Philosophers who have used the AMC: Clark (1977); Jamieson (1981); Regan (1983); Rachels (1986; 
1990); Singer (1990); Rollin (1993); Pluhar (1995); Rowlands (2002). Here is a partial list of 
philosophers who argue directly or indirectly against the AMC: Nozick (1974); Benson (1978); 
Diamond (1978); Francis and Norman (1978); Cigman (1980); Rolston (1988). 
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structure, I argue, is represented in the conditional: If all human beings deserve moral status, 
then so do some animals. I then continue by discussing two main subtypes of the AMC, the 
negative and the positive. The negative AMC shows, based on abilities that both marginal 
cases and animals lack, that not only are animals undeserving of the moral entitlement in 
question, but so are marginal cases. Founded on the conditional that I stated above, the 
negative AMC takes the form of modus tollens: one denies the consequent of the conditional, 
and hence must conclude that some humans do not deserve moral status. The positive AMC is 
based on qualities which humans and animals share, and shows that animals deserve the 
relevant moral entitlement. Established upon the same conditional, this AMC takes the form 
of modus ponens: one asserts the antecedent of the conditional, and hence must conclude that 
some animals deserve moral status.4 
In the critical discussion to follow, I argue that the positive AMC leads to the 
reproduction of a major problem of the arguments it originally aimed to refute. The positive 
AMC strategy is to equate marginal cases with animals in terms of the conditions of moral 
status. By accepting the conditions of moral status set by traditional arguments, the positive 
AMC aims to show that some animals satisfy these conditions. But at the same time it 
embraces the methodology of establishing moral status on a single foundation shared by all 
individuals who supposedly deserve moral status. This conception is based upon moral 
individualism, i.e., on approaching the conditions for moral status in terms of individual 
characteristics shared by both humans and animals. Accordingly, I argue that the positive 
AMC is indifferent to the idea of morality as a complex concept, and that by reconstructing 
the methodology of traditional reasoning, the positive AMC cannot single-handedly provide a 
satisfying foundation for moral status. 
Using the conditions suggested by Regan (subject-of-a-life) and Singer (sentience), I 
argue that formulating a single broad condition also fails to provide a satisfying foundation 
                                                 
4 Each version of the AMC is an argument for moral consistency. But in each version there is also the 
possibility to refute the conditional. In the latter case, the reasons for this refutation lead one to uncover 
speciesism. In order to maintain continuity in the presentation of the argument, I shall present this 
possibility in this chapter. However, its critical examination will take place in the next chapter.  
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for moral status. I demonstrate that moral individualism-based conditions are indifferent to 
important elements in our society and thus cannot provide justification for some of our moral 
practices. Possible objections to my examples are examined in detail. While responding to the 
objections, I develop extensive discussions concerning the issues of intuitive convictions and 
the debate about partiality and impartiality.   
 
II. The Background Principles of the AMC 
Many arguments against animals' moral status focus on the segregation of humans and 
animals. A major aim of the AMC is to show that this separation is artificial and arbitrary. 
The general strategy of the AMC is to equate all humans with animals in terms of the 
conditions for moral status by embracing existing premises in favour of human moral status. 
These premises concern proffered conditions of moral status, and typically consist of mental 
ability or certain properties which presumably only humans possess. The principles behind 
the AMC can be described as follows: 
(a) All humans deserve moral status.  
(b) No property or set of properties can make a morally relevant difference 
between humans and animals that would follow the boundaries of the human 
species. 
(c) Like cases should be treated alike.  
Regarding principle (a) both opponents and proponents of animals' moral status would agree 
that, with the exception of controversial cases and subsidiary circumstances, all humans 
(paradigmatic as well as non-paradigmatic) fall within the moral domain. The idea is that 
there are some properties which are relevant to moral status, or a particular moral entitlement, 
that humans possess but animals do not. Accordingly—as we have seen in chapters three and 
four—all humans, and only humans, deserve the moral status in question (whether moral 
status in general or of a particular type).  
Principle (b) takes on the similarities between humans—especially non-paradigmatic 
humans, but paradigmatic as well—and some animals. The idea is that it is simply impossible 
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to locate a morally relevant difference that will follow the boundaries of the human species. 
This is because for every property (such as language, self-consciousness, autonomy, 
rationality, reciprocity and others) that is supposed to make a morally relevant difference 
between humans and animals there are always some humans who lack it, or some animals 
who have it.5
Principle (c)— that like cases should be treated alike—means, for instance, that if X 
and Y satisfy the conditions of moral status, then both deserve this status, whether they are 
humans or animals. It relies on moral individualism, i.e., on the idea that morality is primarily 
based on the individual's characteristics.6 Thus, this principle makes the AMC species-neutral. 
At least at first approximation this principle is indifferent to the species into which one falls, 
since it primarily refers to one's abilities and properties, whether human or animal. 
Accordingly, it circumvents the species barrier, extricating the similarities between humans 
and animals on a scale of their abilities.7
Usually philosophers agree on principle (a), namely, that all humans deserve moral 
status (although they may differ with regard to the moral rights of children and the mentally 
handicapped). Those who maintain the AMC accept principle (a), and also hold principle (b). 
Hence, as long as there is no set of properties that can isolate all humans from animals, one 
cannot simply make a division between all humans and some animals. Along the lines of 
principle (c), as long as humans and animals are alike, they should be treated alike. Thus, one 
                                                 
5 For instance, Rowlands presents such an argument: "Whatever feature is proposed, ask yourself: 'Do 
all humans have it?' If they don't, then ask yourself: 'What about those humans who don't have it?' This 
argument, almost single-handedly, rules out most of the suggested relevant differences between 
humans and animals. Differences there may be, but, as the argument from marginal cases shows, these 
differences are almost certainly not morally relevant ones" (2002, 45).  
6 There is no clear claim, however, for supervenience of the moral on the mental. 
7 Singer makes it clear: "Whatever criteria we choose, however, we will have to admit that they do not 
follow precisely the boundary of our own species. We may legitimately hold that there are some 
features of certain beings that make their lives more valuable than those of other beings; but there will 
surely be some nonhuman animals whose lives, by any standards, are more valuable than the lives of 
some humans. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for instance, will have a higher degree of self-awareness and 
a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone in a 
state of advanced senility. So if we base the right to life on these characteristics we must grant these 
animals a right to life as good as, or better than, such retarded or senile humans" (1990, 19. My 
italics). Rachels argues the same: "If we think it is wrong to treat a human in a certain way, because the 
human has certain characteristics, and a particular non-human animal also has those characteristics, 
then consistency requires that we also object to treating the non-human in that way" (1990, 175). 
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must actually draw a line from all humans to some animals. In other words, the AMC delivers 
the idea that if we do not have any prior reason to privilege the moral status of humans, the 
lack of species-specific moral properties shows that there is no non-arbitrary way of 
restricting moral status to humans alone. This way of reasoning is represented in the 
following conditional: If all human beings deserve moral status, then so do some animals. 
In the next part, I demonstrate how this conditional that I have identified operates in 
each subtype of the AMC. We shall see that this conditional has not appeared independently, 
but is based on the main narrative of traditional reasoning.  
 
III. Two Versions of the AMC 
A. The Negative AMC 
The underlying idea of the negative AMC is that if denying moral status to animals is 
justifiable on a certain basis, then denying it to marginal cases on the same basis is also 
justifiable. I characterise this AMC as negative since its purpose is not to establish a sound 
ascription of moral status to animals, but to invalidate the original argument against animals' 
moral status.  
 Different kinds of negative AMCs are based on different properties. As long as some 
humans do not possess the relevant property, one can make the negative AMC.8 The crucial 
point, though, is that the same principles that I recounted earlier are employed by all negative 
AMCs. Hence, there is no need to examine each suggested criterion individually because one 
can simply work with the general conditional that if all human beings deserve moral status, 
then so do some animals.  
In its negative version, the conditional of the AMC takes the form of modus tollens:  
If all human beings deserve moral status, then so do some animals 
No animals deserve moral status 
      Therefore, 
Some human beings do not deserve moral status 
                                                 
8 Singer (1990, 14), for instance, develops a negative AMC in relation to the claim that non-linguistic 
creatures do not feel pain, and in relation to the claim that without language one does not have 
substantial evidence that animals feel pain. 
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If the statement that all humans deserve moral status is true, then it must be that some animals 
deserve moral status as well. This is because the consequent of the conditional is a necessary 
condition for its antecedent. Thus, 'some animals deserve moral status' is a necessary 
condition for 'all humans deserve moral status'. Let us examine the possibilities within this 
argument.  
 
1. Moral Consistency 
One way to understand this AMC is as an argument for moral consistency. It asserts that if 
one accepts principles (a), (b) and (c), then moral consistency requires us to accept the 
conclusion that either some humans do not deserve moral status or some animals do. The 
conclusion that some humans do not deserve moral status creates a problem for anyone 
holding an original argument that grants moral status to all humans.9 Therefore, in order to 
create moral consistency, one must either accept that some humans do not deserve moral 
status, or disregard the capacity in question as a necessary condition for moral status.  
 The philosopher who argues on the basis of the AMC invokes situations in which the 
conclusion that some humans do not deserve moral status is counter-intuitive and contradicts 
basic moral practice. Although the moral practice, like any other practice, does not necessarily 
justify the theory, nonetheless, to regularly exclude some humans from the moral domain 
(that is, without special, extreme or unrepeatable circumstances) seems unrealistic, and can be 
very costly. Support of this conclusion implies, for instance, that only moral agents or normal 
humans deserve moral status, and dismisses the important question regarding humans who are 
not agents (or who are not paradigmatic). A possible reply that the main conditional of the 
AMC is false brings us to the other horn of the AMC. 
                                                 
9 Some philosophers may agree with this type of conclusion. Singer (1990, 19-20) discusses this 
possibility. Frey, for instance, argues the following: "[…] I have and know of nothing which enables 
me to say, a priori, that a human life of any quality, however low, is more valuable than an animal life 
of any quality, however high. […] In the absence of something with which to meet the above need, we 
cannot, with the appeal to benefit, justify (painful) animal experiments without justifying (painful) 
human experiments" (1983, 115). After discussing this issue Frey concludes: "[W]e are left with human 
experiments. I think this is how I would choose, not with great glee and rejoicing, and with great 
reluctance; but if this is the price we must pay to hold the appeal to benefit and to enjoy the benefits 
which that appeal licenses, then I think we must pay it" (1983, 115-116). 
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2. Refuting the Conditional of the AMC 
A denial of the conclusion that 'some human beings do not deserve moral status' while still 
holding that animals do not deserve moral status, entails that one must also reject the 
conditional. Thus, one must deny that it is impossible to attribute moral status to all humans, 
but not to some animals as well. In this case, one maintains that it is possible to attribute 
moral status to all humans, and still not attribute moral status to some animals.  
 Yet by endorsing this position one must show a morally relevant difference between 
humans and animals in order to justify this claim. Here, however, bait is ready: like cases 
should be treated alike. If individual X and individual Y both satisfy the criterion of moral 
status, then they both deserve moral status. Indeed, marginal cases create a situation in which 
some humans and animals are alike. Thus, if one denies animals' moral status on a certain 
basis one must also deny it to marginal cases on the same basis.10 But if one does not deny it 
to marginal cases, then one should not deny it to some animals without further explanation. 
The consequence, therefore, is that if one asserts that all humans—including marginal cases—
deserve moral status, then some animals deserve it as well.  
In other words, the AMC appears to create a no-win situation for the traditional 
arguments. On the one hand, if these arguments really support moral status for all humans and 
only humans, i.e., including marginal cases but not animals, they must be based on premises 
that include all humans. On the other hand, the problem becomes how to do this without 
including animals, i.e., to find a significant difference—a difference that is morally relevant—
between humans and animals. This is the problem of those who deny the conditional.  
The AMC aims to show that it is impossible to conclude soundly that 'all humans and 
only humans deserve moral status', unless the premises are speciesist, based on the fact that 
marginal cases are part of the human species. Once one dismisses the case for animals' moral 
status by claiming that 'humans deserve moral status because they are humans', or because 
they belong to a special species—Homo sapiens—one actually maintains a speciesist view 
                                                 
10 For instance, consider the argument that only individuals who can reciprocate deserve moral status, 
and that only humans fulfil this criterion, and that therefore, only humans deserve moral status. The 
negative AMC will show that this is not the case: namely, that some marginal cases cannot reciprocate.  
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that was not supposed to be included in the premises (whose content refers to abilities and 
properties that condition moral status—whether in general or of a specific type).  
At this stage, no attempt to refine the counter-arguments will manage to demolish the 
message delivered by the AMC. Rather, it will simply re-open a dialectic that will end in 
formulating the same conditional. For instance, if the counter-reply to the claim that infants' 
qualities of a-rationality, non-autonomy and reciprocal inability, render them undeserving of 
moral status, is that they have these qualities in potential, then one can still argue that there 
are marginal cases—such as the senile—who lack even this potential. The only possible 
remaining claim that humans are more than animals is not only a speciesist view from the 
perspective of the AMC, but it also shows that either the original argument or the reply to the 
AMC is not really based on the suggested properties that were said to set the criterion of 
moral status. Namely, the suggested properties that were used to separate humans from 
animals are not the real basis of this separation. Accordingly, unless one accepts the counter-
intuitive conclusion that some humans do not deserve moral status, the negative AMC 
manages to show that the traditional arguments eventually converge into speciesism. At this 
stage the issue might turn around the question of the significance of species. 
 
B. The Positive AMC 
Based on existing premises in favour of moral status, the positive AMC shows that some 
animals deserve to be included within the moral domain. So if a certain trait is said to be a 
sufficient condition of moral status, then the claim is that at least some animals share this trait, 
and therefore should be included in the moral domain. Whereas the negative AMC has taken 
the form of modus tollens, the positive AMC takes the form of modus ponens:  
If all human beings deserve moral status, then so do some animals 
All human beings deserve moral status 
      Therefore, 
Some animals deserve moral status 
Thus, if it is true that 'all humans deserve moral status', then this is a sufficient condition for 
some animals to be deserving of moral status as well.  
 147 
 
1. Moral Consistency 
This argument supports the conclusion that some animals deserve moral status, and thus 
achieves moral consistency. The positive AMC in the form of an argument for moral 
consistency provides an elegant way of showing that animals should be included within the 
moral domain from which they are usually excluded. As in the case of the negative AMC, the 
positive AMC does not pretend to be a new argument, but to extract a part of the original 
conclusion that was 'hidden' in the premises of the original argument.11 Thus, the positive 
AMC establishes a possible case for animals' moral status, or other particular moral 
entitlement, based on existing premises regarding the sufficient conditions of the moral 
entitlement in question. Accordingly, this argument brings to light the arbitrariness and 
artificiality of the separation between humans and animals. 
 
2. Refuting the Conditional of the AMC 
As a consequence of the negative AMC, the holders of the traditional argument need to offer 
new premises that would include all humans, but not animals. The positive AMC creates 
exactly the same problem for its counter-arguments. If one denies the conditional, then one 
must deny that it is impossible to attribute moral status to all humans, but not to some animals 
as well. In this case, one actually claims that it is possible to attribute moral status to all 
humans, but still not attribute moral status to some animals. Yet again, in this case one must 
demonstrate a morally relevant difference between humans and animals in order to justify this 
position. This is where marginal cases come into play. 
For every refinement of a property that is supposedly morally relevant and that may 
make a difference between humans and animals with regard to the moral domain, it is 
possible to show that some marginal cases do not possess this property. This takes us back to 
the negative AMC. In order to establish an argument in favour of humans' moral status and 
                                                 
11  Singer, for instance, maintains that some animals, like humans in general—not only marginal 
cases—can feel pain (and also that they can suffer). Hence, he claims that the conclusion of an 
argument that is based on sentience applies not only to humans, but to many animals as well. Note that 
in associating criteria such as autonomy or consciousness it is also possible to claim that some 
humans—marginal cases—do not meet the requirements, while some animals do. This option 
reproduces the counter-intuitive result of the negative AMC. 
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against animals' moral status that is not based on speciesism, it must be shown that there is a 
property, or set of properties, shared by all humans but not by animals, which is morally 
relevant. Furthermore, in order to avoid a problem for marginal cases such a property or set of 
properties also cannot be based on paradigmatic cases. This will take us back to the problem 
of working from the human paradigm, such as basing moral status on moral agency rather 
than associating the case of moral patience as well.  
In conclusion, a denial of the conditional leads to the same problem that we faced 
earlier. That is, if one attributes moral status—whether in general or of a particular type—to 
all humans based on the possession of certain properties, one must demonstrate how marginal 
cases not possessing these properties deserve this status. However, since there is no morally 
relevant difference that follows the boundaries of our species, then it is very likely that such 
an explanation will be associated with speciesism. 
* * * 
There are two main points, then, that emerge from this part: (1) In each subtype of AMC the 
conditional is based on the premises of a traditional argument. The negative AMC is used to 
invalidate the original argument by showing its counter-intuitive conclusion and its typically 
anthropocentric premises which cannot account for non-paradigmatic humans. The positive 
AMC embraces the original premises in order to establish a case for animals' moral status (or 
for other moral entitlement such as moral rights). (2) Each subtype of AMC can also work on 
the basis of denying the conditional by the opponent who holds that 'it is possible that all 
humans deserve moral status, but animals do not'. From the perspective of the AMC, 
however, this path will converge into speciesism (this latter possibility will be at the centre of 
the next chapter).  
In part IV, I examine the first option with regard to the positive AMC. I argue that as 
a consequence of being bound by traditional anthropocentric reasoning, the positive AMC 





IV. The AMC and its Argumentative Framework 
A significant feature of the arguments that I critically examined in chapter three is also found 
in the two subtypes of the AMC: 
Moral status is established on a single foundation shared by 
all individuals who supposedly deserve such status. 
 
My aim in this part is to show that as a consequence of embracing this pattern of traditional 
arguments, the positive AMC, but not the negative, reproduces a major problem of the 
arguments it was originally designed to refute. Consequently, as we shall see in the upcoming 
parts, the positive AMC cannot account for all those who supposedly deserve moral status, 
and does not always provide the relevant basis for moral status.   
The significant contribution of the AMC is in extricating the 'hidden' content of the 
premises of traditional arguments with regard to either marginal cases or animals. The 
premises of traditional arguments usually concern common denominators of mental abilities 
and sometimes physical as well—shared by all who supposedly deserve moral status. 
Searching for a common denominator is a general philosophical aspiration, but in the case of 
the AMC it is also a consequence of inheriting the traditional premises and more specifically, 
of being bound to a connection between 'all humans' and 'some animals'. This connection, 
which is represented in the conditional of the AMC, is the AMC's main tool to show that for 
every proposed condition that is said to endow moral status to humans and only humans, there 
are some humans and some animals that equally share or lack these conditions.  
In section A, I briefly point to an advantage of the negative AMC against traditional 
anthropocentric reasoning, and in section B I expand on the problematic result of the positive 




A. The Negative AMC and Traditional Anthropocentric Reasoning 
The traditional arguments that are relevant to our current concern share the idea that moral 
status can be reduced to one rigidly defined set of common denominators shared by all those 
who are deserving of moral status that serve as conditions for moral status.12 This pattern, 
which was presented in chapter three, has obscured the issue of animals' moral status through 
its use of anthropocentric reasoning: it uses human paradigms as the only standard for 
attribution of moral status, and therefore characterises moral status in terms of moral agency. 
Accordingly, it cannot account for marginal or non-paradigmatic cases (although there is no 
intention to exclude them from the moral community in general, or from a particular moral 
community, such as that of rights-holders). Note that this is closely related to the rationale of 
the negative AMC.  
Indeed, the negative AMC is a successful argument as long as its aim is to undermine 
traditional types of premises.13 The negative AMC does so by exposing their anthropocentric 
nature and revealing their inconsistencies. In endorsing the anthropocentric premises of the 
original arguments, the negative AMC proves their falsity by showing that they cannot 
account for many humans. The negative AMC serves as a counter-example, and as such is 
only capable of exposing inconsistencies in the arguments that it criticises. The significant 
point is that the aim of the negative AMC is not to construct a new basis for moral status, but 
to show the problematic results that one arrives at once one accepts the premises of the 
original argument in favour of attributing moral status to all humans and only humans.   
In this sense, the main function of the negative AMC can be seen as creating a 
provocation against traditional reasoning in order to prepare the ground for a comprehensive 
positive theory that will justify the inclusion of moral patients—humans and some animals—
in the moral community.14  
                                                 
12 For instance, we saw earlier that for Kant, moral status can be attributed only to subjects of reason 
(or rational agents), under the specific characteristics of Kantian reason (or Kantian rationality). 
13 However, it does have a problematic aspect when its aim is to uncover speciesism (to be discussed in 
chapter six). 
14 As we saw earlier, in some cases it is possible that one will actually endorse the conclusion of the 
negative AMC; that is, that some humans do not deserve moral status (See footnote 9). However, it is 
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The main difficulty in the AMC concerns its positive subtype. This is the problem of 
sustaining traditional anthropocentric moral reasoning.    
 
B. The Positive AMC and the Sustenance of Traditional Reasoning 
The problem of sustaining traditional moral reasoning takes place while relying solely on the 
reasoning of the positive AMC to lead to the real condition of moral status—a condition that 
is supposed to include animals. By contrast with the negative AMC, the positive AMC does 
not inherit the premises of traditional arguments merely in order to show their inconsistency, 
and hence to destroy them. The positive AMC aims to be a constructive argument, i.e., to 
establish a basis upon which one can soundly attribute a moral status to animals. It does so by 
accepting the premises of the original argument regarding the conditions of moral status, and 
by extricating their 'hidden' content into the conclusion. To put it in the formula of the 
conditional: the positive AMC shows that 'all humans deserve moral status' is a sufficient 
condition for some animals to deserve it as well.  
However, the positive AMC, by reconstructing the premises of the arguments it was 
designed to refute, cannot contain the thesis of moral status as a complex concept. It is just as 
indifferent as anthropocentric arguments towards altered foundations of different types of 
moral status. Namely, it is indifferent to a system that would constitute different bases for 
moral status. Consequently, the positive AMC leads its proponents to base the attribution of 
moral status on a single foundation—a common denominator concerning mental and physical 
abilities—shared by all those who supposedly deserve moral status.15 Thus, the positive AMC 
does not deconstruct or outflank the traditional argumentative pattern, but preserves the 
problem of arbitrariness and artificiality in the original arguments: it preserves the 
                                                                                                                                            
very likely that this endorsement will remain at the theoretical level, because practical considerations 
will be associated. 
15 For instance, while arguing for animals' right to liberty, Rachels argues as follows: "First, we select 
for discussion a right which we are confident that humans do have. Then we ask whether there is a 
relevant difference between humans and animals which would justify us in denying that right to 
animals while at the same time granting it to humans. If not, then the right in question is a right 
possessed by animals as well as by humans" (1976, 123). In part V, I discuss the common 
denominators offered by Singer (sentience) and Regan (subject-of-a-life criterion). 
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oversimplified nature of the inquiry into moral status in general and animals' moral status in 
particular. 
To expound, let us examine Rowlands' claims: 
[T]here is a profound logical problem with the claim that a 
difference in, say, intelligence, is a morally relevant difference. 
The problem is that it seems impossible to non-arbitrarily settle 
on any relevant level of intelligence. Suppose, for example, there 
were a species of extraterrestrials, vastly more intelligent than 
us. And whereas the average human intelligence on the IQ scale 
is around 100, the aliens' level of intelligence, on the same scale, 
averages over 500. Accordingly, they suggest 300 as the cut off 
point for the possession of moral rights: any individual with an 
IQ of 300 or above should be treated with equal consideration 
and respect, anyone who falls below that threshold should not. 
Presumably, we would all be very unhappy with their choice of 
threshold level, since we all fall below it. We would probably 
claim that 300 is a morally arbitrary figure. But what makes 300 
any more arbitrary than, say, a level of fifty? Or ten? Once we 
set our own likely scores aside, all seem equally arbitrary. And 
this strongly suggests that intelligence is not a morally relevant 
feature, but a morally arbitrary one. (2002, 46-47) 
 
As Rowlands recognises, the intelligence example can be applied to other properties or 
capacities that are supposed to make a difference between humans and animals. Along the 
lines of principle (b), he continues by arguing that a morally relevant difference is not only 
difficult to identify, but that there is no such difference (2002, 47). However, the logical 
problem that Rowlands points to is also a problem within the positive AMC.  
In order to explicate my claim, let us go back to the preceding stage of formulating 
the general form of the AMC which is represented by the conditional. Principle (b) 
concerning the impossibility of differentiating all humans from animals in a way that will 
follow the boundaries of the human species is typically underpinned by the possession of 
mental abilities as a criterion of moral status. Demonstrating his claim through the case of 
intelligence, Rowlands argues that for every suggested level of intelligence or other mental 
ability, the positive AMC can show that some animals satisfy the criterion. But note that if 
this criterion (be it intelligence or some other) is arbitrary and artificial, as Rowlands claims, 
then the conclusion of the positive AMC is arbitrary and artificial as well. Thus, using such 
criterion in the positive AMC means that one does not step out of the pattern that perpetuates 
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the problem of arbitrariness and artificiality of the proposed conditions of moral status, but 
rather inherits its problems.16
On the one hand, by accepting criteria based on individual abilities such as 
intelligence, reciprocity, or autonomy to justify animal moral status, one may expand the 
moral circle and show that some animals deserve moral status. On the other hand, this 
foundation is not reliable because the positive AMC is vulnerable to counter-examples. In 
every case where one succeeds in including animals in the moral domain, we are still left with 
a problem concerning some marginal cases. Not all humans can reciprocate, for example, or 
have the potential to reciprocate, and not all humans are sufficiently autonomous, if at all. 
Ultimately, this very rationale underlies the negative AMC as a critical device. 
This situation shows that the attribution and the possession of moral status cannot be 
based solely on intelligence, or on any other individual property or fixed set of individual 
properties such as consciousness, reciprocity, autonomy or the ability to participate in moral 
discourse. Recalling my line of argument in the preceding chapters, all these properties and 
others may be sufficient conditions for moral status, and necessary conditions for some 
specific types of moral status, but they do not, and cannot, exhaust the issue. Moreover, these 
properties are always exposed to counter-examples.  
In sum, the acceptance of mentally and/or physically-based criteria such as 
intelligence, reciprocity, or autonomy as the single foundation of moral status—in humans or 
animals—perpetuates the problem demonstrated by the negative AMC. Namely, each 
condition, or set of conditions, that functions as a single foundation of moral status is 
vulnerable to counter-examples: there are always some humans who do not have the potential 
to satisfy the proffered condition. Based on a common denominator, the positive AMC is also 
indifferent to morality as a complex concept. At the same time, it is very likely to perpetuate 
                                                 
16 I agree with the rationale of Rowlands' argument, which is a version of principle (b) in the frame of a 
negative AMC: no matter how one defines intelligence, there will always be some humans who will not 
satisfy the required level of this property. At the same time, there is even a possibility that some 




the conception that mental and/or physical abilities are the only possible parameters to serves 
as conditions of moral status. 
Importantly, the condition of moral status offered by the positive AMC is usually a 
sufficient condition—'all humans deserve moral status' is a sufficient condition for some 
animals to be deserving of moral status.17 As such, it does not contradict the possibility of 
associating other conditions for moral status. Note that throughout this chapter my criticism 
only concerns the employment of the positive AMC exclusively; namely, I have argued that 
the positive AMC cannot alone provide a reliable foundation for moral status. However, the 
more important point here is that due to the connection between 'all humans' and 'some 
animals', the positive AMC leads one to hold the proffered condition as the only relevant 
condition, and to practically ignore other relevant conditions.18  
In the next part, I critically evaluate a possible solution to this problem—formulating 
a single broad condition for moral status. I argue that this attempt fails. 
 
V. A Broad Condition for Moral Status 
I argued that the negative AMC instructs us that for each proffered condition for moral status, 
one can provide counter-examples regarding humans—usually marginal cases. I also argued 
that the negative AMC, which reveals the arbitrariness and artificiality of the original 
condition, can work against the positive AMC, which inherits an original condition that is 
(supposedly) shared by all humans, and therefore inherits its arbitrariness and artificiality. 
Nonetheless, this problem can purportedly be solved by constructing a broad enough 
condition that is common to all those who supposedly deserve moral status. Indeed, the 
proponent of the positive AMC must find such a common denominator in order to link 'all 
humans' with 'some animals' because its very rationale, based on principle (b), is to equate all 
humans with some animals. If such a broad condition can be found, then my claims against a 
single foundation for moral status may be dismissed. 
                                                 
17 Although, as we shall see in part V, Singer takes the condition of sentience to be necessary. 




Following Bentham, and with principle (b) in mind, Singer identifies such a broad 
condition as sentience. While arguing for animal rights, Regan offers a new condition—the 
subject-of-a-life-criterion.19 The proposals of Singer and Regan take the form of a positive 
AMC: excluding specific and exceptional cases, they both agree that all humans deserve 
moral status.20 For instance, Singer's idea is that all humans are sentient, that sentience does 
not distinguish humans from animals, and accordingly that the cases of human and animals 
are alike (in the relevant sense).21 The conditions that Singer and Regan offer are supposedly 
broad enough to include all humans and some animals in the moral domain, and thus appear 
to solve the problem of moral patience in general and marginal cases in particular. Also, the 
conditions of sentience and subject-of-a-life are not afflicted with the cut and dried separation 
of humans from animals, but show the commonality between humans and some animals.22  
However, I argue that such broad conditions do not exhaust the question of the basis 
of moral status, and that they are indifferent to the complexity of moral status. First, pain, 
                                                 
19 Regan distinguishes between 'being alive' on the one hand, and 'having a life' on the other. The latter 
represents the criterion of 'subject-of-a-life': "[I]ndividuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and 
desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life 
together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate 
action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual 
welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their 
utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests" (1983, 
243). Regan takes this condition to identify the similarity between moral agents and moral patients 
(1983, 245), and claims that all subjects-of-a-life have inherent value (1983, 233 & 243-244). He is 
aware of the fact that some humans do not satisfy this condition, and hence considers it as a sufficient 
condition. He also offers the condition of inherent value, as an independent criterion in an attempt to 
cover for these cases. However, he hesitates to determine whether 'being alive' (in contrast to 'having a 
life') is a sufficient or necessary condition for inherent value. Accordingly, he is very ambiguous about 
considering some marginal cases as having an inherent value (1979, 141; 1983, 242-243 & 246). 
Therefore, practically, Regan relates to the condition of subject-of-a-life as a broad condition for moral 
rights. Notice that in contrast to Fox, Regan's use of the expression 'moral rights' does not mean moral 
rights as a particular moral domain, but a specification of moral entitlements.  
20 It is well known that Singer (1994) has some reservations in this concern, and thus for instance, he 
supports euthanasia. But, whether justifiably or not, euthanasia is an act based on mercy, and thus an 
act that presupposes sentience. In this sense euthanasia should be seen as a moral act (whether it is 
indeed a moral act is a different question). But the more important thing to our concern is that Singer 
takes sentience as a condition of moral status which connects the human case in general with the 
animal case. Note that Singer's condition is subjected to utilitarian considerations. 
21 Singer takes the condition of sentience to be necessary: "If a being is not capable of suffering, or of 
experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. So the limit of 
sentience […] is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others" (1990, 8-9). 
22 Rachels (1990, ch.5) emphasises the connection between humans and animals by relying on a 
Darwinian approach concerning the continuation between animals and humans. A similar idea 
regarding this continuation is maintained by Macintyre: "To acknowledge that there are these animal 
preconditions for human rationality requires us to think of the relationship of human beings to members 
of other intelligent species in terms of a scale or a spectrum rather than of a single line of division 
between 'them' and 'us' " (1999, 57). 
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suffering and being the subject-of-a-life cannot account for our moral behaviour towards the 
dead; in this case—as well as in others—these conditions are irrelevant to moral status. In 
other words, these broad conditions are vulnerable to criticism by a negative AMC. Secondly, 
even if all those who supposedly deserve moral status satisfy these conditions—assuming, for 
the sake of argument, that our decent behaviour towards the dead cannot be considered 
moral—practice still shows that these conditions are not always taken into consideration. 
They are not taken into consideration not because of neglect or ignorance, but because in 
some cases they are irrelevant, a point I explain in the coming sections. 
In sections A and B I demonstrate my claims using two examples concerning our 
behaviour towards the dead and the element of relational value. I concentrate on the broad 
conditions offered by Regan and Singer.  
 
A. Example A: Behaving Morally towards the Dead and Human Corpses 
Based on the claim that either sentience or subject-of-a-life are the conditions of moral status 
or moral rights (as I stated in footnote 19, Regan uses the expression 'moral rights' as a 
specification of moral entitlements) one cannot include the dead and human corpses in the 
moral domain, and therefore cannot justify the moral treatment of human corpses and the 
dead. It is clear that the dead in general and human corpses in particular are not human beings 
in the relevant sense of the concept, as they can neither feel pain nor suffer, and they are not 
subjects-of-a-life. They do not even satisfy the minimal condition for Regan's ambiguous 
lower-limit criterion—the criterion of inherent value (1983, 246). Not only does a human 
corpse not have a life, but in contrast to future generations, it does not have the potential to be 
alive or to have a life. A corpse is a former being who once had a life. Nevertheless, we 
behave morally towards human corpses and the dead.   
Most of us hold that one should pay due respect to human corpses and the dead; this 
is a well-embedded (moral) practice. We feel repulsion towards the abuse of a corpse, and, all 
things being equal, denounce speaking ill of the dead. Assuming that the dead deserve a 
minimal moral status, this example shows that the conditions of sentience and subject-of-a-
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life cannot include the dead in the moral domain.23 From the perspective of such a negative 
AMC, sentience and being a subject-of-a-life are no less arbitrary and artificial than 
intelligence, rationality, autonomy and other possible conditions, although they support 
bringing more individuals into the moral domain. Furthermore, the example shows that these 
conditions cannot justify attributing moral status to all those who supposedly deserve it.  
Indeed, it seems that there is no reason—aside from the aim of simplifying things—
that a single condition should be shared by all those who supposedly deserve moral status (or 
most of them). One may suggest an extra principle, a kind of local theoretical framework, that 
would include human corpses and the dead in the moral domain (although this alternative is 
not open to Singer, who takes sentience to be a necessary condition). But then once again we 
do not get a single condition for moral status, and doing so requires stepping into a complex 
theoretical framework.  
 
B. Example B: Relational Value 
It appears that concerning certain relationships between individuals, sentience and being the 
subject-of-a-life are irrelevant as conditions for moral status. Accepting sentience as the sole 
basis of moral status means that parents relate morally to their child because she can suffer 
and feel pain (and to experience pleasure). The same goes for subject-of-a-life as a sole basis 
of moral status. But can each of these conditions be the real or sole reason that they hold her 
to be morally considerable? 
The condition of sentience cannot account for certain relational values that have an 
enormous impact on our lives and our obligations towards others. Indeed, while both Smith's 
daughter and her friend, for example, share the ability to feel pain, to suffer and to experience 
pleasure, Smith has a unique relationship to his daughter. This relationship cannot be 
measured by the parameters of mental abilities—parameters that define her abilities, and 
hence define what she is. Rather, such a relationship is based on a scale which classifies 
                                                 




Smith's daughter in terms of kinship (and in other cases in terms of rapport), a scale that 
defines her in accordance with what she is to him.  
It is reasonable to say that in times of trouble, as an ordinary and normal man, Smith 
will not take into consideration the fact that his daughter can feel pain and suffering. Smith 
would help or save his daughter because she is his daughter; namely, because of her value to 
him as her parent.24 The fact that Smith's daughter can feel pain and suffering is irrelevant as 
a condition in this case. It is also irrelevant as an absolute condition that she is the subject-of-
a-life who has inherent value, because it does not encapsulate her value for him, as her father.  
 
VI. Possible Objections 
I offered two examples to show that a single broad condition cannot exhaust the question of 
the basis of moral status, and that using a single condition is indifferent to the complexity of 
moral status. In this part, I consider possible objections to my examples. In section A, I 
consider objections to the example concerning moral behaviour towards the dead and discuss 
the relationships of this practice to our moral feelings on the matter. In section B, I consider 
objections to the example of relational value: my main focus is on the objection that the 
element of relational value invokes problems that stand in conflict with an impartial 
perspective. Section C summarises this part. 
 
 A. Objections to Example A 
1. The Moral Relevance of Respecting the Dead  
A possible objection to my counter-example concerning the dead and human corpses is the 
claim that both our ideals and practice of behaving in a dignified way towards them cannot be 
said to be moral. In other words, human corpses and the dead do not have moral status, 
although this does not mean that we are welcome to defame the dead or to abuse corpses. 
With regard to human corpses such a claim might first appear reasonable, because corpses—
in the purely rational sense—are just material. In contrast to other inanimate things such as 
                                                 
24 The possible objection that relational value becomes relevant only in the framework of the basic 
conditions offered by Regan and Singer will be discussed in part VI, section B.  
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memorial monuments or the natural world to which one may suggest attributing moral 
status,25 a corpse is a material that is about to disintegrate. To be sure, the bones will last for 
many years, and so do our memories of the dead person, but they are a poor 'representation' of 
the late person. Using such an argument can be very useful to archaeologists as well as to 
medical scientists, because it paves the way towards a justification for using ancient graves, 
corpses' remains, and body organs without any potential disturbance to the research.  
However, consider the rituals of 'traditional' societies. For many societies, the issues 
of burial ceremonies, the corpse's interment in the grave and its remaining in the grave, are 
considered to be of extra importance to the peacefulness of the dead (as opposed to that of his 
descendants). Such last rites are considered as having a direct influence on the spirit of the 
dead. Significantly, in these cases, this faith had been shared by the late person. In one way or 
another, even in our scientific age, such customs are widespread, crossing continents, 
cultures, and nations. Thus, it appears to be important to find a justification for this well-
embedded practice (for the existence of such practices does not mean that they are necessarily 
morally relevant). But if one objects to seeing them as morally relevant, then an explanation is 
needed for discounting these practices, or for considering them morally irrelevant. Either way, 
they cannot be dismissed as primitive customs, or as religious matters to be dismissed from 
the outset in formulating the conditions of moral status, without providing a proper 
explanation. The broad conditions of sentience and subject-of-a-life, which are based on 
mental and/or physical abilities of subjects, do not provide such an explanation. 
However, even if one does not consider such rituals to be connected with morality, 
we are still left with the case of the dead person, who may have had wishes to be fulfiled after 
his death. It is reasonable to a certain degree to think that we cannot harm the dead, or to view 
his moral importance in relation to his descendents.26 However, we do have some duties 
                                                 
25 Rolston (1988) suggested an environmentalist approach concerning our duties to insentient objects 
such as the biospheric earth. 
26 Partridge claims that the dead can have no interests, and thus argues that posthumous events cannot 
harm the dead. He argues as follows: "After death, no events can alter a moment of a person's life. 
Nothing remains to be affected" (1981, 248-249). The dubious nature of this sort of claim was 
recognised long time ago by Aristotle in his discussion about change of fortune after death 
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towards the dead person himself. For instance, all things being equal, it is one's duty to 
execute the will of a dead person. It is not clear whether one should always execute a will, but 
exactly for the reason that it is considered an obligation there is a legal process in which such 
matters (as well as patrimony in general) are resolved. All things being equal, to avoid 
respecting a will is to wrong the person who wrote it.27  
Another way to wrong the dead that appears to be related to morality is defamation. 
We have seen earlier that Kant relates to individual humans in terms of humanity. He 
continues to do so with the dead as well. While discussing the good reputation of the dead, 
Kant argues as follows:  
[…] I can and must abstract from whether he ceases to be 
entirely at his death or whether he survives as a person; for in the 
context of his rights in relation to others, I actually regard every 
person simply in terms of his humanity, hence as homo 
noumenon. So any attempt to stain someone's reputation by 
falsehood after his death is suspect, because it is at least 
ungenerous to spread reproaches against one who is absent and 
cannot defend himself, unless one is quite certain of them. (1798, 
111)28
 
Thus, Kant considers the dead part of the moral community. Consequently, we have direct 
duties towards the dead. Earlier, I criticised Kant's use of his condition for moral status. 
However, whether or not Kant is justified in the way he includes the dead in the moral domain 
is not my concern in the present discussion. Rather, I am concerned with Kant's moral 
intuition in this regard.29 Even if Kant fails to convince us that his condition is sufficient to 
count the dead within the moral domain, most of us would agree with his intuition regarding 
                                                                                                                                            
(Nichomachean Ethics, Book 1, chapter 10). For an argument in favour of dead persons' interests, see 
Wilkinson (2002).  
27 Feinberg attributes interests to the dead, and claims that posthumous harm is possible: "Because the 
objects of a person's interests are usually wanted or aimed-at events that occur outside his immediate 
experience and at some future time, the area of a person's good or harm is necessarily wider than his 
subjective experience and longer than his biological life" (1984, 86). A similar view is held by Nagel 
(1970, 76-77). 
28 See also the following quote from Kant: "Someone who, a hundred years from now, falsely repeats 
something evil about me injures me right now; for in relation purely of rights, which is entirely 
intellectual, abstraction is made from any physical condition (of time), and whoever robs me of my 
honor (a slanderer) is just as punishable as if he had done it during my lifetime […]" (1798, 112n). 
Scarre (2003) argues that to wrong the dead cannot be reducible to doing wrong to their descendents or 
successors, and reaches a similar conclusion to that of Kant in the quote in this note. 
29 It is significant that in contrast to his lack of direct account regarding marginal cases, in the case of 
the dead Kant sees the need to provide an account. 
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defaming the dead. This does not mean that Kant is correct, but such an agreement is 
noteworthy, and cannot be dismissed without a good reason.  
Under normal conditions, most of us would consider breaking a promise or a failure 
to execute a will immoral, and most of us would agree that we have a duty to carry out those 
commitments towards the dead person—even though other duties might prevail.30 Along the 
lines of my argument in the preceding chapter, duties towards the dead (such as the duty to 
execute a will or to keep a very important promise) can be substantial duties only within the 
framework of moral status—even if minimal—to the dead. 
 
2. Respecting the Dead and Moral Intuitions 
Earlier, I claimed that most of us hold that we should pay respect for human corpses and for 
the dead. This practice, I also claimed, is well-embedded. Nonetheless, it may be argued that 
this position relies on intuitive conviction that needs to be explained and cannot be taken for 
granted. Usually, implicit in our moral intuitions are some basic moral principles. For 
instance, consider the anti-abortionist's conviction that it is immoral to kill a fetus deliberately 
because it is immoral to kill human beings deliberately. A critical examination of this moral 
conviction aims to identify and to challenge its implicit assumptions, namely, that human 
beings have a certain moral status that makes it wrong to kill them and that a fetus is a human 
being.  
  On the one hand, moral intuitions vary between individuals and between societies, 
and thus are not reliable. On the other hand, if one's ideal is to entirely abandon moral 
feelings, then it is unclear how it is possible to construct a moral theory while giving up this 
important element of what makes us moral creatures. Tooley offers a view that combines 
these two extremes. He claims the following:  
If ethical knowledge is possible, then it seems reasonable to 
expect that people will gradually arrive at moral beliefs that are 
epistemically justified. If, on the other hand, ethical principles 
are neither true nor false, but can be non-epistemically justified, 
then there is reason to believe that people will gradually arrive at 
ethical principles that are non-epistemically justified. In either 
                                                 
30 Grover provides an example of posthumous harm with regard to keeping a promise (1989, 351). 
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case, then, even if moral feelings or intuitions are not initially 
good grounds for accepting certain ethical principles, over a 
period of time there will come to be a closer and closer 
correlation between moral feelings and objectively justified 
moral principles.  
If this argument is right, then one can plausibly adopt the 
position suggested above. That is to say, one can hold that 
agreement with the moral feeling of people makes it at least 
somewhat more likely, other things being equal, that a given 
moral principle is correct, while denying that moral feelings have 
any ultimate or basic evidential significance. (1983, 27) 
 
As an alternative to moral intuitions or feelings as a worthless matter of taste on the one hand, 
and as objective hallmarks on the other, Tooley offers a combined approach. This approach 
enables one to simultaneously respect and suspect our moral intuitions. Namely, one may 
consider our moral feelings seriously, but without necessarily seeing them as representing 
morally objective principles. So, for instance, the fact that many people are convinced that 
abortion is wrong does not indicate the moral correctness of this position. 
Tooley offers three factors to consider in measuring certain moral feelings and 
critically weighing their appeal (1983, 27-29). Let us examine these factors in relation to the 
morally shared feeling that the dead should be respected.  
The first factor concerns the pervasiveness of a moral feeling. The idea is that the 
more a moral feeling is shared by people across cultures and time, the greater the chances that 
it corresponds to an objectively justified principle. As I mentioned earlier, customs of 
respecting the dead as well as last rites are widespread phenomena in human society, as they 
can be found in almost every human culture and nation since long ago.  
The second factor concerns the way people came to agreement on a certain moral 
feeling. There is no problem, the claim goes, where a certain moral intuition was developed or 
adopted by many people and cultures as a result of its intrinsic appeal. Such adoption of a 
moral intuition, however, stands in contrast to what Tooley titles a 'package deal'. In these 
cases certain principles were adopted only because they are part of total view of the world that 
the agent is attracted to. The idea is that this total view of the world cannot be accepted 
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without accepting the principles in question, and so the agent virtually compromises in 
accepting them.31  
Our attitudes towards burial ceremonies and our respect to the dead have been 
influenced by our total views of the world, especially by religious views. Recall that what is 
important to our concern is not the acceptance of a specific custom, but rather that each 
custom represents the shared feeling that one should respect the dead, or at least avoid its 
abuse. Achilles' dragging of Hector's body around the walls of Troy did not lack religious 
meaning. Yet people who do not believe in afterlife, i.e., do not believe that this act has any 
affect on Hector's afterlife, feel repulsion towards this act as well. The repulsion is partially 
due to the fact that Hector, though dead, is not just an object. It is probably impossible to 
provide a purely rational explanation for this feeling, but one can definitely see our attitude 
towards the dead as having an intrinsic appeal. To support this, one may view the case of 
respecting the dead in contrast to Tooley's example regarding pre-marital sex (see footnote 
31). In our present era, fewer and fewer people believe that pre-marital sex is wrong. One 
reason for this concerns the level and sort of influence that religion has on people in 
contemporary society. Nevertheless, the attitudes regarding respect to the dead have not 
changed, at least not in such a clear way as with the case of pre-marital sex, or even as with 
the status of the institute of marriage.  
Another significant issue here is that our intuitive convictions about cases such as pre 
-marital sex, marriage, abortion or euthanasia, have consequences that are potentially of 
tremendous influence on one's life. For instance, one's moral feeling regarding abortion may 
determine whether or not one will have a child. However, in the case of the dead, there do not 
seem to be any immediate influences on our life choices (excluding religious considerations—
                                                 
31 As an example Tooley brings the case of considering pre-marital sex to be wrong (1983, 28). He 
claims that in many cases people considered pre-marital sex wrong only because it was an essential part 
of Christianity, and thus in order to become Christian, it was necessary to accept this principle. Note 
that Tooley does not argue against religious beliefs in general, and thus he does not argue against those 
who truly believe that pre-marital sex is wrong. He points at those beliefs that are adopted as a result of 
accepting other beliefs. 
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which are important for their own sake). Yet people still share the idea that we should pay 
respect to the dead.  
What make intuitive convictions problematic (and interesting) is the conflicts that 
they produce. In the case of euthanasia of severely mentally handicapped infants, for instance, 
one may claim that society spends money and other resources on these human beings in vain, 
instead of investing them in normal infants who will grow up to be happy and productive 
adults. At the same time, these severely mentally handicapped infants and their families 
suffer. This position stands in tension with the claim that even severely mentally handicapped 
infants are innocent human beings who deserve to be alive. Any solution, it appears, will not 
eliminate the conflict and will involve a compromise, even if an emotional compromise. This 
dynamics does not exist in the case of respect to the dead, although people may disagree 
about what would be considered respect to the dead or its abuse. For instance, for some, 
cremating is the proper way to respect the dead, while for others it is a sin. This disagreement, 
however, rests on the shared assumption that the dead should be respected.  
The third factor is that an appeal to moral intuitions "should in general be confined to 
intuitions concerning basic moral principles" (1983, 29). A moral principle is basic, Tooley 
claims, if its acceptance is independent of non-moral facts. A basic moral principle stands in 
contrast to a derived moral principle. A moral principle would be defined as a derived 
principle if its acceptance is entailed by a more basic principle as well as non-moral facts 
(1983, 62). Tooley's claim that accepting basic moral principles should not be dependent upon 
non-moral facts is not trivial. This is because it is unclear that morality can be entirely 
independent of non-moral facts. It is also unclear that there is an objective way of separating 
moral feeling and beliefs from non-moral facts. The problem is not that principles such as 'it 
is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain on human beings' are subjected to the possibility that they 
are derived principles, since the whole point is to critically examine the status of such 
principles. The problem is that according to certain interpretations of 'non-moral facts', basic 
moral principles are unattainable.  
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The rationale of this third factor is to pinpoint the most basic moral intuitions that are 
able to correlate with objectively justified moral principles by neutralising moral intuitions 
that lack independent status and that depend upon non-moral facts. Although the attempt to be 
critical towards moral feelings is significant for creating reflective discussion on moral theory, 
the appeal to objective justification is problematic. It is true, as Tooley claims, that until quite 
recently, most people felt that pre-marital sex was morally wrong. Yet the question of what 
makes it objectively right these days, remains. Many still feel that it is morally wrong and at 
the same time, many others feel that it is morally right. From our current standpoint it is 
possible to locate retrospectively the influence of religion on our moral beliefs and feelings in 
general and of pre-marital sex in particular. However, it is a far more complicated task to 
locate what currently influences our moral beliefs and feelings at this and other matters.  
A critical stance towards moral intuitions is significant for Tooley, in light of his 
cautious permission to use moral feelings. This critical stance underlies the three 
aforementioned factors he proposed for considering the weight one should assign to moral 
feelings. In this sense Tooley, conveys the idea that although moral intuitions are not 
objective hallmarks, at the end of the day there is no clear alternative to appealing to moral 
intuitions of some kind, whether they be more abstract or more concrete.  
At any rate, the issue of respecting the dead and avoiding its abuse appears to be 
entirely uncontroversial in relation to issues such as abortion, euthanasia, equality for women, 
or homosexuality, for example. Tooley claims that "even if moral feelings or intuitions are not 
initially good grounds for accepting certain ethical principles, over a period of time there will 
come to be a closer and closer correlation between moral feelings and objectively justified 
moral principles" (1983, 27). Compared to the cases I brought above (including pre-marital 
sex), respecting the dead has proven over time to be a far more stable moral conviction. 
Therefore, if one accepts Tooley's claim, then one should also accept that the moral feeling 
discussed here with regard to the dead has become more closely correlated with objectively 




The important issue to our concern is whether or not basing morality on a single broad 
condition of moral status, which refers us to mental and/or physical abilities of subjects, can 
account for the case of respecting the dead. The criteria offered by Singer and Regan cannot 
do the job of including the dead in the moral domain. Indeed, the fact that most people hold 
that one should pay due respect to human corpses and the dead, and the fact that we have 
different practices that represent our moral beliefs in these matters, does not mean that this is 
necessarily the way it should be and that it should preclude critical examination. Yet after 
examining objections and seeing this issue in the mirror of the factors provided by Tooley, the 
shared beliefs and the practice in this matter appear to be significant enough to be considered. 
Thus, if one claims that respect to the dead is based on a moral intuition that should be 
discounted, then one should provide a strong argument for this claim. Now, it might be the 
case that Singer and Regan did not mean to include the dead in the moral domain, but then 
they would have had to provide an argument for this exclusion, especially as there is broad 
and strong agreement on this issue across cultures and times.  
 
B. Objections to Example B 
1. The Status of Relational Value 
A possible objection to my example regarding relational value is that although the element of 
relational value might indeed be very powerful, it assumes either the conditions of sentience 
or of being the subject-of-a-life. That is, the objector might agree that the element of 
relational value that I have described, i.e., the intimate kinship between Smith and his 
daughter, conditions Smith's course of action. But it conditions Smith's actions, so the claim 
goes, only because his daughter is a sentient being or the subject-of-a-life who has inherent 
value. Had she not satisfied one of these conditions there would be no point in trying to save 
her. In other words, the element of relational value is an element of a second order that only 
concerns prioritising possible courses of action.  
The immediate reply to this objection is that I have not suggested the element of 
relational value as a condition of moral status. Like in the examples regarding the dead, I used 
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this example in order to point to the deficiency of the conditions for moral considerability 
offered by Singer and Regan, namely, to point at significant exceptions to these broad 
conditions. (In the next chapter I suggest the element of bond-forming as a condition of moral 
status. The relationships between the example of parents and children to bond-forming will be 
discussed as well).  
Nonetheless, following my purpose in giving the example of relational value, let us 
take this example further in order to see why the objection I presented fails—namely, why the 
broad conditions offered by Singer and Regan are deficient. Consider an example of humans 
not considered subjects-of-a-life, or whose sentience is debatable—specifically, the comatose 
in a terminal state. It is unclear to what extent humans in a terminal vegetative state have a 
life and to what extent they can suffer, or even feel pain.32 These people do not satisfy Regan's 
condition of subjects-of-a-life, and, in fact, Regan himself doubts whether it is right to 
consider beings in a vegetative states as human beings (1975, 14) and as creatures who have 
inherent value.33  
With this example in mind, one may reconsider whether sentience and the subject-of-
a-life are the real conditions for considering people in a vegetative state to be morally 
considerable. In such circumstances it is only natural for one to behave morally towards this 
individual because of respect to the life he once had (since such individual is no longer a 
subject-of a-life according to Regan). Such behaviour is entirely independent of the 
unfortunate individual's ability to feel pain and to suffer.34 The closest that this can get to 
Regan's criterion is that the gap between the present inability of the comatose person and his 
                                                 
32 A dispute over the sufficient level of pain, the ability to suffer, and different interpretations of the 
subject-of-a-life condition entails a negative AMC; for instance, for every proposed characterisation of 
pain one presumably can show that there are some humans who do not meet this refined 
characterisation. Also, analgesics can eliminate pain and suffering, and thus can circumvent the 
condition of sentience. Once again we can see the effectiveness of the negative AMC. Nevertheless, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, once one removes the single foundation, thus stepping out of the single 
foundation strategy that is based on mental ability—the AMC's methodology (both the negative and the 
positive) collapses.   
33 Regan argues as follows: "[I]t is radically unclear how the attribution of inherent value to these 
individuals [permanently comatose human beings] can be made intelligible and nonarbitrary" (1983, 
246).  
34 It seems that respect for one's life in such situations is the reason that organs would be removed from 
one's body only once one is dead. 
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abilities in the past grants his moral status. Namely, the relevant condition here cannot be that 
he is the subject-of-a-life, but rather that he used to be the subject-of-a-life.  
Thus, if we agree that the person in a permanent comatose state is part of the moral 
community, then we cannot locate the basis of this agreement in the conditions offered by 
Regan and Singer. In other words, their conditions, although broad, cannot account for all 
cases. Now, even if Singer and Regan can produce a successful reply to my example 
concerning the comatose, we are still left with the first example concerning human corpses 
and the dead in which a negative AMC can be formulated against their conditions.  
Another line of objection to my example regarding relational value can be drawn 
from the impartial viewpoint. I will examine this issue in the following section. 
 
2. Impartiality and Partiality 
I argued that Smith has a special relationship to his daughter and that such a relationship is 
based on a scale which classifies Smith's daughter in terms of kinship and defines her in 
accordance with what she is to him. Thus, all things being equal, it appears that if Smith 
would have to choose in a time of trouble between his daughter and her friends, he would 
choose to save or help his daughter, and not her friend, because of her value to him, as her 
parent. The idea is that the value of one's child is higher, indeed, much higher, than the value 
of others' children. Therefore, when one approaches the example of relational value from the 
normative perspective, it emerges as a classic example of partiality and of a personal 
standpoint, which collides with the impartial viewpoint and the values that it delivers. 
The impartial viewpoint considers every moral entity in an equal way, and thus 
avoids seeing certain moral entities as intrinsically more significant than others. Impartiality 
in its general form relies mainly on an impersonal standpoint that asks us to relate to all moral 
entities in an equal way.35 Consider, for instance, Bentham's famous slogan that "everybody to 
                                                 
35 In Piper's view, this is not necessarily so. She argues as follows: "Proponents of this criticism assume 
that there is an intimate connection between the impartiality of the principles of moral theory and the 
impersonality of the point of view one must take as a consequence of adopting it. But this assumption 
is false. One may adhere to impartial moral principles without adopting an impersonal point of view, 
and one may adopt an impersonal point of view without adhering to impartial moral principles" (1987, 
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count for one, nobody for more than one".36 In contrast to the impartial system, the general 
approach of the partial viewpoint is that one cannot relate to all moral entities in an equal way, 
and this is because some moral entities are more significant than others in relation to certain 
moral being. For instance, the partialist would claim that there are some favourable treatments 
to certain moral entities—such as one's family or community—that are morally justifiable. 
The impartial viewpoint attempts to neutralise implicit and explicit discriminatory 
acts. In a profound sense, this attempt is at the heart of morality because it is supposed to 
neutralise people's personal needs and interests, and hence to avoid biases. A potential 
example for such a bias is the favourable treatment that parents provide to their children. 
Nonetheless, although impartiality is central to morality, it has some drawbacks. These 
drawbacks are relevant for us as a reply to the impartialist's potential claim that my example 
concerning relational value undermines the central theme of morality and allows unjustifiable 
biases.  
Becker stated the followings with regard to perfect impartiality: "Not only would we 
then be required to prosecute our fathers as if they were strangers, but to donate every spare 
nickel, lung, or ounce of bread at our disposal to those who can make better moral use of it 
than we" (1991, 699).37  Impartiality, thus, appears to be too demanding a system. This 
problem is a result of the viewpoint that the moral agent should not give any priority to her 
personal standpoint, and that this standpoint must not have a special role in her deliberations 
(for instance, this is the case in Kant's system). This claim for impersonality in our moral 
deliberations, which is significant for the impartial viewpoint, promotes an instrumental and 
indifferent attitude towards morality (Henberg, 1978). It is unclear that such an approach is 
realistic.  
                                                                                                                                            
104). I will not develop this debate. Still, it is important to notice that usually, impersonality is required 
to maintain impartiality, since impartiality supports the idea of considering equally all moral entities 
whether or not one has a personal connection with them. 
36 Quoted in Mill's Utilitarianism, chapter 5 (an online text). And Sidgwick claims: "The good of any 
one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than 
the good of any other" (1907, 382). 
37 And Cottingham argues: "When I sit up all night with my sick child, the impartiality thesis tells me 
that I am not acting morally; or at least, if my action is to be justified morally, I have to show that I 
could not be making a greater contribution to human welfare by helping any other child who may be in 
greater need of care and attention" (1983, 88). 
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A famous critique of impartiality is conveyed by Williams, who emphasised the 
importance of the personal standpoint and the agent's character that conflicts with impartial 
values. Williams claims: 
[S]omewhere […] one reaches the necessity that such things as 
deep attachments to other persons will express themselves in the 
world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the 
impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending 
against it. 
They run that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such things exist, 
there will not be enough substance or conviction in a man's life 
to compel his allegiance to life itself. Life has to have substance 
if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial 
system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme 
importance to the impartial system, and that system's hold on it 
will be, at the limit, insecure. 
It follows that moral philosophy's habit, particularly in its 
Kantian forms, of treating persons in abstraction from character 
is not so much a legitimate device for dealing with one aspect of 
thought, but is rather a misrepresentation, since it leaves out 
what both limits and helps to define that aspect of thought. Nor 
can it be judged solely as a theoretical device: this is one of the 
areas in which one's conception of the self, and of oneself, most 
importantly meet. (1981, 18-19)38
 
The impartial viewpoint acknowledges the fact that each of us has individual needs and 
interests, and it assumes that we are able to recognise all these in other people as well. But it 
also requires us to consider others' needs and interests in a way that is detached from our 
personal standpoint. The requirement to suppress the personal standpoint is not trivial because 
it asks us to ignore to a large degree what we favour and prefer as persons. But people's nature 
is that their personal needs and interests, such as favouring their friends and relatives, often 
prevail over the needs and interests of others. Williams' claim, however, is far stronger than 
this.  
Williams claims that morality that does not seriously recognise the special role of the 
personal point of view in moral deliberations is absurd. This is because such an approach 
threatens the 'ground projects' of our lives, including our commitments, loyalties, and 
attachment to our friends and families. Williams claims that the impartial system undermines 
the substance of life itself as well as our identities as persons. To put it in his words, which I 
                                                 
38 Williams discusses an example similar to the case of parents-children. The relational value in his 
case concerns a rescuer and his wife (1981, 17-18).  
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quoted earlier: "[U]nless such things [attachments to other persons] exist, there will not be 
enough substance or conviction in a man's life to compel his allegiance to life itself" (1981, 
18). The problem that Williams points at, thus, concerns not only the application of the 
impartial viewpoint in cases of conflicts, but also the very requirements of impartiality, 
requirements that according to his claim, neither support nor enable a normal and meaningful 
way of life. When it concerns personal relationships, it is clear that Williams claims that it is 
improper to be guided only by the standards of the impartial viewpoint while rejecting 
motives that stem from the personal perspective: 
A man who has […] a ground project will be required by 
Utilitarianism to give up what it requires in a given case just if 
that conflicts with what he is required to do as an impersonal 
utility-maximizer when all the causally relevant considerations 
are in. That is quite an absurd requirement. But the Kantian, who 
can do rather better than that, still cannot do well enough. For 
impartial morality, if the conflict really does arise, must be 
required to win; and that cannot necessarily be a reasonable 
demand on the agent. (1981, 14) 
  
Williams' position appears to be radical, and to rely heavily on personal character. His 
position conveys that the ideal of the good life cannot exist under one roof together with the 
ideal of moral life. Mendus criticises Williams in claiming that: 
[I]t is a huge exaggeration to suggest that all cases in which I fail 
to fulfil an obligation of impartial morality are cases in which 
my identity is threatened. There are cases (many cases) in which 
obedience to the requirements of impartial morality would force 
me to sacrifice something I care about very deeply, and would 
therefore result in deep disappointment, but disappointment is a 
very long way from loss of identity. (2002, 75)  
 
Formulating Mendus' claim in Williams' terminology, it can be said that disappointments, 
sacrifices and conflicts are also part of our character and part of what establish one's identity, 
and thus should be taken into account. As a matter of fact, Mendus criticises the way 
Williams presents the conflicts between impartial considerations and partial considerations.39 
At any rate, even if Mendus is right, the core of Williams' contention is still disturbing and 
demands serious consideration.  
                                                 
39 For another criticism in this regard, see MacIntyre (1983, 120-123). 
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Nagel's position concerning the interplay between impartial standards and personal 
relationships within a moral theory also recognises the importance of the personal standpoint: 
There is a venerable tradition in ethics, fully developed by 
utilitarians, according to which we should attempt to become, so 
far as possible, instruments for the realization of those impartial 
values that appear from the impersonal standpoint—living, in 
effect, as if we were under the direction of an impartial 
benevolent spectator of the world in which we appear as one 
among billions. But this radical claim would have to be defended, 
it cannot simply be assumed; and I shall defend the alternative 
view that the personal standpoint must be taken into account 
directly in the justification of any ethical or political system 
which humans can be expected to live by. (1995, 15) 
 
Nagel attempts to depart from the ongoing debate by combining aspects of the personal 
standpoint into ethical and political theory. Note that in saying 'ethical theory' Nagel refers to 
a theory according to which we are expected to live. Formulating the end of Nagel's quote in 
Brad Hooker's idiom, it may be said that by 'ethical theory' Nagel refers to a real code rather 
than to an ideal world (Hooker, 2000). The real code is not detached from our abilities and 
limitations as human beings. Accordingly, Nagel suggests that: 
The response to that problem is the third stage in the generation 
of ethics, and it is the point at which ethics must assume a 
Kantian form. That is, it must go beyond the question "What can 
we all agree would be best, impersonally considered?" to address 
the further question "What, if anything, can we all agree that we 
should do, given that our motives are not merely impersonal?" 
(1995, 15)40
 
In other words, Nagel offers to approach the impartialist-partialist debate in terms of the 
Copernican revolution that Kant adopted in his Critique of Pure Reason: we should take into 
account in ethics not only people's ideal moral abilities, but their moral flaws and moral 
disabilities as well. In other words, one cannot simply ignore people's natures, especially if 
one's aim is to establish a moral theory that will be applicable in practice. This also concerns 
the favourable treatment that parents give to their children in that it represent part of what we, 
human beings, are. As Nagel puts it in an earlier book: "The good, like the true, includes 
irreducibly subjective elements" (1986, 8). All things being equal, this is why it would be 
                                                 
40 See also Nagel (1986, 8). 
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wrong, at least for the parent, not to prefer his child over the children of others. Only when 
exceptional circumstances occur is such a preference no longer trivial.  
A striking example of this point is found in the film The Good Son,41 in which a 
mother must decide whether she will save her son or his friend who is staying with the family. 
Both boys hold her hands while hung over a cliff from which they are about to fall. At that 
stage the mother knows that her son—whom she had thought was a very good boy—is 
actually a very bad boy who has killed his sister, has tried to kill her as well, and has 
committed many other evils. She also knows that his friend—whom she was led to think is 
the bad boy responsible for most of the atrocities that took place—is actually innocent. Under 
normal circumstances one would expect her to save her child, but in this case we face 
exceptional circumstances. Now, in this extraordinary state of affairs, she must make a moral 
decision—she must decide who to save. It is no longer about saving her son automatically or 
instinctively. Eventually the mother drops her son and saves his friend.  
This example represents the interplay between considerations that concern the 
impartial system and those that concern the partial system. It conveys the idea that something 
very radical must happen in order for a parent to bypass values that stem from the personal 
standpoint. What Nagel says is that the integration between these considerations is always 
complicated. Of course, one might think about less radical examples in which it would be less 
obvious that a parent should save his child and not another child, and to ask whether it would 
be justified to act in accordance with the personal standpoint in such states of affairs. The 
general question here is actually 'what would be considered a relevant case for at least a 
temporary suspension of impartial consideration?' It is unclear that one could answer this 
question in a sufficient way without associating a personal perspective. At any rate, the 
answer for these sorts of questions will be problematic because even if we decide on the 
relevant cases, the result will always associate the lesser evil: as a consequence of two 
conflicting systems of values, someone will have to lose. In a profound sense, in most cases, 
at least for the parent, it will always be just to save his child, although from the perspective of 
                                                 
41 Directed by Joseph Ruben, 1993.  
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the impartial viewpoint it is not necessarily so. This is why Nagel claims that "[i]n the case of 
the single life jacket, there is no reasonable solution, and neither parent is unreasonable to try 
to grab it for his child as against the other" (1995, 172). 
In his discussion of Williams' challenge, Nagel acknowledges the problems seriously. 
Yet he also claims that the dilemmas that Williams brought up concerning the gap between 
the good life and the moral life "can arise for most ethical theories, and in particular for 
theories with a significant impersonal element. Whether the dilemmas are not only possible 
but actual will depend on the way the world is, and the way we are" (1986, 205). In order to 
see why Nagel is right in claiming that the tension between the impartial viewpoint and the 
partial viewpoint concerns most ethical theories, it might be enough to notice that Williams 
criticised not only Kantianism, but Utilitarianism as well—two entirely different approaches 
to morality. The issue is so common and complex according to Nagel that besides the third 
stage concerning what can we agree on given that our motives are not only impersonal (1995, 
15-17), he offers a fourth stage in the generation of ethics, a stage that involves political 
institutions:  
Political institutions can be regarded as in part the response to an 
ethical demand: the demand for creation of a context in which it 
will be possible for each of us to live a decent and integrated life, 
both because the effects of our actions are altered by the context 
and because we ourselves are transformed by our place in it. 
Political institutions serve some of the same purposes as moral 
conventions, though our participation in them, unlike obedience 
to moral requirements, is not voluntary but coercively imposed. 
This together with their much greater complexity and role 
differentiation gives them exceptional powers of transformation, 
for better or for worse. (1995, 17-18) 
 
Without delving deeply into Nagel's argument, which will shift us far from our main concern, 
the main idea worth noting here is that political institutions have the power to create another 
layer of balance between the partial viewpoint and the impartial viewpoint. Nagel is definitely 
aware, though, that in many cases there is no reasonable solution, and that Williams still has 
good reasons to argue again that "[t]here can come a point at which it is quite unreasonable 
for a man to give up, in the name of the impartial good ordering of the world of moral agents, 
something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in that world at all" 
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(1981, 14). In other words, it seems nearly impossible to resolve these dilemmas in a way that 
will be free of any substantial conflicts. 
The impartial viewpoint allows us to treat others differently, but our different 
treatment should be justified in a generalised manner, i.e., the justification is that in like 
circumstances, others will act in a similar way. This approach is supposed to neutralise all 
sorts of biases that may be caused by associating the personal perspective, but one may also 
see it as a beginning of a solution that contains the personal perspective. Consider the 
following scenario: in the case of parents and children, all parents might agree that in time of 
trouble it would be best to help and save their children before attempting to help and save 
other children. Yet even this line of thought, which is not free of problems, is a questionable 
compromise for the impartialist. This is because it threatens the idea of impartiality that no 
one person is more important than another. Nevertheless, note that by agreeing that they 
should save their own children, the parents will not be saying that their children are 
intrinsically more valuable than other children, only that their children are more important in 
relation to them as parents. Another problem with this line of thought is the slippery slope that 
it can be said to sustain: the critic may ask, and for good reason, 'to what extent should we 
take into account personal considerations?' Notice, however, that a similar question can be 
asked with regard to the impartial system as well: 'to what extent should we let impartial 
considerations prevail over personal considerations?' 
*** 
My aim in examining the broad conditions that Singer and Regan proposed has been to show 
that their approach to the foundation of moral status is not satisfying because it sustains the 
problems of traditional reasoning. In particular, it does not take into account the complexity of 
our social reality—and this complexity also includes the personal standpoint.  
In bringing the case of parents and children and allowing acts of partiality of that sort, 
I have not argued that such relationships are immune to impartial considerations, or that 
partial considerations always prevail over impartial ones. Also, note that I have not argued 
that some moral entities are intrinsically more significant than others, but that some moral 
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entities are more significant than others in relation to a third party as a consequence of 
relational value.  
Partiality in general and relational values in particular create biases.42 But as we have 
seen, impartiality, just like partiality, also creates problems for individuals and for society in 
general. All things being equal, a parent who will save another's child instead of his own 
because of impartial considerations will bear a heavy burden for the rest of his life. But more 
importantly, society will pay the price of weakening its internal bonds that, as I will argue in 
the next chapter, are essential for its existence. In other words, if parents should not be more 
committed to their children than to children of others, than it would be unclear for the 
children on whom they may rely. Thus, one cannot simply assume that impartiality is 
preferable to partiality, for the impartial system demands justification no less than the partial 
system. At any rate, conflicts of the kind described above are part of any moral theory that 
aims to be practical, i.e., a moral theory that sets ideals by which most of us can live. In one 
way or another, such a theory will have to associate both the impartial and the partial 
viewpoints.  
 
C. Summary: Reconsidering the Relationship between the Positive AMC and 
     Traditional Reasoning 
I argued that the AMC is bound by traditional anthropocentric reasoning and that 
consequently, the positive AMC does not provide a satisfying condition for moral status. 
Singer and Regan reconstruct the strategy of the positive AMC. They accept principle (b) 
according to which there is no possibility to find a morally relevant difference that will follow 
the boundaries of our species. Thus, they search for a single condition, for either moral status 
or moral rights, that is satisfied by both moral agents and moral patients—be they human or 
animal. However, this methodology perpetuates traditional reasoning, even though it avoids 
its anthropocentric nature.  
                                                 
42 The problem is not as much with biases as with unjustified biases. I deal with this in the next chapter 




The main narrative of traditional reasoning is to emphasise the uniqueness of humans 
and their superiority over animals by finding a common property—paradigmatic of humans—
that supposedly all humans and only humans share. The positive AMC highlights the 
similarities shared by humans—especially marginal cases—and some animals, showing what 
both humans and animals have in common (recall that Rowlands claims that there is no 
morally relevant difference between humans and animals). Singer and Regan follow the 
positive AMC while offering their broad conditions.  
One main characteristic of traditional reasoning is to work only in accordance with 
the differences between humans and animals. This characteristic is one-dimensional in that it 
ignores the similarities between humans and animals. But note that the positive AMC sustains 
the same reasoning, only it concentrates on the similarities and ignores the differences.43 It 
also inherits the idea that moral status is determined by certain mental and/or physical 
abilities. We have seen that the simplicity and anthropocentric nature of traditional premises 
do not provide a sufficient account of marginal cases and animals. The positive AMC is also 
one-dimensional: it is indifferent to important patterns of behaviour that cannot be justified 
within its framework. Both reasonings are one-dimensional as a result of using a common 
denominator as a basis for moral status. Accordingly, the positive AMC reconstructs an 
indifferent approach to the complex nature of our moral reality. This is the sense in which the 
positive AMC reconstructs the main problem of traditional arguments that it was designed to 
refute.  
Singer and Regan refer to a broad condition, a common denominator of all those who 
supposedly deserve moral status. The conditions of sentience and subject-of-a-life are more 
comprehensive than anthropocentric conditions. Thus, they can definitely lead to expansion of 
the moral circle. Moreover, these conditions provide a simple framework to work with—
especially in the case of sentience. Such a simple framework is essential to practical ethics—
ethics that Singer and Regan have sustained. 
                                                 
43 This rationale is reasonable to a certain degree, given that creating different foundations for human 
moral status and that of animals may preserve the separation between the species—a separation that the 
AMC aims to deconstruct. 
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The AMC, impressively, attempts to refute the idea that 'only humans deserve moral 
entitlements of any sort', and to show that the common notion that there are morally relevant 
differences between humans and animals that can be traced in our biological species is 
mistaken. Nonetheless, we have seen that the common denominators offered by Singer and 
Regan cannot account for all cases, e.g., the case of the dead and the case of relational value. 
Indeed, the common denominators support impartiality, but they appear to enforce it in such a 
way that we are left with situations in which the proffered conditions appear to be irrelevant. 
At any rate, precisely for the reason that the practices in these issues are widespread and 
pervasive, they should have received more attention. 
The attempt to reduce the concept of moral status to a single element reproduces a 
scientific-like inquiry, and is based on the working assumption that it is possible to establish 
the complexity of our moral practices and theories and their conflicting nature upon one 
foundation. We have seen that our diverse moral practices within society do not appear 
directly, and sometimes cannot appear at all, on 'the AMC balance sheet'. Thus, the solution 
which is offered by the positive AMC may bring more creatures into the moral community, 
but it cannot single-handedly be a constructive argument in the sense of constructing a new 
argumentative framework that outflanks the problems of the traditional framework. 
The solution should be found in a non-simplified set of conditions in accordance with 
their relevance to different cases. The similarities between humans and some animals are 
important and should be emphasised, but the differences are important as well. There is a 
middle way between the speciesist idea that being human is important in itself or, at the same 
extreme, the anthropocentric idea that the conditions of moral status should be formulated on 
the basis of the human paradigm, and between the opposite extreme advocated by the AMC 
that what really matters is the similarities in individual characteristics between humans and 
animals. In the next chapter, in examining the possibility of refuting the AMC's conditional, I 
will offer such a middle way, of creating different foundations for moral statuses. As we shall 





At the beginning of this chapter I identified the general structure of the AMC, which is 
represented by the conditional: If all human beings deserve moral status, then so do some 
animals. I argued that both positive and negative types of AMC have played a significant role 
in showing the problematic premises of traditional reasoning in favour of human moral status 
and against animal moral status. Inheriting the premises of traditional arguments makes the 
negative AMC an elegant argument to show their falsity. The negative AMC undermines the 
anthropocentric premises of traditional arguments by showing that they cannot account for 
many humans, and in fact uncovers double standards in this moral reasoning. As such, it 
challenges our approach to the issue of animal moral status, and also potentially challenges 
our approach to the issue of moral status in general.  
 However, I also argued that the positive AMC reconstructs a major problem inherited 
from traditional arguments. The line that it draws between 'all humans' and 'some animals', 
although reasonable to a certain degree, oversimplifies the inquiry into moral status, and 
sustains the idea that if certain creatures deserve moral status then all of them should satisfy 
the same condition. This line of reasoning makes the positive AMC vulnerable to criticism by 
a negative AMC. A broad condition, as we have seen, sustains the same reasoning and hence 
cannot resolve these problems. Another flaw of the positive AMC that is inherited from 
traditional reasoning is the reliance on mental and/or physical abilities as conditions for moral 
status.  
This conception cannot account for some of our practices, which are considered to be 
moral and are anchored deeply in society. In order to demonstrate the flaws within the 
conditions for moral considerability that Singer and Regan have offered, I provided examples 
regarding respectful treatment to the dead and relational value. Importantly, the example of 
respectful treatment of the dead represents a practice that one has no urgent reason, if any, to 
abandon. This practice also survived a critical examination in the mirror of intuitive 
convictions. If one claims that this practice should be abandoned, or has nothing to do with 
morality, then this should have been explained. On the one hand it is not trivial that every 
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embedded practice should be considered moral, but on the other hand, it cannot be excluded 
from the moral domain without a satisfying explanation. My example deserves an answer for 
the same reason that the AMCs—both negative and positive—offered by Singer and Regan 
deserve an answer from those who support anthropocentric reasoning. However, the single 
broad conditions that Regan and Singer offered, conditions that are based on mental and 
physical abilities, cannot lead to including the dead in the moral domain.  
A similar problem occurs with regard to the example of relational value. The example 
I discussed supports partiality to a certain degree, but there is no point in ignoring the 
importance of relational values to individuals and to our society. Impartiality is an ideal that 
humans, as moral creatures, have come to establish in order to prevent certain biases. But this 
ideal must be related to our social reality in order not to create biases even greater than those 
it was originally designed to prevent. In other words, as with traditional reasoning, the 
positive AMC continues to sterilise social and cultural factors. This, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, has a significant impact on the validity of the AMC's conditional in uncovering 
speciesism.  
The AMC's methodology encapsulates the potential to deconstruct the traditional 
pattern that excludes animals from the moral community into a complex explanatory system. 
Indeed, it is possible to avoid reconstructing the problems of traditional moral reasoning. In 
order to do that, the positive AMC can be used not so much as an argument that aims to show 
that some animals are deserving of moral consideration, but as an argument that uncovers 
moral inconsistencies in the original arguments. Thus, it can have the same function as the 
negative argument. In this sense, not only the negative version of the AMC can operate as a 
critical philosophical tool, but so can the positive version. The negative version invalidates 
the original arguments by extricating their problematic conclusions and the anthropocentric 
nature of their premises—that is, excluding some humans from the moral domain is, by all 
means, very costly. The positive version can uncover inconsistencies in some arguments with 
regard to certain animals, showing that in order for the original argument to be consistent, 
some animals must be included in its conclusion. Still, at this stage one should not necessarily 
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endorse the conclusion as providing a satisfying condition for moral status. The significance 
of such a positive AMC is in showing that the presumed difference between humans and 
animals with respect to the given premises is mistaken. However, since one can hardly base 
moral status on a single foundation, this situation invites us to re-examine the foundation of 
moral status. In this sense, both subtypes of the AMC can show that there is no point in 
continuing the dialectic of refining arguments and counter-arguments as long as one maintains 




Humans, Animals, and Human Society 
[M]orality is founded in a sense  
of the contingency of the world,  




The rationale of the AMC entails that the denial of moral status to animals must be considered 
speciesism. This is a consequence of the connection between 'all humans' and 'some animals', 
based on the notion of a single basis for moral status, a connection represented by the AMC's 
conditional. In this chapter, I continue to critically examine the AMC, focusing on the 
possibility to refute this conditional. 
I argue that the connection that the AMC emphasises between 'all humans and 'some 
animals' is usually unjustified. Specifically, I argue that being part of human society—for 
which being human is a sufficient condition—makes a morally relevant difference that can 
distinguish between the human case and the animal case. This distinction, though not absolute 
is very significant. In other words, my aim is to refute principle (b) without refuting principle 
(c): that is, to show that 'all humans' and 'some animals' are like cases, although there is a 
morally relevant difference that distinguishes them. Thus, I also argue that a refutation of the 
AMC's conditional is not necessarily equivalent to speciesism; that is, the charge of 
speciesism is not necessarily justified if moral status is based on more than a single 
foundation. I propose that the foundations of different types of moral status should be 
determined in terms of their relevance rather than in terms of unity. By 'relevance' I mean the 
pertinence of the criteria used in attributing moral status. By 'unity' I refer to the idea of single 
foundation, or a set of fixed individual characteristics, which can supposedly account for all 
possible cases. That is to say, I attempt to depart from the methodology that seeks a single 
foundation, even if a broad one, of moral status. The methodology that I offer undermines not 
                                                 
 





only the strategy of the AMC, but anthropocentric moral reasoning as well. Thus, it could 
lead us towards a system of morality that is not detached from our social reality. 
I establish my claims by relying primarily on two elements: (1) the different 
background theories in the human case and the animal case, which are relevant to moral 
reasoning; and (2) the notion of humans as bond-forming creatures as a possible grounds for 
moral status for humans. Bond-forming is generally irrelevant as a grounds for moral status in 
animals. First, I briefly re-introduce the rationale of the AMC regarding speciesism. This is 
followed by an exposition of the background theories. In the next stage, I show that the 
consideration of oneself as part of human society plays a significant role in moral reasoning, 
particularly insofar as the bond between humans is concerned. Finally, I explain how my 
position is not speciesist, and does not introduce rampant biases towards either humans or 
animals. Although a moral theory that aims to be practical must take into account the partial 
viewpoint, it also must not dismiss the impartial viewpoint. Biases are part of any moral 
theory, but a moral theory that aims to be practical must also set minimal standards to secure 
the basic needs and interests (of both humans and animals) in order to prevent unjustified 
biases. 
 
II. Revisiting the Refutation of the AMC's Conditional 
For a traditional moral reasoning to truly support moral status for all humans and only 
humans, it is not enough that it merely declares such moral status, but it must be built upon 
premises that include marginal cases. The problem is how to do this without including 
animals—that is, how to find a morally relevant difference to separate all humans from 
animals.  
 In the previous chapter, we saw that a denial of the negative AMC's conclusion that 
'some human beings do not deserve moral status' while still holding that 'animals do not 
deserve moral status' entails a refutation of the AMC's conditional. The same goes, of course, 
for a denial of the positive AMC's conclusion that 'some animals deserve moral status', while 





possible to attribute moral status to all humans, and still not acknowledge that the relevant 
animals deserve moral status.  
 Yet in order to present this position within a non-speciesist framework, one must 
show that there is a morally relevant difference between humans and animals. According to 
principle (b), however, there is no morally relevant difference that follows the boundaries of 
the human species. Thus, it appears to be impossible to justify a refutation of the conditional, 
unless there are prior reasons for giving special consideration to the moral status of humans 
and for withholding moral status from animals. However, since moral status is taken as 
having a single foundation, such reasons must be infected with speciesism. Thus, a denial of 
moral status to animals but not to marginal cases must be based on the fact that animals are 
not members of the human species.2 In other words, the original characteristics suggested are 
not the real criteria used in drawing the distinction between humans and animals.3 These 
characteristics, the claim goes, only camouflage the real (and implicit) condition, that is, 
being part of the human species. 
However, as I stressed throughout the preceding chapters, we could take moral status 
as having more than one foundation. I also suggested that there could be different foundations 
for humans' and animals' moral status. Operating with this rationale, the problem of 
speciesism does not necessarily arise through refutation of the conditional. Such a manoeuvre 
undermines the very idea of the AMC's conditional. It suggests that it is possible to hold that 
'like cases should be treated alike' while denying that 'no property or set of properties can 
make a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that will follow the 
boundaries of the human species', and still not maintain a speciesist position. In other words, 
it suggests that it is consistent to accept principle (c) while refuting principle (b). That is, 
                                                 
 
2 Regan, for instance, argues that: "Some there are who resist the idea that animals have inherent value.  
'Only humans have such values,' they profess. How might this narrow view be defended? Shall we say 
that only humans have the requisite intelligence, or autonomy, or reason? But there are many, many 
humans who fail to meet these standards and yet are reasonably viewed as having value above and 
beyond their usefulness to others. Shall we claim that only humans belong to the right species, the 
species Homo sapiens? But this is blatant speciesism" (1986, 112). 
3 Traditional moral reasoning uses these characteristics to separate humans from animals; the AMCs 





humans and animals can be like cases and thus be treated equally (in the relevant sense, i.e., 
in proportion to their needs and interests) in that both deserve moral status. This situation, 
however, which is based on principle (c)—does not mean that the entitlement of humans and 
animals to moral status is always based on the same foundation. Thus, acknowledging 
humans' moral status while denying that of animals would be associated with speciesism only 
when both attributions of moral status are based on the same foundation. 
Accordingly, my main concern in part III to follow is to show that principle (b)—
when it is linked to the issue of moral status—is not necessarily true. I point at our different 
background theories in the human case and the animal case. These background theories have 
a constitutive role in establishing our social reality as well as our moral practice. Presenting 
them will serve us as the first step in showing that individual characteristics upon which 
principle (b) is established cannot capture the complexity of social reality.  
 
III. The Background Theories 
Different background theories underlie the arguments for animal and human moral status. 
Understanding these theories is important for two reasons. One reason is to highlight the 
authoritative presence of human society in our lives. The second reason is to show that 
principle (b) is not always justified; specifically, that being part of human society can, in most 
cases, make a morally relevant difference between humans and animals.    
Being part of the human species is important not as much for biological reasons as 
because it is the basis of human society. The fact that we are part of human society influences 
the background theory in the human case. The background theory in the animal case underlies 
speciesism, and may sometimes be considered one of its causes. The AMC, however, is 
indifferent to both background theories. This indifference is a consequence of the AMC's 
methodology which attempts to anchor moral status in certain mental and/or physical abilities 
and thus this methodology underlies the AMC conditional, which has been inherited from 





Stated otherwise, when the proponent of the AMC claims that no property or set of 
properties can make a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that will 
follow the boundaries of the human species, he refers to individual characteristics. However, 
positing individual characteristics as conditions of moral status (by both traditional reasoning 
and the AMC) cannot provide a justification for many interrelationships between individuals 
within society. I argue that the inconsistency that the AMC exposes in many arguments is just 
a symptom of a larger situation. Mistakenly, the AMC recognises the inconsistency, 
arbitrariness and artificiality that underlie the employment of double standards vis-à-vis the 
conditions of moral status as the main problem plaguing the animal issue. However, these 
charges could be seen in a different light once the background theories are explicated. In that 
case, let us be clearer on the different background theories that underlie the human case and 
the animal case. 
 
A. The Moral Convictions Embedded in Anthropocentric Reasoning 
A major feature of our approach to the animal issue concerns the background theory about the 
'place' of animals in nature and society. Orthodoxy usually takes it for granted that animals 
are either beyond moral consideration, or morally less important than humans. Many who 
argue on the basis of the AMC have not seriously considered the historical fact that many 
who exclude animals from the moral community have not paid much attention, if any, to the 
issue of infants and marginal cases. Namely, they did not investigate why the issue of infants 
and marginal cases was never seriously discussed.4 Investigating this issue would reveal a 
background theory in favour of humans in that respect, a background theory that receives 
wide expression in our social practice.5  
                                                 
 
4 This matter becomes very interesting when one recalls that the link between infants and morality is 
not an unfamiliar subject in Western and Christian thought; consider the controversy in early 
Christianity concerning the destiny of infants who died before baptism.  
5 Some philosophers who use the AMC have raised the issue of favouring humans, but located the 
causes in speciesism. The charge of speciesism, however, although true in many respects, has limited 





In contrast to the animal case, the task of founding morality upon human paradigms is 
much less problematic when we consider humans who fall short of the standards. In a 
profound sense, it is not problematic at all. In the case of marginal cases, we have a positive 
background theory concerning their entitlement to moral status, namely that all humans are 
entitled to moral status. By analogy to the idea of methodological doubt versus actual doubt in 
chapter two, the idea here is that we usually approach the question of such individuals' moral 
status from a methodological perspective, but not from a practical or actual perspective.  
In other words, our basic moral convictions have already granted moral status to 
marginal cases. Indeed, in ordinary life, we do not relate to infants and mentally handicapped 
humans in an amoral manner. We hold that we should behave towards them in a moral way, 
regardless of the fact that they are moral patients who lack basic mental capabilities. In the 
relevant respects, we do not even distinguish between types of humans (race, gender, age and 
physical or mental abilities). For that reason, it is possibly not a coincidence that many 
philosophers fail to mention the cases of infants, mentally handicapped humans or future 
generations when they formulate the conditions for moral status.6  
The positive background theory that grants moral status to all humans, including 
marginal cases does not stand as a justification for endowing them and all human beings in 
general with moral status. Nonetheless, in many cases it is of the last consequence. For 
instance, in his early writings, Carruthers posited consciousness (in its full-blown sense, i.e., 
self-consciousness) as a necessary condition of moral concern. I will demonstrate how bizarre 
Carruthers' approach would appear if extended to severely retarded human beings. What 
follows is a passage from his book with some changes that I have inserted—the expression 
'severely mentally retarded humans' in italics replaces the term 'animals': 
[S]ince there is no reason to believe that any severely 
mentally retarded humans are capable of thinking about their 
                                                 
 
6 It does not mean, however, that they were unaware of failing to address these issues. For instance, we 
have seen that Rawls included marginal cases within the scope of his principle of equality (1971, 510). 
However, Rawls provided a very ambiguous reason for this, and appeared to draw on practical 
considerations that have nothing to do with the condition he offered for moral personality. See also 





own thinkings in this way [reflexive thinking], none of their 
mental states will be conscious ones. If this account were 
acceptable, it would follow almost immediately that severely 
mentally retarded humans can make no moral claims on us. 
For non-conscious mental states are not appropriate objects 
of moral concern. (Based on Carruthers 1992, 193)7
 
It is hard to imagine a philosopher who would argue for such a view concerning humans in 
such a cut and dried way, and with such an absolute tone.8 Now, with regard to Carruthers' 
original claim, if infants, the comatose and severely mentally handicapped humans are 
included in an extension of this principle, then it should have been explicit, and this extension 
would have had to have been examined in accordance with this principle (and maybe even in 
accordance with the animal case). I am not trying to develop an AMC against Carruthers here, 
but rather seeking to demonstrate the dominance of what I claim is a background theory in 
favour of human beings. As we saw in chapter three, the same goes for Kant's condition of 
reason which is based on human paradigm. It is also true with regard to Rawls' conditions of 
moral personality as well as Fox's conditions concerning the status of rights-holders.  
Let us be more accurate with regard to the conviction that all human beings, including 
marginal cases, deserve moral status. According to the common assumption that all humans, 
in one way or another, fall within the scope of morality, the philosophical concern is to find a 
principle that will justify such well-established assumption and practice. It is the same matter 
that we faced in the example regarding the dead; we are not re-examining the need for this 
practice (since we take it for granted), but asking on intellectual grounds what principle could 
possibly support it. A good example for this practice is Fox's argument for being a moral 
rights-holder that I examined in the preceding chapters. To be sure, human moral patients fall 
short of Fox's proffered condition and they do not have full moral status, but Fox supports 
                                                 
 
7 See part III, section B in chapter three for the original quote and for my discussion on Carruthers.  
8 Some philosophers deny 'marginal humans' moral status. However, to the best of my knowledge, and 
with the salient exception of Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse (concerning their views on severely 
disabled infants with regard to euthanasia), I do not know of any philosopher who commits himself to 
the implication of such a statement in the way he may commit himself to similar implications in the 
case of animals. Even Singer and Kuhse provide a set of reservations regarding their view, and are 






moral rights to human moral patients by claiming that it is impossible and dangerous to 
separate them from humans who have full moral status. 
In other words, the implicit reasoning is that if the principle we have in hand concerns 
most humans, but not all, then the presumption is that this principle represents at least the 
core of morality, while the marginal cases represent a 'remainder'. This 'remainder' may be 
included in an extension of the principle.9 When this is the case—i.e., when one is aware of 
such a 'remainder'—then an argument in favour of the extension is sometimes made and the 
reason in virtue of which animals are excluded is sometimes given.  
However, note that if marginal cases cannot be included in an extension of the 
principle, we can still live with this result, because it will not entail, in practice, their 
exclusion from the moral community.10 Practically, we almost always did, and still do, 
behave morally towards marginal cases, or at least we hold it necessary to behave morally 
towards them. If one cannot include marginal cases in an extension of the principle for moral 
status, then this is usually when practical considerations are brought in to eliminate the 
'remainder' of marginal cases.11
 
B. The Case of Humans versus the Case of Animals  
I am not arguing that one should not question the conviction—whether explicit or implicit—
that marginal cases should be included in the moral domain. My aim, however, is to pin down 
the moral convictions embedded in anthropocentric reasoning. Namely, my objective is to 
trace the reasons that enable one to simultaneously hold that marginal cases are morally 
                                                 
 
9 For instance, Mackie claims: "The claims of these classes, then, lie outside what I must regard as the 
core of morality. It is only extensions of morality that cover them" (1977, 194). By "these classes" 
Mackie refers to mentally or physically disabled people who will never be independent and active 
participants in society. 
10 Or, to put it bluntly, not providing an extension of the principle to include the dead in the moral 
domain will not stop us from executing their wills. 
11 For instance, consider again the quote from Rawls: "That moral personality suffices to make one a 
subject of claims is the essential thing. We cannot go far wrong in supposing that the sufficient 
condition is always satisfied. Even if the capacity were necessary, it would be unwise in practice to 
withhold justice on this ground. The risk to just institutions would be too great" (1971, 506. My italics). 
And Fox claims: "[I]t appears that drawing a line to separate human beings who are full members of 
the moral community from those who are not is probably not only an impossible task but also, even if 





considerable and generally enable one to take it for granted that animals are either beyond 
moral consideration, or morally less important. Thus, my identifying of the different 
background theories should be understood as an explanation for including marginal cases in 
the moral domain and for some of our presuppositions regarding moral considerability.   
 My idea is that since the issue of marginal cases has essentially been grasped as a 
methodological matter of no pressing practical consequence, then it is usually not approached 
as a matter of attributing moral status to marginal cases. Note that the question of whether 
marginal cases should be included in the moral domain is rarely addressed in the context of a 
general moral theory (in contrast to more specific questions in applied and practical ethics, 
such as 'to what extent is one obligated to marginal cases?'). Rather, moral theories are 
usually concerned with justifying the principle with regard to the general case, that of 
paradigmatic humans.  
For instance, we have seen that although Kant redefined the meaning of 'moral' by 
drawing on the idea of acting from within duty, he still did not challenge his intuitive 
conviction that all human beings deserve moral status. Yet, the justification of the principle 
for moral considerability in moral systems such as Kant's is important in order to square the 
moral theory with 'how things are' with regard to the ordinary human being—the creature of 
reason, in the case of Kant. Yet, it does not appear to provide a justification of moral status 
for marginal cases. For all intents and purposes, we generally treat marginal cases as having 
moral status, and the theory is concerned, from the outset, with the ordinary, paradigmatic 
human. 
One consequence of this methodology in the case of humans is that the justification 
of the proffered principle supports the standard social practice with regard to marginal cases, 
but does not change them or question them, at least not in any revolutionary way. 
Specifically, if this principle neither questions the social practice of behaving morally towards 
marginal cases, nor offers a good enough reason for this practice, then it must be based on the 





theory offers would be a change within the context of agreement that all humans deserve 
moral status.  
What is the situation with regard to the animal case? In contrast to the human case, 
the animal case brings forth conflict that threatens our practice. For some, considering animals 
as deserving moral status is about revolutionising the world.12 Less dramatically put, the crux 
of the matter is that, if animals are entitled to moral status, then humans have committed 
grave misdeeds in treating them. This claim stands in conflict with the common conviction 
that animals are either beyond moral consideration, or morally less important. Accordingly, 
this claim may entail an uncomfortable transformation of our basic practice regarding 
animals; and we—humans—do not easily welcome such a change, especially if it does not 
square with our moral convictions. 
Helpful examples of the complexities involved in changing moral practices are the 
civil rights movements, which involved black liberation and women's liberation. The fact that 
these struggles for equality are far from over illustrates that changes in human morality are 
often slow and complex.13 Similarly, as long as the animal issue is a matter of welfare—in the 
common meaning of the term—it does not substantially threaten our current practice. This is 
largely because it is commonly understood that qua welfare it is a matter of choice, 
compassion, and good will. However, moral status is not a matter of compassion or good will. 
Rather, among other things, it is a matter of principled commitment to certain values.  
 In other words, in the case of animals, the principle formulated in favour of their 
moral status could imply that, ideally, we should change our ways. As Narveson puts it in his 
critique of Regan's (1983) conclusions in favour of animals, such as that vegetarianism is 
obligatory: "These are radical conclusions; few of us would be unaffected by them, and most 
                                                 
 
12 In that sense, women's liberation, black liberation, and the liberation of slaves also revolutionised the 
world. 
13 By saying that these struggles are far from over, I refer to both the theoretical aspect (concerning 
legislation) and the practice. For instance, in regard to women's liberation, it is well known that sexual 
harassment and the rape of women are commonplace (although social awareness of these issues is on 
the rise). Here is an example concerning legislation from Jennifer Jones: "In 1878, Susan B. Anthony 
proposed a right to vote amendment to the Constitution that would grant women full citizenship but it 





of us, indeed, would be in for a terrific alteration in various aspects of our lifestyles" (1987, 
31). Thus, the proffered principle regarding animals' moral status encapsulates a form of 
imperative that does not square with daily life as it stands; such a principle would establish 
what we ought to be doing. By contrast, in the case of humans, the principle in favour of their 
moral status tells us how things are, not so much how they ought to be, thus merely 
expressing an already implicit imperative. Thus, offering a principle of moral status in the 
human case does not formulate a new imperative as we already live our lives in accordance 
with it; it is already embedded in our way of life.  
 
C. How does all this Concern the AMC? 
As I argued in the former chapter, the AMC is a counter-intuitive argument. In its negative 
form, the AMC's conclusion that some humans do not deserve moral status contradicts a basic 
moral practice. It is counter-intuitive in its positive form as well because it says that some 
animals deserve moral status. Thus the AMC is a provocative device that challenges the moral 
conviction of traditional anthropocentric reasoning with regard to both marginal cases and 
some animals. 
However, although the AMC challenges our moral convictions, it does no 
explanatory work in confronting the background theories that I have pointed out; it is 
indifferent to the significantly different background theories underlying the moral 
considerability of both animals and humans, whether these background theories are justified 
or not. The AMC recognises the main problems as the inconsistency, arbitrariness and 
artificiality in the counter-arguments. Indeed, these are problems related to anthropocentric 
moral reasoning, but they are not the main issue at stake. They are only a symptom of the 
background theories. The AMC's indifference is a consequence of inheriting the problem of 
anthropocentric moral reasoning, i.e., employing parameters of individual characteristics as 
the only possible conditions of moral status, and basing moral status on a single foundation. 
This sort of reasoning, which is insensitive to the background theories—and especially the 





humans' to 'some animals'. Thus, the denial of moral consistency that is created by refuting 
the AMC's conditional is interpreted as speciesism. This manoeuvre, however, again 
neutralises the circumstances of our social reality that I have just described.   
In the next part, I argue that our background theory concerning the moral status of 
humans becomes understandable once one brings in a basic element of our social structure, 
namely, our being bond-forming creatures. Recognising this element shows that animal moral 
status and human moral status do not necessarily rest on the same foundation. Thus, a denial 
of the AMC's conditional does not necessarily express speciesism. 
 
IV. Bond-Forming as an Element Underlying Human Society 
The AMC is species-neutral because it is based on individual characteristics. Hence, from the 
perspective of the AMC there is no morally relevant difference between humans and animals. 
In other words, the AMC is established upon a formal approach that cancels out the relevance 
of species, and thus relates to beings—both humans and animals—as one big group. This 
reasoning leads to the conclusion that denying moral status or equal consideration of interests 
to animals while simultaneously granting it to humans is defined as speciesism. However, at 
the same time, by embracing this formal approach the AMC cannot see the woods for the 
trees; it fails to notice the possibility that being a part of the human society makes a 
significant difference to the attribution of moral status.  
Principle (b) states that 'no property or set of properties can make a morally relevant 
difference between humans and animals that will follow the boundaries of the human species'. 
I argue that being a part of the human society does make a significant and relevant moral 
difference that could be partially framed in terms of our bond-forming inclination. The idea is 
that the bond between humans cannot be measured in terms of individual characteristics (such 
as self-consciousness, autonomy, rationality and others). Following this line of thought, 
refuting the AMC's conditional does not necessarily express speciesism. 
Here I am taking a similar line of argument to that which I took in previous chapters 





moral patients. I argued that although the issue of moral patience is well-established in the 
literature, this reasoning either ignores the issue of moral patience, or does not provide a 
satisfying account in that respect, because it concentrates on moral agency and human 
paradigms-based conditions. Yet, human paradigms-based conditions are irrelevant to the 
attribution of moral status in the case of moral patients. Note, however, that a similar problem 
results from the AMC's emphasis on the connection between the case of 'all humans' and that 
of 'some animals'. Like anthropocentric reasoning, the AMC takes moral status to be based on 
a single foundation and concentrates on individual characteristics as conditions for moral 
considerability. As we saw, the characteristics of an individual—his abilities and 
disabilities—may be irrelevant for moral considerability. Thus, also like anthropocentric 
reasoning, the AMC oversimplifies the nature of inquiry into moral status. I argue that the 
relevant criterion for the moral status of humans is our bond-forming inclination. This bond is 
one of the foundations of human society, and it explains our background theory with regard to 
human beings. 
I develop my proposal gradually through the following sections of this part. In section 
A, I begin to develop the idea of humans as bond-forming creatures. In section B, I use the 
metaphor of the Russian doll to establish the idea of bond-forming as an element that 
underlies human society. In section C, I support my proposal by replying to a possible 
objection. In section D, I explain how pets can be seen as part of human society. Based on my 
proposal, in section E I show that refuting the AMC's conditional does not necessarily signify 
speciesism. 
 
A. Humans as Bond-Forming Creatures and the Context of Human Society 
I argue that being a part of human society has a constitutive part in our lives as human beings, 
and that it makes a morally relevant difference between humans and animals. The notion of 
humans as bond-forming creatures underlies human society. This claim is not intended to be 
exhaustive or to exclude animals from the moral domain, but rather to explain and clarify the 





claim is also meant to show that in contrast to the reasoning of the AMC, there is no 
necessary cut and dried connection between the case of 'all humans' and 'some animals'. Our 
concern, therefore, is to make sense of my claim concerning the importance of being part of 
human society to moral considerations, while avoiding a speciesist account. Let us begin, 
then, to explicate the notion of humans as bond-forming creatures. 
Mary Midgley claims that "[t]he special interest which parents feel in their own 
children is not a prejudice […]. We are bond-forming creatures, not abstract intellects" (1983, 
102).14 The issue here is that parents have a legitimate preference of their children over other 
children. Parents love their children more then other children, and this does not entail 
prejudice against other children. Society does not condemn this behaviour but rather 
encourages it.15 Midgley's concern here is with the normative level of preferring one's child 
over other children. I would like to develop Midgley's statement by arguing that a similar 
connection to the one at which she points occurs within human society in general, but on a 
much deeper level. My concern, however, is not with our normative behaviour, but rather 
with explicating the force that human society has on our lives. In other words, I do not relate 
to our bond-forming inclination as a normative recipe for moral action, but rather as a notion 
that explains our basic attitude towards other people. By explaining this, I aim to show that 
our approach to human moral status is entirely different from our approach to animal moral 
status. Specifically, I argue that human moral status is not founded on individual abilities such 
as autonomy, reason and so forth, but on the bond between humans. This will eventually lead 
us to conclude that refuting the AMC's conditional does not necessarily rest on speciesism. 
                                                 
 
14 See also Becker (1983) and Almond (1988). 
15 As Becker claims: "When hard choices have to be made, I am ordinarily expected to rank the 
interests of my family above those of my friends, friends' above neighbors, neighbors' above 
acquaintances', and acquaintances' above strangers', and so on. In general, the expected preference 
ordering follows typical differences in the intimacy, interdependency, and reciprocity in human 
relationships. Such differences are constitutive of what may be called 'social distance'—an imprecise 
amalgam of relevant facts about tolerable spatial arrangements, the frequency and nature of permissible 





In response to Midgley's claim about the natural and emotional preference of one's 
own species over others, as well as to Fox's claim that natural emotional responses should 
play a role in moral judgement,16 Pluhar claims that:  
Instead of arguing that "we prefer individual A to individual 
B because it is right to do so," one is claiming that "our 
preferring A to B makes it right to do so." Let us now 
consider this very different kind of attempt to justify 
speciesism. (1995, 171) 
 
According to Pluhar, the 'natural emotional response' is relevant to moral judgment just as 
speciesism is. In addition, Pluhar actuality characterises the appeal to emotions as 
speciesism.17 She approaches the issue in terms of justification of this preference. It can be 
replied that the very point here is that we do not ask parents to justify the fact that they love 
their children more than others, and, more importantly, that it is unclear here what could be 
considered a justification of this practice. To ask for justification for the special treatment that 
a child gets from his parents is to overlook the crucial point that preferring our children over 
others is a constitutive part of our nature as human beings.18 Defining it as an emotional 
response does not seem satisfactory, but at any rate it should not cause one to underestimate 
the high significance of this practice, as I shall explain. 
 In contrast to Pluhar's claim, it is not that 'the preference of A over B makes it right to 
do so', and not even that 'one prefers A over B because it is right to do so'. It is not so much 
about what is right or what is wrong, as it is about 'what is'. We saw in part III that in the case 
of humans we usually take our moral status for granted. Taking our moral status for granted is 
the reason that many times we do not make a distinction between different kinds of humans 
while establishing a moral theory. In that sense, assuming that it is right to prefer my child 
over other people's children, this preference is not subjected to justification in the 'pure' sense 
of the concept, because it is taken to be self-evident. That is, 'right' is not seen here as the 
opposite of 'objective wrong'; rather, it stands as a moral valuation in relation to how it works 
                                                 
 
16 Midgley (1983, 124); Fox (1986, 60). 
17 Pluhar confuses speciesism and discrimination. I discuss this in part V. 
18 As Wittgenstein claimed: "Justification by experience comes to an end. If it did not it would not be 





in society. That is to say that the normative level is not detached from the descriptive level of 
'how things are' in human society.  
The case of parents-children is significant because it very clearly highlights the 
authoritative presence of human society in our lives as well as the bonds between humans that 
underlie our social reality. I have claimed that parents have a legitimate preference of their 
children over other children, and that society encourages parents to behave that way. Indeed, 
in contrast to what Pluhar suggests, the relationships between parents and children do not 
distil down to simple emotions. Nor can they be described solely as emotions (which may 
also allude to a relaxation of philosophical restraint). It is a special bond that is not only 
relevant to this type of relationship, but helps establishing it as such. Humans relate to their 
offspring, even if their offspring is mentally handicapped, in certain ways and on the basis of 
certain reasons (and emotions) that cannot be fully articulated. These elements become 
meaningful mostly in the context of human society.  
In other words, there are considerable forces underlying our social reality, and they 
cannot be reduced to individual capacities. We prefer our children over other people's 
children because it is right to do so, but to a large degree it is right to do so because one is 
expected by society to behave that way. In contrast to Pluhar's approach, we do not have two 
separate equations here (namely, 'preferring individual A to individual B because it is right to 
do so' in contrast to 'preferring individual A to individual B makes it right to do so'). Not to 
prefer my child over others is wrong in the sense that it is in contrast with a structure of 
gradual preference in families in particular and in society in general. As we saw in the former 
chapter, only when a conflict arises is the preference for one's own child not self-evident, and 
becomes subject to consideration that may result in a decision to favour the other child over 
one's own.  
In a slightly different formulation, what I argue is that 'right' stands here as the 
opposite of 'wrong' with regard to the existing moral conception in human society. This claim 
is similar to Nagel's suggestion (that I quoted in chapter five, part VI), that we should aim to 





15). Pluhar does not relate to the authority of our social reality, but rather relates to 'right' and 
'wrong' as if they are entirely objective.19 At any rate, my idea is not to replace the statement 
'we prefer individual A to individual B because it is right to do so' with the statement that 'our 
preferring A to B makes it right to do so'. The idea is that to a certain degree we prefer 
individual A to individual B because it is right to do so, but at the same time it is right to do 
so also because our preferring A to B makes it right to do so.  
Once the power and authority of our social and moral reality is taken into account, it 
is almost impossible to separate the two equations on purely intellectual grounds. Note that in 
contrast to Pluhar, I do not approach the issue in terms of justification of this preference, but 
in terms of a genealogical explanation. First, again, it is entirely unclear what in the case of 
parents and children could be considered a justification of the sort that Pluhar is seeking. 
Second, while parents do love their children far more than other children, they are also 
expected to do so by society. It is a necessary condition for the strength of society (some may 
go even further by arguing that in its basis this practice is embedded in natural selection).  
It does not mean, though, that every practice is taken for granted. For instance, 
although rape and murder are widespread phenomena in our society, we consider them to be 
wrong. We cannot detach this normative consideration from the social reality that defines 
them as wrong. So, although we consider murder and rape as acts that one should not perform 
because it is wrong to do them, our consideration of murder and rape as acts that one should 
not perform is what makes them wrong acts to commit. It is significant that the same society 
in which rape and murder occur everyday as widespread phenomena is able to classify them 
as evil. It shows that we do not accept every practice as it is, and that we are able to act in 
order to change some practices. In other words, our society is capable of acting in order to 
eliminate practices that weaken its strength, while supporting others at the same time.  
Pluhar provides a counter-example to Midgley's notion of natural emotional response.  
She claims as follows: 
                                                 
 
19 I do not argue against the legitimacy of such a claim. Yet Pluhar takes this position for granted and 





This appeal to aggregate emotion [i.e., the attempt to 
generalise the appeal to emotion] (for oneself as well as for 
others) also fails […]. It would be easy to institute rules 
protecting humans who lose their capacity for full 
personhood through mishap or age. Similarly, marginal 
humans whose families care for them could also be protected 
from exploitation. Congenitally marginal humans who have 
never been loved be out in the cold. Moreover, societies in 
which the abnormal are shunned and scorned even by their 
own families, and in which persons accept the prospect of 
death should they lose their personhood, would simply not 
encounter the "side effects" a more compassionate society 
might experience. Neither self-love nor sentiment can be 
relied upon to provide the results speciesists desire. (1995, 
172) 
 
It is important to note that the appeal to emotions, sentiments, or to special cases for humans 
does not necessarily stand for speciesism. Pluhar, from the outset, defines such an approach as 
speciesist. However, as Midgely states, "[a] belief is not a prejudice simply because it 
indicates a difference" (1983, 101).  
Pluhar's counter-examples quoted above are a form of a negative AMC. She tries to 
show that emotions cannot be generalised, and hence that some humans are not deserving of 
moral status on these grounds. These AMCs gain their force because Pluhar pursues the idea 
of single foundation for moral status, a foundation that should be generalisable. Significantly, 
Midgely does not argue that emotions are the foundation of moral status (although Pluhar 
interprets her claim as if she does). However, the point here is that even had one argued that 
emotions to kin or others are the condition for moral status, then only while considering such 
emotions as the only condition for attributing moral status can one claim that the mentally 
handicapped (or animals, or even orphans and isolated people) "who have never been loved", 
to use Pluhar's phrasing, be left "out in the cold". The use of a single condition is what 
enables Pluhar to define this as speciesism.  
For my current concern, I would like to focus on animals, leaving aside momentarily 
the issue of inclusion of marginal cases in the moral domain (to be addressed in section B 
below). It is possible to refute the conditional of the AMC provided by Pluhar on the basis 
that humans and animals do not always satisfy the same condition for moral status. For 





while animals that do not deserve moral status on this basis may deserve moral status on basis 
Y. Thus, the possibility that a certain criterion cannot be generalised to all those who 
supposedly deserve moral status, should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that those who 
cannot satisfy this certain criterion are not deserving of moral status—and hence that this is a 
speciesist position. This makes sense only if we do not define moral status as resting on a 
single foundation.  
In any event, it is important to emphasise that my purpose in presenting the notion of 
bond-forming is not to replace a single foundation for moral status by another. My purpose is 
to show that the notion of bond-forming can, to a significant extent, separate the human case 
from the animal case. However, the significance of bond-forming in the human case should 
not discount other potential criteria for justifying the attribution of moral status to animals.  
I now continue to delineate my proposal in more detail, and show that the notion of 
bond-forming may explain why Rawls and Fox do not separate the case of human moral 
patients from that of moral agents.  
 
B. The 'Russian Doll Effect' 
The human interrelationship can be illustrated using the metaphor of the Russian doll. The 
Russian doll is a set of puppets of different sizes in which each puppet contains a smaller and 
almost identical puppet. All these puppets, in a sense, are part of the 'notion' of the Russian 
doll, but not because they are all made of wood, or because they were all made in Russia. 
Rather, they are part of the same 'notion' because they relate to each other in a certain way. It 
does not matter what size the puppets are, and it is irrelevant that certain characteristics of the 
biggest puppet cannot be found in the smaller puppets. By analogy, a similar type of 
interrelationship is found within human society. The issue is not that we humans are 
biologically the same, nor that some of us are less or more competent in terms of individual 
characteristics, such as rational judgment, autonomy and so forth. My point is that humans are 
simply interrelated in the same way that the puppets of the Russian doll are interrelated—that 





Let us be clearer about the idea of humans as bond-forming creatures within society: I 
relate to bond-forming as a term of art that represents our deep affiliation to our fellow 
humans. Our bond-forming inclination concerns the shared history of our evolution and our 
ability to reflect not only on ourselves as individuals, but also on our being part of the human 
species and part of human society. Our bond-forming inclination also concerns our 
development into creatures who are able to live according to cultural rules and moral rules. 
Most animals, and definitely most social animals, have a tendency to associate and to mate 
with members of their own species. In the human case it is the same. Like non-human 
animals, we are part of nature and obey its rules, but our ability to live according to cultural 
and moral rules has the potential of transcending our beastly nature. A crucial point here is 
that we do not live neutrally and indifferently among people. We are born into human society, 
grow up in human society, start families with beings of our own species and live our lives 
within a human culture and within many kinds of social interactions that mostly concern other 
humans. Naturally, therefore, our social reality constitutes a much deeper affiliation to 
humans than to animals. This affiliation is a basic situation that comes with being part of 
human society, and it concerns not only a shared set of biological similarities, but a shared set 
of social and cultural similarities as well. In contrast to what Pluhar suggests on behalf of her 
opponents, this affiliation cannot simply be reduced to emotions such as affection or love. 
In Section A I demonstrated the authoritative presence of human society in our lives, 
using the example of children and parents. To continue this discussion, I would like to address 
the issue of experimentation. Most of us oppose experimenting on human beings—whether 
they are mentally handicapped or not—at least insofar as it concerns experiments that are 
similar to animal experimentation in their invasiveness and harm. This is true not only with 
regard to cosmetics experiments, but also with regard to medical experiments. Because of the 
biological similarities of humans, experimenting on people should increase the validity of the 
experiments and to increase the likelihood of finding solutions to many illnesses. 
Nevertheless, we think very negatively of subjecting people to experiments of the kind that 





that this example shows that experiments on animals and the killing of animals are justified, 
and I definitely do not aim in this direction. As in the background theories that I described 
earlier, the purpose of this example is to show the different ways in which we think about 
humans and about animals. It supports the idea that our inclination is to be far more attuned to 
people than to animals.  
Continuing the metaphor of the Russian doll, the point is that even if one of the 
puppets of the doll is defective or very different (e.g., a mentally handicapped), it is still part 
of the Russian doll. Throwing this part away may eliminate the defective or different part, but 
it will also damage the entirety of the Russian doll, whose parts, by definition, are different 
from each other. The different puppets of the Russian Doll represent the different kinds of 
humans. Humans differ from each other in sex, race, age and mental abilities as well. But all 
humans together establish our society and make our society what it is. In other words, we 
relate to human society as a whole, and thus one cannot simply exclude marginal cases from 
the moral community because they are different from most people. The reason for including 
the mentally handicapped or the senile in the moral community cannot be conditioned by 
individual abilities, such as those we critically explored in the previous chapters. Therefore, 
the reason one includes marginal cases in the moral domain and even struggles to include 
them in a particular moral domain that is defined in terms of moral agency, must exceed 
individual characteristics. I offered the notion of bond-forming as an element that creates the 
deep affiliation of humans towards fellow humans, a notion that points at the entirety of 
society and its Gordian knots,  and thus can explain why we include all human in a the same 
moral domain. 
Let me demonstrate the explanatory value of the notion of bond-forming on Fox's and 
Rawls' accounts. 
The idea of bond-forming explains why Fox does not exclude human moral patients 
from the central moral community of rights-holders, although they do not satisfy the 
condition for full moral status. That is, it explains the reason that underlies Fox's claim that it 





people who do not have full moral status (1986, 62). The same goes for Rawls' claim that it 
would be unwise in practice to withhold justice from marginal cases even though they do not 
satisfy the conditions of moral personality, and that it would be a great risk for just 
institutions (1971, 506).20 I do not claim that Fox and Rawls had the following explanation in 
mind, but rather, as I shall clarify, that this explanation explicates the background theory of 
their commitment to marginal cases. 
In chapter three I examined Rawls' potential reply to my critique. Based on the 
circumstances of justice, I claimed that Rawls could have argued that human moral patients 
are included in the social contract because they are part of human society. Rawls agrees with 
this idea, but his explicit condition of moral personality is based on individual abilities and 
hence, in itself, cannot bring marginal cases into the scope of the theory of justice. Rawls is 
clearly aware of this problem in his account and is not interested in excluding marginal cases 
from his theory of justice. I claimed that in order to compensate for this, Rawls ambiguously 
diverges from the original condition of moral personality by converting it to a collective 
condition, adding that it will be unwise to withhold justice from humans who cannot satisfy 
the condition of moral personality.  
Significantly, despite the salient exceptions regarding the inability of marginal cases 
to fulfil Rawls' condition of moral personality, even as a sufficient condition, he brings 
forward a perfectly comprehensible idea: all humans are part of human society and not merely 
as individuals. Moreover, it appears that Rawls' awareness of the cost of excluding certain 
individuals from the particular scope of equal justice is based on the consideration of all 
humans as part of human society, in that such exclusion would be dangerous not only to just 
institutions, but to the stability of society as well.  
It is worth mentioning that Fox, like Rawls, struggles to include marginal cases in the 
particular moral domain that is defined in accordance with the human paradigm and is not 
satisfied in giving them an inferior moral protection. This is why Fox includes human moral 
                                                 
 





patients not only in the moral community, but in the community of rights-holders. 
Considering all human beings as part of human society also explains why Kant and 
Carruthers do not exclude human moral patients from the moral domain, and why they do not 
distinguish between moral patients and moral agents.  
The philosophers I dealt with in chapters three and four do not always have the same 
aims, but they all include humans who do not satisfy the required conditions in the proposed 
moral domain while this domain is defined on the basis of a human paradigm. At the same 
time, the conditions that they offer exclude these humans either from the moral domain in 
general, or from the particular moral domain that they argue for. We saw that in some cases, 
the reason for including humans who do not satisfy the required conditions in the moral 
domain is unexplained, and in other cases the suggested explanation is highly unsatisfying.  
In all these cases there must be a reason by virtue of which, as Fox and Rawls claim, 
it would be unwise and dangerous to exclude certain groups of humans from the moral 
community. There must be something that qualifies those humans to be members of the moral 
community, something beyond the individual abilities by which all these philosophers include 
humans who do not satisfy the required condition in the proffered moral domain, although it 
is defined in terms of moral agency. The notion of bond-forming explains this situation, but 
without the need to manipulate the suggested condition. Namely, the notion of bond-forming 
explains why Rawls sees human moral patients as entitled to equal justice and explains why 
Fox sees them as rights-holders. Fox's and Rawls' commitment to marginal cases indicates 
their approach to human beings as part of a whole and not merely as individuals21 (this may 
sound trivial in the case of Rawls, but recall that the condition he suggested, the condition of 
moral personality, is based on individual characteristics). Excluding certain groups of humans 
from the moral domain of most humans would weaken the fabric of society. Similar to what I 
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argued earlier, this is not only a risk to just institution, but a risk to the very existence of 
society. This is why it would be dangerous and unwise.  
We saw that the notion of bond-forming has great explanatory value for our 
background theory concerning humans' moral status in general and human moral patients in 
particular. Nonetheless, one may argue that what I have proposed until now in regard to our 
bond-forming inclination points to a sort of a social instinct of commitment.22 But even if 
there is a natural commitment between humans, then it still does not mean that we cannot 
change our moral practices, or that we are enslaved to the societal status quo, because the 
practices are allegedly biologically-based. In this case it is significant that society manages to 
change its practices, and classifies practices in terms of right and wrong. As I have illustrated 
using the example of rape and murder, practice does not necessarily justify moral theory. I 
claimed that we consider rape and murder to be wrong, and that we cannot detach this 
consideration from our social reality that defines them as wrong. The crucial point here is that 
these unfortunate practices destabilise our social order and undermine the Gordian knots of 
our society.  
 
C. An Objection and a Reply 
We have a strong commitment and connection to our families and friends. But do we really 
have any commitment to someone in the other side of the world who is not part of our society 
or our culture? Does the metaphor of the Russian doll, which is supposed to demonstrate how 
people are interrelated and the notion of bond-forming, apply to such cases?  
The objection, thus, is that the notion of bond-forming cannot bear the weight of 
relationships between humans. The objector may agree that our bond-forming inclination 
plays a major role in the relationships between parents and children as well as within other 
kinds of relationships. But at the same time the objector would argue that our connection with 
people who are beyond our immediate social and cultural circles of family, friends and even 
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our nation and religion, is very loose. Thus, he would claim that it is doubtful whether one 
can be justified in describing our relationships with those people in terms of our bond-
forming inclination.  
Indeed, the case of parents and children is different from other kinds of connections 
between people, and it is also true that commonly we care more for our families and friends 
than for others. In general, the more one steps out of one's local social circles, the less one 
feels committed to others beyond those circles.23 It is also seems that in our daily lives most 
of us, in that way or another, are indifferent to what happens or will happen to other people 
around the world. Usually, most of us will develop a deep concern to such 'others' only when 
an exceptional event takes place. For instance, most of us have become aware of the destitute 
life of Iraqis only in the wake of the second Gulf war.  
Nonetheless, as I shall explain, these tendencies of human concern are versions of our 
bond-forming inclination. Recalling the background theory in the human case, our main 
concern is whether we consider 'others' (like the people of Iraq, for instance) to have moral 
status, whether we experience a profound affiliation towards people around the world and see 
them as part of a whole to which we all belong. As I have already argued with respect to 
Pluhar's contention, I do not refer to the element of bond-forming as representing emotions 
such as love and affection, although these emotions are important for their own sake and 
clearly play a significant role in the interrelationships between parents and children. My main 
concern lies with our pre-conceptions regarding other humans—pre-conceptions that point at 
a bond between humans, a bond that usually does not take place in our relationships with 
animals. Most of us do sympathise with the Iraqi people who have miserable lives. Many 
people in the West (and clearly the vast majority) who sympathise with the people of Iraq are 
not part of the Iraqi society in terms of family, culture, nationality or religion, and clearly in 
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most cases they do not even know them. The same goes for the propound sympathy and 
affiliation that we share towards the tsunami victims in the Far East.  
 These types of affiliations between humans stand in contrast to the animal case. Daily 
controversies and/or disasters that concern animals usually only re-open the question of 
whether animals deserve moral consideration. However, at the same time, we consider the 
people of Iraq and the tsunami victims, whom we usually do not know, as deserving moral 
status. In the human case we clearly face disputes with regard to the normative level. For 
instance, we may wonder whether it is our job (for instance, as people from other countries) 
to help the people of Iraq or the tsunami victims. Nonetheless, in contrast to the animal case, 
we have no doubt that it is someone's job to help them: there is a solid agreement that those 
people have moral status, and the disputes usually concern 'how we or others should act, 
given that they have moral status'.  
 Nagel claims that "[e]ach of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of 
his own, and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then remove 
ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply of all those 
people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be" (1995, 10). Nagel's concern here is 
with the possibility of impersonality in ethical theory, and this explicates our ability to 
sympathise with other people. The ability to be impersonal has a significant role in enabling 
us to identify with other people, especially with people whom we do not know and even with 
our enemies. If our identification with others were based only on the personal standpoint, then 
we would have identified only with people we know and to whom we are closely related. The 
ability to be impersonal makes it possible for us to see things from the perspective of other 
people by shifting ourselves from the centre of the issue. That is to say that in order to 
sympathise with other people, we do not necessarily need to employ a personal standpoint. 
In other words, my reply to the objection is that de facto people are attuned to 
problems of other people—including nations—even if they represent the perfect 'other'. It is 
true that we feel less committed towards those who are not included in our social circles, but 





The objection that we have dealt with is a version of Pluhar's contention. Pluhar 
interprets the bond between humans as an emotion, and accordingly expresses the worry that 
people such as the lone mentally handicapped who have never been loved would not be 
endowed with moral status. In doing so she ties the attribution of moral status with the 
personal standpoint. However, again, our bond forming inclination should not be understood 
as an emotion such as love or affection (although these emotions have a significant role in 
motivating one for action). Indeed, my example concerning the bond between parents and 
children is very different from other types of bonds between humans, but it should be 
understood as a salient case of our bond-forming inclination, and for that reason I chose it as a 
main example. Recalling my account on the authority of human society and our bond-forming 
inclination that constitutes its strength, the foundation of the relationships between parents 
and children cannot be reduced to love. This, of course, is not meant to deny the special 
emotions that take place between parents and children, that are connected with the personal 
standpoint, but these special emotions are not proposed here as conditions for moral status.  
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the personal standpoint has a significant impact 
on our lives and cannot be easily dismissed. Conflicts in this matter will never disappear. At 
any rate, our ability to sympathise with other people whom we do not know undermines 
Pluhar's claim that nobody will take care of the lone mentally handicapped. In this respect it is 
important to emphasise that the notion of bond-forming should not be understood as an 
individually applied criterion of moral status. Relevant to our case is not 'who loves this 
baby', or 'who cares for this mentally handicapped baby', but rather, the affiliation between 
humans, which is an element that takes part in establishing us as a human society. As I have 
argued earlier, this affiliation that represents our bonds with other humans, is not based on the 
personal standpoint, but rather on the impersonal standpoint.  
The unique human tendency to care even for unrelated humans may also be 
demonstrated with the example of orphans. A female cat will not take care of stray kittens, 
but people do take care of orphans. Cases of 'adoption' in the animal kingdom are the 





a matter of routine. The relevant issue here is whether we relate to orphans as morally 
considerable beings, and the fact is that we do. This routine is not established only upon love 
and affection, or only upon acquaintance with orphans, but mainly by our sense of 
commitment to creatures like us. In other words, in contrast to non-human animals, we find 
that human society usually takes care of individuals who were left alone.24 This is one form of 
humans as bond-forming creatures. Thus, Pluhar's example concerning individuals who have 
never been loved fits mostly with the animal kingdom, but usually not with human society. In 
human society, such individuals have very good chances of survival. The same goes for 
marginal cases. In contrast, an abnormal animal usually will not survive, because the mother, 
or the group, ignores it.   
The element of bond-forming separates the human case from the animal case to a 
large degree. In most cases, animals are not part of our social reality in a way that would be 
relevant to the notion of bond-forming. Thus, bond-forming is generally irrelevant as a 
criterion for moral status to animals, although, as we shall see in section D, it is fairly relevant 
in the case of pets. Indeed, the case of pets supports my argument because many humans 
relate to pets as an integral part of our social reality. It is highly significant that the pressing 
moral problems in regard to animals usually do not concern pets, but have mostly to do with 
wild animals, animals in farm factories, and animals that are being raised or captured for 
experiments. Problems such as killing animals for food, or harming and killing them during 
experiments, usually do not apply to pets.  
In section D, I elaborate on my claim that pets can be seen as part of human society.  
 
D. The Case of Pets and Bond-Forming 
Allegedly, the possibility of seeing pets as part of human society weakens my claim for a 
separation between humans and animals. However, as I mentioned earlier, the main problems 
of animal ethics do not concern pets. I argued that one often relates to marginal cases as the 
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'remainder' of a principle that supposedly represents the core of morality. I also argued that 
this does not entail any pressing practical consequences for marginal cases. Like marginal 
cases, even if we relate to pets as a 'remainder' of the moral theory in use, by and large it will 
not affect their situation. As with the marginal cases, for all intents and purposes, pets are 
considered moral patients. For instance, people spend a huge amount of money on their pets' 
needs, they do not consume pets, and are against using pets in research laboratories. 
Moreover, most people would condemn pet abuse. A lot fewer, though, would condemn 
animal abuse of non-pets at the research laboratories. Again, exceptions may apply, but this is 
not an exact science. At any rate, this definitely does not mean that animal experimentation is 
justified. My aim is to show that our background theory regarding humans is also true 
regarding pets. Indeed, in that sense, the case of pets validates my theory with regard to the 
importance of being part of human society: in the relevant sense we do consider pets as part 
of our society, and that is the reason that we treat them so differently from other animals. The 
main moral problems, such as cruel experiments that cause pain, irreversible physical damage 
or death, hunting for sport and trade, or exclusion from the natural habitat, do not concern 
pets, but rather concern animals in factory farms, in research laboratories, and in the wild.  
At this stage, it is apparent that the case of pets does not harm my argument, but in 
fact makes it stronger. The separation of the human case from the animal case is a general 
one, but it is not a mere formality. The reason for the separation is that we have different 
relationships with animals and people on the basis of different background theories—theories 
that affect our lives. In the case of humans, the background theory highlights the importance 
of society in our lives. Earlier I argued that via my identification of the background theories, I 
explain why we include marginal cases in the moral domain. The same applies in the case of 
pets, since the inclusion of pets in our social reality is loyal to our background theory in their 
case. In that sense, my explanation is appropriate to the ways we think about pets. Since we 
see pets as part of our social reality, then the relevant criterion for moral status in their case is 





As we saw in chapter four, my view is that granting moral status to animals in 
general, not only to pets, is of extra importance in order to secure their well-being. For that 
reason, the criteria for their moral status should be relevant to their case. I disputed the idea of 
a single condition as a sole foundation for moral status in the preceding chapters, arguing, 
among other things, that this idea does not enable us to approach the foundation of moral 
status in terms of relevance, namely in a way that is far more related to our social reality. 
Treating the criteria of moral status in terms of relevance is meant to replace the approach to 
moral status in terms of unity (namely, the notion that there is a single foundation for moral 
considerability, based on set of fixed individual characteristics, that is allegedly applicable to 
all possible cases). By 'relevance' I refer to the extent to which the criteria used in attributing 
moral status fits our social reality. The criterion of bond-forming is relevant mostly to the 
human case, but it is irrelevant to most animals. However, sentience and being a subject-of-a-
life are very relevant criteria for the case of most animals. In the frame of my proposal, these 
kinds of criteria can be applied only to the relevant animals, i.e., animals that have the ability 
to feel pain and that are not pets.25  
Seeing bond-forming as the relevant criterion in the human case does not mean that 
one does not consider whether an action will cause another human to be in pain. Yet the issue 
here is what establishes one as a moral entity. Indeed, in the human case, or in the case where 
the criterion of bond-forming applies, sentience might condition a certain moral behaviour, 
but in a context that from the outset grants moral status to humans on the basis of bond-
forming. The core idea here is that once we draw on additional criteria, we should no longer 
have to force a criterion for moral status where it appears to be irrelevant. The separation 
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between humans and animals that are not pets seems to complicate the conditions of moral 
status. However, providing simple theories does not guarantee their successful application.26  
In section E, I reconnect my account concerning bond-forming to my contention that 
refuting the AMC's conditional does not necessarily entail speciesism.  
 
E. The Outcome of Refuting the AMC's Conditional 
 
After presenting the notions of bond-forming and being part of human society, lets us re-
examine the rationale of the AMC. 
On the basis of his moral individualism thesis,27 Rachels claims as follows:  
[O]ur treatment of individual creatures, human or non-
human, should be adjusted to fit the actual characteristics of 
those creatures. A being's specific characteristics, and not 
simply its species membership, will then be seen as 
providing the basis for judgments about how it should be 
treated. (1990, 175. My italics)  
 
Rachels provides us with a claim that is based on principle (b), the principle which stands at 
the centre of this chapter.28 This principle usually concerns biological traits in relation to 
individuals. The difference between Rachels' position—a position that represents the 
reasoning that underlies the AMC—and my proposal, is that by 'actual characteristics' of 
humans I also take into account the human society to which they belong (but not simply their 
                                                 
 
26 Singer takes sentience to be the criterion for demarcating the realm of equal consideration of 
interests. The application of the principle of equality is proportional to the creatures' needs (1990, 7-8). 
Practically, however, Singer draws on extra criteria—higher-order criteria—for determining levels of 
consideration of interests or moral concern (and sometimes animals can be at higher levels than 
humans, especially when it concerns marginal cases). Yet sometimes these other criteria prevail over 
the criterion of sentience, especially in Singer's utilitarian approach. Thus, although an animal belongs 
in the moral domain, or the domain of equal consideration of interest, it may not benefit from this, 
because the interests of humans may prevail. For instance, consider animal experimentation whose aim 
is to find a cure for AIDS. Even if one experiments on animals in a painless way, one cannot guarantee 
that the consequence of the experiment will not be painful or terminal. Some developed this line of 
argument against Singer's utilitarian approach (for instance, Regan 1980 and 1983), but I am concerned 
with a different issue. Singer's appeal to sentience aims to simplify the issue of moral status in general 
and the issue of animals' moral status in particular. But practically, he does not manage to simplify the 
issues, because higher-order criteria are involved. Thus, if things are complicated anyway, and if the 
criterion of sentience can be superceded by other criteria, then there is no real barrier for Singer, not 
even his utilitarianism, to draw on other criteria at the stage that precedes classification to levels of 
moral concern (here I am referring to the basis of moral status). 
27 Rachels (1990, 173-175).  
28 Priniciple (b): No property or set of properties can make a morally relevant difference between 
humans and animals that would follow the boundaries of the human species. Singer and Regan, as we 





species). The element of society, which is the context in which humans live their lives, 
introduces a trait that cannot be easily reduced, if at all, to biology. It also cannot be reduced 
to individual traits. This element, I argued, makes a morally relevant difference between 
humans and animals, and usually separates the case of humans from the animal case as much 
as it concerns the foundations of moral status. 
Recall that a denial of the AMC's conclusion—both the negative and the positive—
entails a refutation of the AMC's conditional. In both cases, therefore, one maintains that it is 
possible to attribute moral status to 'all humans' but still not to attribute moral status to 'some 
animals'. The idea is that in order to present this position within a non-speciesist framework, 
one must show that principle (b) is not always justified, i.e., that there is a morally relevant 
difference between humans and some animals. However, in contrast to principle (b), we saw 
that there is a morally relevant difference between humans and most animals. Being part of 
human society makes a morally relevant difference between humans and animals and this 
difference can be framed in terms of our bond-forming inclination. Thus, since usually the 
human case and the animal case are based on different foundations, then refuting the AMC's 
conditional does not necessarily signify speciesism. Again, the notion of bond-forming is not 
based on individual characteristics and cannot be measured in terms of individual 
characteristics, but the AMC is insensitive to this. The AMC is also indifferent to the idea that 
there could be different foundations for humans' and animals' moral status. As I argued 
earlier, this manoeuvre undermines the very idea of the AMC's conditional. 
Now, if pets are part of human society, then the only case where refuting the 
conditional would signify speciesism is when 'some animals' stands for pets. In all other 
cases, refuting the conditional would mean that 'some animals' do not deserve moral status on 
the particular basis that 'all humans' deserve moral status. Principle (c) states that like cases 
should be treated alike. Indeed, if one establishes animals' moral status on a different 
foundation than humans' moral status, then both 'all humans' and 'some animals' deserve 
moral status, and therefore should be treated alike (in the relevant sense, namely, in 





hold principle (c), while denying principle (b), that 'no property or set of properties can make 
a morally relevant difference between humans and animals that will follow the boundaries of 
the human species', and still not maintain a speciesist position. 
In section D, I claimed that the main moral problems regarding animals, such as cruel 
experimentation and hunting, usually do not apply to pets, but to other animals. Accordingly, 
the AMC's proponent is supposed to be mainly concerned with securing moral status for 
animals who are not pets. On the basis of the positive AMC he aims to provide a broad basis 
that includes both humans and animals. Nonetheless, we saw that once the idea of a broad 
basis for moral status is removed, then refuting the AMC's conditional entails a speciesist 
view only with regard to pets, and thus this argument misses its main target. 
 
*** 
In contrast to Kant, Rawls, and Fox, I have not suggested the notion of bond-forming as a 
collective condition, i.e., as a condition that compensates for incompetence of some 
individuals in relation to a proffered condition of moral status. The notion of bond-forming 
explains why we relate to all humans, not only moral agents, as morally considerable. At the 
same time I claimed that pets can be seen as members of our social reality. Thus, I did not aim 
to create an absolute separation between humans and animals. At any rate, from a claim to a 
strong commitment between humans, and from the idea that usually we do not experience to 
animals the same commitment that we do to humans, it cannot be derived that animals do not 
deserve moral status. First, other criteria aside from bond-forming are available for the animal 
case. Second, it is possible to relate to pets as part of our society. Finally, it is a fact that 
society manages to change its practices with regard to animals in order to improve their well-
being.  
Some may consider my separating the animal case from the human case to be 
speciesism, especially since I criticised the AMC that aims to connect these cases. 
Accordingly, my aim in the next part is to explain how my position cannot be described as 





V. Speciesism and Discrimination 
The view that I described here concerning the separation between humans and animals does 
not represent speciesism, although it is discriminatory to a certain extent. Discrimination in 
itself, however, is not necessarily a prejudice, or else affirmative action would be considered 
prejudice.29
Singer defines speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of 
members of one's own species and against those of members of other species" (1990, 6). 
Rachels distinguishes between several types of speciesism.30 He characterises radical 
speciesism as the view that every human interest prevails over that of animals. Mild 
speciesism states that when comparing trivial interests of humans to a substantial interest of 
animals, the latter may prevail. Rachels also describes two other possible speciesist 
approaches: unqualified speciesism and qualified speciesism. Unqualified speciesism, which 
constitutes a possible logical basis of radical speciesism, is the view that membership in a 
certain species is alone sufficient to grant one certain treatment. In this case, moral 
significance lies in the species alone. Qualified speciesism is the view that human interests are 
more important than animal interests because the latter lack some morally relevant 
characteristics. 
Although my account does not square with any of these definitions, rather than 
attempt to answer specifically to each definition of speciesism, I will show that my overall 
thesis cannot be classified as speciesism. First and foremost, my primary aim was not about 
the normative level. Rather, I focused on different foundations for moral status and, as a result 
of my attempt to refute the AMC's conditional without speciesism, I focused mainly on the 
foundation of human moral status. Moreover, I argued that my proposal for different 
foundations for moral status results in the idea that all humans and the relevant animals are 
entitled to moral status. Thus, I did not argue that animals do not deserve moral status, but 
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rather accepted Rawls' and Fox's claim that animals deserve moral status. Second, I did not 
argue that humans deserve moral status only because they are part of the human species. 
Nonetheless, I did argue that their being part of human society is of much relevance to the 
basis upon which humans deserve moral status, and I offered an explanation that underlies 
this claim: I argued that because humans are part of human society, the criterion of bond-
forming is available mainly to them. Finally, I argued that the criterion of bond-forming is 
also relevant to pets, even though pets are not part of the human species. This also shows that 
my separation between the human case and the animal case is not speciesist.  
Let us clarify the distinction between speciesism and discrimination recalling Pluhar's 
characterisation of speciesisim. Here is the quote by Pluhar again: 
Instead of arguing that "we prefer individual A to individual 
B because it is right to do so," one is claiming that "our 
preferring A to B makes it right to do so." Let us now 
consider this very different kind of attempt to justify 
speciesism. (1995, 171) 
 
Pluhar's confuses discrimination and speciesism, and this confusion is a consequence of her 
raw conception of speciesism. According to this conception, it seems that every preference for 
humans over animals is classified as speciesism. But surely one can justify some preferences, 
and this is what I tried to do.31
Speciesism is a far more delicate and complicated concept than what Pluhar, Rachels 
and the rationale of the AMC take it to be. Ultimately, even pro-animal philosophers claim 
that in many circumstances, human interests prevail over the interests of animals. For 
instance, all things being equal, if one must choose between the death of an animal—even a 
pet—and the death of a human, it is very likely that the human interest to stay alive will 
prevail. This is discrimination. Yet under certain circumstances this discrimination can be 
justified on the basis that human life is more valuable than animal life.32 Note, however, that 
                                                 
 
31 Basically, this is also what Midgley tries to do when referring to natural emotional preference. If I 
am correct then, at worst, Pluhar may claim that Midgley's sort of justification is unsuccessful, but not 
speciesist. 
32 Singer agrees with this: "[A] rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. 





in this latter claim I do not suggest that animal experiments are justified in order to avoid 
human death or suffering. My claim should be understood in the context that exceeds the 
animal's specific level of moral status, as I shall explain. 
Regarding human entitlements versus animal entitlements and which one prevails, I 
attempted to provide a solution that would not render animal moral status meaningless. 
Therefore, in chapter four, I claimed that substantiating animals' moral status means that 
humans have direct duties towards animals, i.e., duties that are directed to the animals 
themselves. Human needs and interests may prevail over animal needs and interests under 
certain circumstances, but not as a routine practice that lacks restrictions. This is because if 
we are to relate to animals as moral patients, then some of their entitlements concerning their 
basic needs and interests must be secured to a certain extent. All things being equal, with 
regard to this secured realm of needs and interests, human needs and interests should not 
prevail over the needs and interests of animals.33 This is the sense in which one substantiates 
the recognition of animals as having a moral status.  
Here we should recall that Fox and Rawls do consider animals as deserving moral 
status, even if minimal or different from that of humans. Nonetheless, their accounts create an 
inherent bias against animals. In the case of Rawls we saw that, on the one hand, even if 
people are asked to take animal welfare into consideration in the original position, their 
interest for doing so is entirely unclear. On the other hand, taking animals' interests into 
account at a later stage means that the animal case would be subjugated to existing and 
protected human interests. Moreover, in that latter stage people are still self-interested, and 
hence even if they would have an interest to provide some protection to animals, then it is 
hard to imagine how it will be carried out towards animals in an unbiased manner. All this 
relies on Rawls' claim that animals do not satisfy the conditions for moral personality. The 
                                                                                                                                            
 
capacity for meaningful relations with others and so on are not relevant to the question of inflicting 
pain—since pain is pain, the being may have—these capacities are relevant to the question of taking 
life. It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning 
for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being 
without these capacities" (1990, 20). 





subjugation of animals to human needs and interests means that the protection that one can 
accord animals is very limited from the outset. The bias in the case of Fox is more salient. We 
saw that Fox claims that although animals' ability to suffer makes them morally considerable, 
they do not have a moral status equal to human beings (1986, 70). Accordingly, in many 
cases, human needs and interests would prevail over animal needs and interests.34 Thus, 
Rawls and Fox consider it legitimate and justifiable that human interests prevail over animal 
interests. The main problem, as we saw at chapter four, is that humans seem to be under no 
serious obligation to secure animals' well-being, which is bound by human needs and 
interests.  
The problem of the circumstances under which it is legitimate to favour human 
interests over animal interests occurs in Singer's account as well. Singer claims that we should 
give equal consideration to the suffering of all creatures capable of suffering. In that sense, his 
principle is unbiased and impartial because it considers all moral beings in an equal way. This 
is the formal aspect of Singer's principle. But equal consideration of interests does not entail 
equal treatment, because different creatures clearly have different needs and interests. Thus, 
Singer claims that the principle should be applied proportionally, i.e., in accordance with the 
needs and interests of each creature—whether human or animal. I do not wish to dispute this, 
but, as I have already mentioned, aside from the ability to feel pain, there are other 
considerations to be taken into account. For instance, Singer claims the following: 
The evil of pain is, in itself, unaffected by other characteristics of 
the being who feels the pain; the value of life is affected by these 
other characteristics. To give just one reason for this difference, 
to take the life of a being who has been hoping, planning, and 
working for some future goal is to deprive that being of the 
fulfillment of all those efforts; to take the life of a being with a 
mental capacity below the level needed to grasp that one is a 
being with a future—much less make plans for the future—
cannot involve this particular kind of loss.  
Normally this will mean that if we have to choose between the 
life of a human being and the life of another animal we should 
choose to save the life of the human; but there may be special 
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cases in which the reverse holds true, because the human being 
in question does not have the capacities of a normal human 
being. (2002, 20-21) 
 
Indeed, the characteristics that Singer mentions may not affect the evil of pain in itself, but 
they do appear to influence the experience of pain, and to create more suffering (both in 
humans and the relevant animals). Under the relevant circumstances, fear of pain is a great 
evil, as is as the trauma that one may suffer as a result of pain (for instance, people who 
expect to be in pain suffer more than people who do not expect to be in pain). The same goes 
for the mental experience that for some people accompanies pain. Accordingly, following 
Singer's claim in the last paragraph above, it appears that if we have to choose between 
inflicting pain on a human being and inflicting pain on an animal, we should choose to inflict 
pain on the latter. It means that although animals deserve equal consideration of interests, 
they still may not benefit from this since human interests may prevail. Singer's utilitarian 
approach does not prevent this possibility.  
Singer's account is by all means highly friendly to animals and it is hard to 
exaggerate his contribution to the animal debate. Moreover, his account is clearly far more 
friendly to animals than Rawls' and Fox's accounts. Still, especially since Singer's account is 
utilitarian, it is unclear under what circumstances we may inflict pain on animals. It is also 
unclear under what circumstances we should prefer human interests over animal interests. 
This is a problem not only for Singer, but for any account that aims to re-slice the cake rather 
than leaving it all for human beings; indeed, a moral theory based on my proposal will be no 
different.  
However, I have not offered a moral theory here, but rather examined potential 
foundations for being morally considerable. I proposed a general structure for a moral theory 
that attempts to grant minimal protection to animals as well as humans. Regarding the issue 
of human needs and interests versus animal needs and interests and which one prevails, my 
attempt was to provide a better solution that would continue neither anthropocentric 
reasoning on the one hand, nor the reasoning of the AMC on the other. According to my 





units—entitlements that are basic to the being, whether human or animal—and that under 
normal circumstances must not be violated. The idea, to recap, is that seeing moral status as a 
unit of security and protection means that, all things being equal, this secured realm should be 
protected. Developing this idea to a comprehensive moral theory may entail that not all 
morally considerable beings will have equal moral status, but if we consider moral status as 
the scope of one's high priority entitlements (based on defining these entitlements as minimal 
standards), then this scope must be protected.   
For instance, consider the entitlement to be inflicted with unnecessary pain. As I 
argued in chapter four, in order to substantiate this entitlement regarding animals one must 
define the duty not to inflict unnecessary pain upon animals as a direct duty. As such, this 
duty would be based on animals' ability to feel pain and would be defined in relation to 
animal needs and interests, and, thus, we must not manipulate this duty. Manipulating this 
duty on the basis of human needs and interests will violate animals' moral status. In other 
words, defining moral status in the way that I proposed prevents the possibility of frustrating 
animals' moral status on the basis of human needs and interests, and thus avoids biases 
against animals. 
Therefore, in contrast to Rawls and Fox, my account clearly restricts cases of well-
reasoned preference in favour of humans to entitlements that are not part of the secured 
realm. Although Fox and Rawls consider animals as deserving moral status, their accounts do 
not substantiate this consideration. Accordingly, from the perspective of their accounts, it is 
entirely unclear how animals can potentially be protected, even in a minimal sense. Granting 
moral status to a creature, even if it is only minimal status, means that its basic needs and 
interests in the relevant aspects should be protected.  
My approach is meant to protect animals in a way that Singer's account cannot, 
because my account aims to formulate minimal thresholds that will secure animals' basic 
needs and interests. Since we formulate types of moral statuses as minimal standards, then 
those standards are of high priority. Accordingly, these minimal standards should not be 





creature—be it human or animal—that exceed the secured realm can be frustrated relative to 
other human or animal needs or interests. It is in these circumstances that it is most likely that 
some human needs and interests would prevail over those of animals. This proposal can be 
justified on the basis that humans have characteristics that affects their lives in ways that are 
not available to animals. These characteristics establish the complexity of human mental life. 
When there is a confrontation between human entitlements that are part of their secured realm 
and animal entitlements in their secured realm—which is provided by their specific moral 
status—only then will one face a conflict that will have to be solved in our moral practice. 
Formulating minimal thresholds is also meant to prevent biases of partiality, such as 
in cases where relational value is involved. All things being equal, when someone's basic 
entitlements are at stake, considerations of relational value should not prevail. This is the 
sense in which formulating minimal thresholds represents the impartial viewpoint. However, 
when there is a conflict between the secured realm of Smith's daughter and the secured realm 
of another's child, then indeed, Smith might face a very hard decision. Nagel, as we saw at the 
previous chapter, claimed that "[i]n the case of the single life jacket, there is no reasonable 
solution, and neither parent is unreasonable to try to grab it for his child as against the other" 
(1995, 172). Now, one may even think about more complicated scenarios in which the 
reasonable decision for the parent is less obvious. These kinds of problems and conflicts, 
however, are part of every moral theory. A moral theory cannot solve all the problems and 
conflicts in this matter, but may reduce them. The important thing here is that formulating 
minimal thresholds is supposed to prevent a bias in favour of humans or animals in the 
secured realm. Bias in conflicts such as the one described above may occur, but such bias 
might be justified, depending on the context of the situation.  
It is clear by now that the claim that some interests prevail over others is not limited 
to conflicts between the species. Under certain unfortunate circumstances, when we would 
have to choose between the lives of a normal human and a mentally handicapped human, we 
would probably choose the former. This discriminatory act, however, is not an act of 





take into account the complex mental life of the normal human and the greater value of her 
life in relation to the life of the mentally handicapped. At the same time, such a choice would 
definitely not make us feel content; it would just be the lesser evil. 
The claim that in many cases human interests prevail over animal interests—because 
humans have abilities that give their lives greater value—is a legitimate way to explain the 
preference of their interests over that of animals. It would have been a speciesist claim had I 
argued that human life is more valuable simply because it is human. This explanation, 
therefore, does not express speciesism. However, this explanation does express speciesism 
according to Rachels' (and Pluhar's) notion of qualified speciesism: namely, the view that 
human interests are more important than animal's interests because the latter lack certain 
morally relevant characteristics. The problem with this view is that it conveys the idea that the 
complexity of human mental life and human society is irrelevant to moral considerability. The 
only thing relevant to moral considerability, in this view, is the similarity concerning 
individual characteristics between humans and animals. It is according to this line of thought 
(that I rejected) that discrimination in favour of humans, on the basis of the moral 
characteristics that animals lack, is defined as (qualified) speciesism. In any case, note that the 
conception that Rachels entitled 'qualified speciesism' leaves room for animals' interests to 
prevail over the interests of marginal cases, which may lack the morally relevant 
characteristics. Therefore, this view cannot be a speciesist view.  
Finally, in contrast to Singer's conception of speciesism, which is broad enough to 
stand independently, the conceptions of qualified and mild speciesism described by Rachels 
should not be labelled speciesist before they are located in the context of moral theory. As I 
suggested earlier, a moral theory can set secure thresholds for every grade of moral status in 
order to protect the basic needs and interests—of both animals and humans. This means that 
the question of whether and when human needs and interests or animal needs and interest 






To sum up, I have not argued that human needs and interests always prevail over animal 
needs and interests, nor that what we owe to animals should be carried out within the 
constraints of human needs and interests. The claim that the criterion of bond-forming cannot 
be applied to most animals, and that most animals deserve moral status on a different ground, 
does not mean that our commitment to human beings should prevail over our commitment to 
animals. The aim of separating the animal case from the human case (although this separation 
is not absolute) has been to depart from anthropocentric reasoning and to create a theoretical 
structure that is related to our social reality, in which the concept of moral status does not rely 
on a single foundation, consisting of individual characteristics. Accordingly, my dispute with 
Singer is not about the proportional distribution of needs and interests (and recall that I did 
not attempt to refute principle (c)—like cases should be treated alike). Rather, my dispute 
with Singer as well as with the other philosophers that I have discussed concerns the idea that 
there is a common denominator, based on individual characteristics, that is shared by all those 
who deserve moral status. This dispute is in line with the main debate discussed throughout 
this dissertation, which is between anthropocentric reasoning and the AMC supporters on the 
one hand, and my non-anthropocentric account on the other hand, concerning the relevant 
foundation of moral status.35
 
VI. Conclusion 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the AMC's conditional, which 
entails that a denial of moral status to animal must be defined as speciesism, is not necessarily 
true. We saw that this conditional is a consequence of the AMC's rationale, namely, of the 
connection that it emphasises between 'all humans' and 'some animals', based on the notion of 
a single foundation for moral status. The emphasis on the similarity aims to show that 'all 
humans' and 'some animals' are like cases and hence should be treated alike. The AMC 
definitely challenges the anthropocentric moral reasoning by undermining the (implicit) 
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distribution of moral status according to species—based on the paradigm case of humans—as 
a result of relating to the similarities concerning individual characteristics between humans 
and animals. In a profound sense, however, the AMC throws the baby out with the bath water 
by failing to address the importance of society in the lives of human beings.  
In accordance with my purpose to abandon anthropocentric reasoning for a more 
complex system, I proposed that moral status can be seen as having more than a single 
foundation. I argued that the connection between 'all humans' and 'some animals' is not 
necessarily justified, because there is a morally relevant difference between humans and most 
animals that cannot be captured by principle (b). The morally relevant difference is our being 
part of human society, which can be framed in terms of our bond-forming inclination. At the 
same time, I accepted Rawls' and Fox claim that animals deserve moral status, but I claimed 
that in most cases the criterion of bond-forming is irrelevant to the animal case. Thus, in most 
cases humans' moral status and animals' moral status are grounded in different foundations. 
Arguing for more than a single foundation to moral status undermines the idea of the AMC's 
conditional, and hence the charge of speciesism in such cases is unjustified. Seeing humans as 
deserving moral status but on a different foundation than that of most animals, means that in 
spite of the morally relevant difference, their case and the human case are like cases that 
should be treated alike (in proportion to their needs and interests).  
The notion of bond-forming has a great explanatory value in explicating our 
background theory regarding the moral status of humans. We live between people within 
society, and being part of human society creates a profound solidarity between human beings. 
In other words, our affiliation to human beings is an element that helps establishing the 
strength and stability of our society. My proposal regarding the notion of bond-forming is not 
independent, but a part of my critique of the AMC, and mainly the positive AMC, that I 
began to develop in chapter five. In contrast to the notion of bond-forming, the AMC is 
indifferent to our being part of human society, a whole that cannot be reduced to individual 





My proposal avoids blatant exceptions concerning moral patients and at the same 
time it is not detached from our social reality. The notion of bond-forming can explain why 
Rawls and Fox struggle to include moral patients in the moral domain. Also, using this 
notion, we do not need to manipulate the original proffered condition in order to include 
beings who do not satisfy the required condition for moral status in general or for moral status 
of a particular kind. The notion of bond-forming does not point at paradigmatic individual 
characteristics but rather signifies an element underlying human society. Accordingly, it 
enables us to approach the foundation of moral status in terms of relevance. Regarding human 
beings, I offered bond-forming as the relevant criterion. I also argued that the criterion of 
bond-forming is usually irrelevant to the case of animals, but very much in place for pets. 
Finally, I argued that my position is not speciesist. It is not based on the biological 
fact that we all belong to the same species, or on the assumption that humans are simply 
superior to animals. My separating of the human case from that of most animals was not 
meant to exclude animals from the moral domain but rather to show that human moral status 
and animal moral status usually do not rest on the same foundation. At any rate, as I 
suggested in chapter four, considering moral status as the scope of a being's high priority 
entitlements means that this scope must be protected.  
To sum up, the qualities of our social reality and the Gordian knots that it produces 
cannot be fully articulated, and cannot be analysed by a model—the AMC's conditional—that 
reduces our being into individual characteristics, and thus neutralises the context that helps 
establishing who and what we are. In other words, the sum of human society cannot be 






You realize only too well you're part of the 
desert generation. You can read this sordid  
discovery in the eyes of children, wandering 
around those bright streets which your father 
might have built and which you, with some 
luck, may someday destroy.1
 
In identifying and criticising the anthropocentric reasoning used in philosophical writing 
about animals and its implications, I aimed to point at problems that distort the debate and to 
lead towards different ways of thinking about the animal issue. My goal has not been one of 
applied ethics that sought to specify particular aspects of what we can or cannot do with 
animals in our daily lives. Rather, it aimed to scrutinise our ways of thinking about animal 
minds and animals' moral status in relation to our ways of thinking about human minds and 
humans' moral status. These ways of thinking have influenced our common assumptions and 
thus shaped both the theoretical debate and particular aspects of do's and don'ts with regard to 
animals. Accordingly, the main contribution of this project is in redefining the animal debate 
by ridding it of its predominant anthropocentric reasoning.  
Towards this aim, I have shown the ways in which the animal debate is infused with 
an anthropocentric discourse. In analysing this discourse, I have shown that its common 
strategy is to take human paradigms as the only possible standard for the attribution or 
possession of certain properties, be they mental properties such as intentionality or regulative 
properties such as moral status. Identifying this anthropocentric discourse and explaining the 
ways in which it has influenced the development of the animal debate have been at the centre 
of this dissertation.  
My account has recognised the value of human paradigms to philosophical analysis, 
but has criticised their overuse. Accordingly, I have argued that in some respects, human 
standards are too demanding. Indeed, with regard to mental abilities, such standards do not 
account for the many alleged abilities of animals (such as waylaying or hiding), and have no 
explanatory value in accounting for primitive cases of alleged intentionality (as in the cases of 
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animals and young children). Concurrently, with regard to morality, establishing a specific or 
general kind of moral status (e.g., the status of rights-holders) based on a human paradigm, 
i.e., moral agency, excludes from the relevant moral domain not only animals, but human 
moral patients as well. This outcome, I argued, is a consequence of establishing the relevant 
moral status on a single condition that consists of mental and physical characteristics that are 
applied individually. Additionally, I demonstrated that similar methodological problems occur 
in the use of the AMC.  
The methodology that I suggested, however, undermines both the strategy of 
anthropocentric reasoning and the strategy of the AMC, in which similar methodological 
problems occur. I first suggested the idea of establishing different foundations for moral status, 
and then subsequently highlighted certain characteristics of human society and its authority in 
our lives, in order to show that moral status should not necessarily be based on individual 
characteristics. Although, as I explained earlier, I did not offer a normative moral theory in 
this project, as this has not been my aim, I nonetheless demonstrated that taking animals to be 
moral patients has implications for our commitment to animals in the sense that it entails 
direct duties towards them. As this project is nearing its end, let me recapitulate how it 
unfolds.  
*** 
Anthropocentric standards emphasise the uniqueness of humans, thus enabling an arbitrary 
segregation of their case from that of animals. For instance, we have seen in the first chapter 
that Davidson attempts to distinguish between rational and a-rational animals, but he does so 
by comparing the case of normal, adult humans with the case of animals, avoiding an account 
of borderline human cases that are relevant to the animal case. Using the human prototype as 
the only possible standard leads to the development of an argument that proves what we 
already know: that to have a certain capacity in the human manner of that capacity, one has to 
be human. More specifically, in order to have a capacity in the paradigmatic human manner, 
one has to be a normal, adult human being. Arguing from an anthropocentric perspective, one 
has addressed the issue of animal mental capacities in an irrelevant manner and has not 
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addressed the relevant case at stake, i.e., that of non-paradigmatic beings—whether human or 
animal.   
 I demonstrated how arguments that are based on anthropocentric a priori reasoning 
facilitate the inattention to empirical findings. Indeed, empirical findings and scientific 
theories based on these findings may be deficient. Yet setting language as a necessary 
condition for certain abilities precludes from the outset the possibility of drawing on allegedly 
sophisticated animal behaviour. Moreover, anthropocentric a priori reasoning fails to address 
what the seemingly sophisticated behaviour of animals indicates. Rather, this reasoning 
concentrates on 'what such behaviour cannot indicate', namely, it concentrates on negating the 
possibility that animals have certain mental capacities such as beliefs. It is in reference to 
arguments based on this kind of reasoning that Singer writes, "they are attempts to do 
philosophy from the armchair, on a topic that demands investigation in the real world" (1993, 
114).  
The possibility of interpreting animal behaviour in multiple ways creates a problem 
for considering behaviour to be evidence for the existence of certain mental states in animals. 
This is a common claim that I have not attempted to refute. However, I did not set out to find 
the 'right' interpretation of empirical findings, nor to show that a certain interpretation is 
infallible. For that reason I argued that it is unnecessary for my argument for empirical 
findings to establish a high degree of certainty regarding mental capacities in animals, but 
rather it is sufficient that they have the potential to indicate certain mental capacities in 
animals. Moreover, my primary argument in this chapter was not based on empirical findings, 
but is conceptual in its nature. Recognising that animal behaviour is subject to different 
interpretations entails a significant conclusion, i.e., that we should be very cautious not only 
in concluding that certain mental capacities should be attributed to animals, but also in 
concluding that certain mental capacities should not be attributed to them.  
My account concerning the mistakes of anthropocentric reasoning demonstrated, 
firstly, that anthropocentric reasoning denies certain mental capacities to animals on the basis 
of a standard that is suitable for normal, adult human beings. Consequently, this reasoning 
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eliminates in advance the relevance of empirical findings that potentially illustrate that 
animals might have the mental capacities under examination, even before allowing any 
critical discussion regarding the correct interpretations of such findings. As I stated, although 
empirical findings are open to multiple interpretations, they have the potential to indicate of 
certain mental capacities in animals. Second, I demonstrated that anthropocentric reasoning 
confuses first-order and second-order intentional status. We saw that this confusion conveys 
the idea that animals lack putative abilities such as hiding, pretending, waylaying and others. 
Specifically, I demonstrated that Davidson did not manage to show that animals lack beliefs. 
Third, I showed that the explanatory value of anthropocentric reasoning is rather low in 
accounting for the gradual process of acquiring certain mental states in humans, and, in the 
case of Davidson, even for language. Thus, the explanatory value of this reasoning is low with 
regard to human beings as well. Finally, I illustrated the low explanatory value of 
anthropocentric reasoning in relation to a competing a priori account.  
In the second chapter, I demonstrated that another consequence of anthropocentric 
reasoning is the presence of a double standard of doubt. I argued against the asymmetry thesis 
between humans and animals with regard to our ability to determine the content of intentional 
states. Analysing this issue from both the epistemological and the conceptual perspectives, I 
showed that once we deal with unarticulated intentional states, there is symmetry between 
humans and animals with respect to determinacy of content. Here we faced again the 
influence of anthropocentric reasoning, in that it leads one to work with the human paradigm 
of 'language user', leaving unaddressed the relevant issue regarding unarticulated intentional 
states of both humans and animals. We saw that the actual doubt in the animal case is a 
consequence of working from the human paradigm, i.e., of setting the standard of language-
based intentional states. This standard, however, is irrelevant to the animal case. Thus, I 
concluded that the actual doubt with regard to animal intentionality is unjustified. 
Alternatively, when comparing the animal case with the case of unarticulated intentionality in 
humans, I concluded that if there is a good reason to employ actual doubt in the animal case, 
then there is a good reason to do so in the relevant human cases as well.  
 230 
 
The implications of anthropocentric reasoning go beyond the issue of mental 
capacities, and affect an arbitrary segregation between the human case and the animal case 
regarding moral status. As we saw in chapter three, basing moral status upon human 
paradigms characterises moral status in terms of moral agency. For instance, we saw that Kant 
takes reason to be a necessary condition for moral consideration, but avoids discussing the 
consequences for marginal cases, i.e., for humans who are not moral agents, which based on 
his account cannot be considered moral entities.  
The distinction between moral agency and moral patience is well-established in the 
literature, especially since Bentham's seminal remark that what is relevant to moral 
consideration is not the ability to reason or to talk, but rather the ability to suffer (1789, 
Chapter 17, 283n). My aim in employing the distinction between moral agency and moral 
patience, however, was to demonstrate how anthropocentric reasoning fails to properly 
address this distinction. Towards this end, I pointed out that anthropocentric reasoning 
equates moral agency with moral status by shifting the discussion from the differences 
between moral agency and moral patience to the differences between human beings and 
animals. A main conclusion in the third chapter was that as a consequence of characterising 
moral status in terms of moral agency, anthropocentric reasoning has not managed to show 
that animals are not moral patients. Rather, once again, anthropocentric reasoning shows us 
what we already know, i.e., that animals are not moral agents. Not being a moral agent, 
however, is an insufficient reason to exclude animals from the moral domain. This is also true 
with regard to humans who are not moral agents, but, significantly, in the cases that I 
analysed, we saw that human paradigm-based conditions are implicitly converted to collective 
conditions and thus all people are included in the relevant moral domain, whether or not they 
are moral agents.  
However, basing a particular moral status on moral agency does not necessarily 
exclude animals from the moral community entirely. For instance, we saw in chapter four that 
based on animals' ability to suffer and experience well-being, both Rawls and Fox see animals 
as deserving moral status. Thus, not being part of the social contract does not mean, for Rawls, 
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that animals are not morally considerable, whereas for Fox, not being rights-holders does not 
mean that animals are not moral patients. I showed, however, that according to both Rawls 
and Fox, it appears that humans are under no serious obligation to ensure animals' well-being. 
In contrast to Fox, the animal issue is not central in Rawls' theory of justice since his main 
and legitimate interest is in human society. However, Rawls does relate to the animal issue, 
and my critique focused on his arguments in this respect. The main problem that I identified 
in his account, as well as in Fox's account, is that animal well-being is conditioned by the 
needs and interests of human beings. Consequently, both positions converge into the Kantian 
conception of indirect duties, i.e., duties that are directed towards human beings, but are 
mediated via animals. 
I argued that moral status primarily provides a measure of security and protection. 
Thus, I proposed that moral status should be formulated on the basis of minimal standards 
concerning basic entitlements of beings, and that consequently those standards are of high 
priority. Moral status thus determines the scope to which one's well-being should be 
considered, and if animals' moral status is to have a minimal force, then it must involve direct 
duties of humans towards animals.  In other words, I demonstrated how the accounts of Rawls 
and Fox (as any account that aims to substantiate its recognition that animals are morally 
considerable) must involve direct duties of humans towards animals in order to secure 
animals' well-being. 
Although neither Rawls nor Fox have excluded animals from the moral community, 
they separate humans and animals in an unsatisfying way via their anthropocentric reasoning. 
That is, they exclude animals from a particular moral domain, but not human moral patients, 
although neither satisfy the required conditions. Similarly to Kant and Carruthers, they do not 
successfully match the human paradigm-based conditions for the particular moral domain 
with the case of human moral patients, and thus include human moral patients in the specific 
moral domain using the conditions in a collective manner. For instance, for Fox, we saw that 
human moral patients cannot satisfy the condition for moral rights, namely, the condition of 
autonomy. Nonetheless, Fox considers all humans as having moral rights because they belong 
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to a species in which autonomy is the typical case. This transition to a collective-based 
condition marks a significant divergence from his original individual-based condition. 
In reply to anthropocentric reasoning, the AMC aims to integrate the cases of humans 
and animals through an emphasis on the similarities between them by drawing upon marginal 
cases. In chapter five, I identified the AMC's conditional, i.e., that if all human beings deserve 
moral status, then so do some animals. Formulating this conditional, I avoided the need to 
examine particular AMCs, and made it possible to examine the main idea underlying this type 
of argument. The AMC has a significant value in enabling us to rethink the issue of moral 
consideration. Yet the reasoning underlying the AMC reduces the depth of morality into a 
common denominator, a broad criterion that is allegedly shared by all members of the moral 
community. In that sense, the AMC also oversimplifies the nature of the inquiry into moral 
status; like traditional arguments and anthropocentric reasoning, the AMC takes moral status 
to be based on a single foundation, and is concentrated on individual characteristics. 
Accordingly, I argued that relying on the AMC alone, and especially relying exclusively on 
the positive AMC, cannot lead us towards a satisfying explanatory system regarding the 
criteria of moral status. 
In order to show that a single broad criterion does not account for all cases, I provided 
examples to demonstrate the susceptibility of such criteria to significant exceptions. In other 
words, the examples regarding the dead and regarding relational value were meant to 
demonstrate the deficiency of the broad conditions for moral considerablitiy offered by Singer 
and Regan. It is possible to consider my example with regard to the dead as based on intuitive 
conviction. Yet, whereas I attempted to justify the moral practice of respecting the dead, the 
reasoning that I criticised excluded the dead from the moral domain without justification. The 
same goes for the example of relational value with regard to parents and children. Although 
this example supports partiality to a certain extent, I did not argue that these relationships are 
immune to impartial considerations. Also, I did not argue that partial considerations always 
prevail over impartial ones. However, whereas I attempted to justify consideration of the 
partial viewpoint, Singer and Regan did not address this issue.  
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As I noted earlier, traditional reasoning and anthropocentric reasoning on the one 
hand and the AMC on the other, both concentrate on individual characteristics as underlying 
the conditions of moral status, and aim to establish the proffered moral status on a single 
foundation—features that oversimplify the nature of the inquiry. In response to these views, I 
suggested a position that would lead us towards a system of morality that is not detached from 
our social reality. I suggested approaching moral status as complex right from the beginning; 
that is, to establish moral statuses on more than a single foundation in accordance with the 
relevance of the given foundation to our social reality.  
As we saw in chapter six, the bond-forming inclination of humans underlies the 
background theory according to which we consider all humans as deserving moral status. This 
background theory is reflected in our social reality and moral practice. We live our lives in the 
context of human society, and this cannot be easily reduced, if at all, to individual 
characteristics such as reason, autonomy, or sentience. For instance, I argued that we do not 
attribute to the senile the entitlement to respectful treatment because of their capacity for 
rational judgment, since they do not posses this capacity. Thus, the notion of bond-forming 
provides us a new perspective regarding the conditions of moral status in that it relates to 
individuals within society as a whole that cannot simply be dissembled into separate 
components while still maintaining the same value. 
Thus, in the case of human beings I suggested the element of bond-forming as the 
relevant criterion of moral status, and argued that this criterion is not detached from our social 
reality and moral practice. The criterion of bond-forming has great explanatory value in 
showing why we tend not to divide between human moral agents and human moral patients, 
i.e., in showing why we include human moral patients in the same moral community. In this 
regard, I demonstrated how the notion of bond-forming can illuminate Rawls' and Fox' 
struggle to include humans who are not moral agents in their proffered moral domain. 
Explaining human moral status using the notion of bond-forming also precludes the blatant 
exceptions that I pointed out in the views that I criticised. This is because the notion of bond-
forming, in contrast to anthropocentric reasoning and to the reasoning of the AMC, does not 
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rest on mental and/or physical properties; properties that are never shared by all those who 
deserve moral status. This result is also a consequence of approaching moral status as a 
complex concept, a framework in which one is not committed to a single, even if broad, 
condition, that allegedly can be applied to all those who deserve moral status. Accordingly, 
animals can be included in the proffered moral domain using criteria that are different from 
the criterion of bond-forming. I suggested that the criteria offered by Singer and Regan might 
be very relevant to the animal cases, although I did not attempt to justify this (in accordance 
with my primary aim in this project, which was not to justify animal moral status but to 
critically examine the anthropocentric reasoning embedded in the animal issue and to 
demonstrate its implications).  
In accordance with my critical approach, my main aim in chapter six was to examine 
the consequences of refuting the AMC's conditional. I demonstrated that in contrast to the 
AMC's reasoning, it is possible to refute the AMC's conditional without maintaining a 
speciesist view. That is, I showed that separating the human case from the animals case does 
not necessarily express speciesism. This became possible since I undermined the idea of the 
AMC's conditional by abandoning the reasoning that seeks a single foundation for moral 
status that is based only on individual characteristics. I claimed that being part of human 
society makes a morally relevant difference that can be underpinned by our bond-forming 
inclination. 
Thus, the notion of bond-forming also explains the reason for which we tend to 
separate humans from animals in respect to morality. However, the criterion of bond-forming 
does not represent a speciesist position for two reasons: first, because this criterion is 
applicable to pets, and second, since my account is not bound to a single condition, the 
criterion of bond-forming does not exclude non-pets from the moral community. In most 
cases bond-forming cannot serve as the relevant criterion for the inclusion of most animals in 
the moral community, because usually animals are not part of our social reality in a way that 
would be relevant to the notion of bond-forming. At any rate, again, I argued that other 
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criteria are available for including non-pet animals in the moral community, a situation 
enabled by basing moral status on more than a single condition.  
Although the criterion of bond-forming distinguishes the human case from the animal 
case to a large degree, my account is not biased against either humans or animals but rather, it 
enables protecting both humans and animals. First, my account demonstrated that 
anthropocentric reasoning did not manage to show that animals are not moral patients. Second, 
relying on Rawls' and Fox' agreement that animals are moral patients, I argued that in order to 
substantiate their moral status, humans should have direct duties towards animals. Finally, as I 
mentioned earlier, in order to substantiate any moral status of both humans and animals, I 
proposed to formulate minimal thresholds that would secure basic needs and interests from 
being frustrated on a regular basis. This is meant to prevent unjustified biases. So, all things 
being equal, when one's basic needs and interests are at stake, they should not be available to 
frustration. This also means that human moral status does not necessarily prevail over animal 
moral status and that human moral status does not subjugate animal moral status. In that sense, 
formulating minimal thresholds represents the impartial viewpoint. I acknowledged the 
importance of the partial viewpoint, but I also claimed that the question of whether and when 
certain needs and interest prevail over others is mainly relevant beyond the minimal 
thresholds. 
*** 
Identifying the anthropocentric reasoning and its implications, including its implications for 
arguments that see animals as moral patients, uncovered basic mistakes that markedly shaped 
the common ways of approaching the animal issue. Abandoning this reasoning is significant 
for promoting the philosophical inquiry regarding the animal issue and moving it towards new 
horizons—both with regard to the theoretical debate and with regard to our moral practice. 
Departing from the reasoning that I criticised is important not only for the animal issue, but 




My account provides us with new ways of thinking about the animal debate. I argued 
that anthropocentric reasoning distinguishes humans from animals in an unjustified way. Note, 
however, that my main contention was not as much against separating animals from humans 
as against the particular ways in which this separation was carried out. This is true both with 
regard to the animal mind debate and the debate concerning animal moral status. In contrast to 
the methodology that seeks a single condition for moral status, I suggested a framework that 
acknowledges different foundations for moral statuses. On the one hand, within this 
framework we are not forced to set a very broad condition to include both humans and 
animals, and on the other hand we are not compelled to approach the debate in absolute terms 
of 'us' (humans) and 'them' (animals). In fact, the criterion of bond-forming that I suggested 
manages to include human moral patients in the moral domain without separating their case 
from that of moral agents. In that sense, this specific part of my account can be seen as 
adjusting the accounts of Rawls and Fox, in that it provides a proper criterion for including 
human moral patients in the moral community. This was possible both because I used a 
criterion not based on individual characteristics, and because I am not committed to 
establishing moral status on a single, human paradigm-based condition. Thus, in contrast to 
Rawls, Fox and Kant, I did not have to ambiguously convert the criterion for moral status 
from an individual-based condition to a collective condition in order to include human moral 
patients in a certain moral domain. 
My account interacts with (and hence is influenced by) social reality, and yet it is not 
subordinate to it. Thus, my account can accommodate social change. While I argued that the 
criterion of bond-forming applies to our relationships with pets, it is indeed possible that one 
day—following a social change—the criterion of bond-forming will be applicable to other 
animals, such as apes. This possibility represents another merit of my proposal: its flexibility 
is harmonious with a view that reflects an understanding of morality as a concept constantly 
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